again upon Occafion, even when the Objects that first produced them are removed. Now our Ideas are nothing else but thefe renewed Reprefentations of what we have at any time perceived and felt, by means of which, things are again brought under the View of the Mind, and feem to have a kind of Exiftence in it. It is true, we can upon many Occafions combine our Ideas varioufly together, and thereby form to ourfelves Reprefentations of things that never had an Existence in Nature, as when we fancy a Centaur, or a Golden Mountain; but it is ftill certain, that the original Ideas out of which these are made, are fuch as have been conveyed into the Mind by fome former Impreffions. It remains therefore to enquire, how we came by our first Notions and Perceptions of things. Whence does the Understanding derive thofe original Impreffions and Characters, which it can combine in fo many different Ways, and reprefent to itself under fuch infinite Varieties? To this I anfwer, that if we attend carefully to what paffes in our own Minds, we fhall obferve two Inlets of Knowledge, from whence, as from two Fountains, the Underftanding is fupplied with all the Materials of thinking. II. FIRST, outward Objects, acting upon our Senfes, roufe in us a Variety of Perceptions, according to the different manner in which they It is thus that we come by the Ideas All cur original Id as derived either from Senfation: affect us. of Light and Darkness, Heat and Cold, Sweet and Bitter, and all thofe other Impreflions which we term fenfible Qualities. This great Source and Inlet of Knowledge, is commonly diftinguifhed by the Name of Senfation, as comprehending all the Notices conveyed into the Mind, by Impulfes made upon the Organs of Senfe. III. BUT thefe Ideas, numerous as they are, Or Reflection. are wholly derived to us from without; there is therefore yet another Source of Impreffions, arifing from the Mind's Attention to its own Acts, when turning inwards upon itfelf, it takes a View of the Percep tions that are lodged there, and the various Ways in which it employs itself about them. For the Ideas furnished by the Senfes, give the Mind an Opportunity of exerting its feveral Powers; and as all our Thoughts, under whatever Form they appear, are attended with Confcioufnefs, hence the Impreffions they leave, when we come to turn the Eye of the Soul upon them, enrich the Understanding with a new Set of Perceptions, no lefs diftinct than thofe conveyed in by the Senfes. Thus it is that we get Ideas of Thinking, Doubting Doubting, Believing, Willing, &c. which are the different Acts and Workings of our Minds, reprefented to us by our own Conscioufnels. This fecond Source of Ideas is called Reflection, and evidently prefuppofes Senfation, as the Impreffions it furnishes, are only of the various Powers of the Understanding, employed about Perceptions already in the Mind. Rife and Pro Knowledge. gress of buman IV. THESE Confiderations, if we duly attend to them, will give us a clear and diftinct View of the natural Procedure of the human Intellect, in its Advances to Knowledge. We can have no Perception of the Operations of our own Minds until they are exerted; nor can they be exerted before the Understanding is furnished with Ideas about which to employ them; and as thefe Ideas, that give the first Employment to our Faculties, are evidently the Perceptions of Sente, it is plain, that all our Knowledge muft begin here. This then is the firft Capacity of the human Mind, that it is fitted to receive the Impreffions made upon it by outward Objects affecting the Senfes; which Impreffions thus derived into the Understanding, and there lodged for the View of the Soul, employ it in various Acts of Perceiving, Remembering, Confidering, &c. all which are attended with an internal Feeling and Confciousness. And this leads us to the fecond Step the Mind takes in its Progrefs towards Knowledge, viz. that it can by its own Confcioufnefs reprefent to itself these its feveral Workings and Operations, and thereby furnish the Understanding with a new Stock of Ideas. From these fimple Beginnings, all our Difcoveries take their Rife; for the Mind thus provided with its original Characters and Notices of things, has a Power of combining, modifying, and examining them in an infinite Variety of Lights, by which means it is enabled to enlarge the Objects of its Perception, and finds itself poffeffed of an inexhauftible Stock of Materials. It is in the various Comparison of these Ideas, according to fuch Combinations of them as feem beft to fuit its Ends, that the Understanding exerts itself in the Acts of Judging and Reafoning, by which the capacious Mind of Man pushes on its Views of Things, adds Discovery to Difcovery, and often extends its Thoughts beyond the utmoft Bounds of the Universe. Thus we fee as it were at one Glance, the whole Progrefs of the Soul, from the very first Dawnings of Perception, till it reaches the Perfection of human Knowledge; nor fhall we, among all its vaft Stock of Difcoveries, or that infinite Variety of Conceptions where of of they confift, be able to find one original Idea which is not derived from Senfation or Reflection, or one complex Idea, which is not made up of thofe original ones. Divifion of our Ideas into fimple and V. HAVING thus fhewn how the Mind comes to be firft furnished with Ideas, we fhall next proceed to the Confideration of the Ideas themcomplex. felves, and endeavour to give fuch an Account of them, as will beft ferve to explain their several Appearances, and the Manner in which they are formed. It is evident from what has been faid above, that they all fall naturally under these two Heads, Firft, thofe original Impreffions that are conveyed into the Mind by Senfation and Reflection, and which exift there fimple, uniform, and without any Shadow of Variety. Secondly, thofe more complex Notions of Things that refult from the various Combinations of our fimple Ideas, whether they are conceived to coexift of themselves in any particular Subject, or are united and joined together by the Mind, enlarging its Conceptions of Things, and pursuing the Ends and Purposes of Knowledge. These two Claffes comprehend our whole Stock of Ideas; and when confidered feparately in that Order, wherein they moft naturally feem to offer themfelves to our Thoughts, will, I hope, give fuch a View of the Conduct and Manner of the Mind, as may contribute not a little to introduce us to an Acquaintance with ourfelves, and make us fenfible of the Capacity and Extent of the human Intellect. We proceed therefore to a more particular Account of this Divifion of our Ideas. Simple Ideas what. IT CHA P. II. Of Simple Ideas. HE firft Clafs of our Ideas are those which I diftinguifh by the Name of fimple Perceptions; because they exift in the Mind under one uniform Appearance, without Vaicty or Compofition. For though external Objects, convey at once into the Understanding, many different Ideas all united together, and making as it were one Whole; yet the Impreffions themselves are evidently diftinct, and are conceived by the Mind, cach under a Form peculiar to itself. Thus Thus the Ideas of Colour, Extenfion, and Motion, may be taken in at one and the fame Time, from the fame Body; yet these three Perceptions are as diftinct in themselves, as if they all proceeded from different Objects, or were exhibited to our Notice at different Times. We are therefore carefully to diftinguish between our fimple and primitive Conceptions, and thofe different Combinations of them, which are often fuggefted to the Mind, by fingle Objects acting upon it. The first conftitute our original Notices of Things, and are not diftinguishable into different Ideas, but enter by the Senfes fimple and unmixed. They are also the Materials out of which all the others, how complex and complicated foever, are formed; and therefore ought defervedly to be looked on as the Foundation and Ground-work of our Knowledge. Simple Ideas of Senfa tion. II. Now if we take a Survey of thefe Ideas, and their several Divifions and Claffes, we fhall find them all fuggefted to us, either by our Senfes, or the Attention of the Mind to what paffes within itself. Thus our Notices of the different Qualities of Bodies, are all of the Kind we call fimple Ideas, and may be reduced to five general Heads, according to the feveral Organs which are affected by them. Colours, &c. and Sounds are conveyed in by the Eyes and Ears; Taftes, and Smells by the Nose and Palate; and Heat, Cold, and Solidity, &c. by the Touch. Besides thefe, there are others which make Impreffions on feveral of our Senfes, as Extenfion, Figure, Reft and Motion, &c. the Ideas of which we receive into our Minds both by feeing and feeling. III. IF we next turn our View upon what pafies within ourselves, we fhall find another Set of fimple Ideas, arifing from our Confcioufnefs of the Acts and Operations of our own Minds. Perception or Thinking, and Volition or Willing, are what every Man experiments in himself, and cannot avoid being fenfible of. I fhall only obferve farther, that befides all the above-mentioned Perceptions, there are others that come into our Minds by all the Ways of Senfation and Reflection; fuch are the Ideas of Pleafure and Pain, Power, Exiftence, Unity, Succeffion, &c. which are derived into our Under ftandings, both by the Action of Objects without us, and the Consciousness of what we feel within. It is true fome of these Ideas, as of Extenfion and Duration, cannot be conceived altogether without Parts; nevertheless they are justly rank'd among our fimple Ideas; because their Parts being Simple Ideas of Reflections &c. all all of the fame Kind, and without the Mixture of any other Idea, neither of them can be refolved into two diftinct and separate Conceptions: Thus they ftill answer the Definition given above, of being one uniform Appearance in the Mind, without Variety or Plurality. But to prevent confounding our fimple Ideas of Space and Duration, with those complex Modes of them, marked out by the feveral Measures commonly in Ufe, as Yards, Miles, Days, Years, &c. it may perhaps be more proper, to confider the leaft Portions of either, whereof we can form a clear and diftinct Perception, as the fimple Ideas of that kind, out of which all their other Modes and Combinations are formed. Such an Inftant, or Point, may be conceived to be the fame in refpect of Duration or Space, as Unity is in refpect of Number; and will ferve beft to fhew, how by a continued Addition or Repetition, our more enlarged and complex Ideas are made up. Simple Ideas bave no Admiffion but by the proper InLets of Nature. IV. HAVING thus given a general View of our fimple Ideas, I have ftill two Obfervations to make concerning them. The firft is, that they are fuch as can only be conveyed into the Mind by the proper Channels and Avenues provided by Nature; infomuch that if we are deftitute of any of those Inlets, by which the Impreffions that produce them are wont to be admitted, all the Ideas thence arifing are abfolutely loft to us; nor can we, by any Quicknefs of Understanding, find a Remedy for this Want. A Man born blind, is incapable of the Ideas of Light and Colours; in like manner as one who is deaf, can form no Notion or Conception of Sound. Hence it appears, that these our fimple Ideas are just such as Nature has furnished them, and have no Dependence on our Will; we can neither destroy them when in the Underftanding, nor fashion or invent any new one, not taken in by the ordinary means of Perception. So that we here fee the utmoft Bounds of human Knowledge, which however mighty and enlarged, cannot exceed the Limits of thefe our fimple original Ideas, and their various Combinations. rials of V. AND this leads me to the fecond ObThey furnish fervation I propofed to make, which is, that ample Mate- though the Mind cannot, in multiplying its ConKnowledge. ceptions of Things, advance one Pace beyond the Materials furnished it by Senfe and Confcioufnefs; yet as it has a Power of combining, modifying and enlarging them, in all the different Ways in which they can be put together, it thereby finds itfelf in Poffeffion of an inexhauftible Treafure of Ideas, fufficient to em ploy |