how we conduct ourselves amidst fo great a Variety, and by what Rules we proceed, in making thofe Combinations, to which we have affixed particular Names, while others perhaps, no lefs obvious, are neglected. The Idea of Killing for Inftance, joined to that of a Father, makes a diftinct Species of Action, known by the Name of Parricide. It was doubtless as obvious, to diftinguish between the killing of an old Man, and a Child, which yet we find is not done, both thefe Actions being comprehended under the general Name of Murder. By what Views therefore does the Mind regulate thefe its Combinations? Why is it determined to one Collection of Ideas rather than another? This cannot be well underftood, without obferving, that it is the End of Language to communicate our Thoughts one to another. Words are the Signs of our Ideas, and ferve to exprefs the Conceptions of the Mind. Now it is apparent, that fuch Conceptions, as are most apt to occur in the Commerce of Life, would be firft diftinguished by particular Names; the frequent Occasion Men have, of mentioning these among themfelves, rendering this abfolutely neceffary. But as many of thefe Conceptions are Collections of different fimple Ideas, hence we are infenfibly led, to fuch peculiar Combinations, as are most ferviceable to Purposes of mutual Intercourfe and Communica tion. Ideas of bu man Allions often formed before the Actions themfelves exift. XVI. LET us fuppose, in the first Beginnings of Society, a Company of Legiflators met together, in order to confult of proper Regulations, for the Government of the Community. If they are Men of Prudence and Forefight, they will naturally obferve many new Occurrences likely to arife, from this Coalition of Mankind, and their living together in Crowds. Perhaps the Age in which they live, has not produced an Inftance of one Man's killing another; yet from the Knowledge of their own Frame, and their Power of doing Hurt, they conceive this as a poffible Cafe, and are willing to provide against it. Thus all the Ideas that enter into the complex one of Murder, are brought together, and united into one Conception, before the Action itfelf really exifts. It is not however thought neceffary, to take into Confideration the Age of the Perfon, the chief thing in View being to prevent the putting an End to another's Life unjustly, whether old or young; and therefore the Penalty equally affects both Cafes. But when they come to confider the Relation, in which the Perfon killed may ftand to the Murderer, here there appears a manifeft Difference, as it adds to D 2 the Book I. the Crime when committed upon a Benefactor, and renders it particularly heinous in the Cafe of a Father. This laft therefore, is made to conftitute a diftinct Species of Action, and has a peculiar Punishment allotted to it. Thus we fee, how Men, according to their different Manner of Life, and the Relations they fland in to one another, are naturally led , to form feveral Collections of fimple Ideas, preferably to others, as forefeeing they may have frequent Occafion, to take Notice of fuch precife Combinations. And because it would be tedious in Converfation, every time thefe complex Notions occur, to enumerate all the Ideas of which they confift; therefore, for the Sake of Eafe and Difpatch, they give them particular Names, and thereby render the Compofitions fixed and permanent. The Neceffity of mutual Intercourfe, and Mens particu XVII. THAT it is in this Manner we come by our complex Ideas, which multiply upon us, according as the Exigencies of Society require, or our Purfuits, Method of Life, and different Aims, lar Aims in Life, a great throw Occafions in our Way, of combining fuch Source of com and fuch Perceptious together, might be easily plex Ideas. made appear, by a fhort View of the Combinations themselves. Human Actions, as occurring most frequently, and affording large Matter of Converfation, Debate, and Enquiry among Men, have been very nicely modified, and diftinguished into Claffes, according to the feveral Circumstances moft likely to attend them. In like manner, the Arts and Sciences, in proportion as they are cultivated, leading us into many compound Views of things, which otherwife would never offer themselves to the Confideration of the Mind; the complex Ideas of this Sort, with the Names by which they are expreffed, are we find, the Work of fuch particular Nations, where these Arts and Sciences have chiefly flourished. The Greeks for Inftance, excelled in Learning and polite Knowledge; hence many of the Terms belonging to Rhetorick, Poetry, Philofophy, Phyfick, &c. come originally from their Language. Modern Fortification has received its greatest Improvements among the French; and accordingly, the Ideas and Terms of the Art, are mostly derived from Writers of that Nation. In Italy; Architecture, Mufick, and Painting, have been the great Exercise of the Men of Genius: it is therefore among them, that we find the feveral complex Notions, belonging to thefe Parts of Study, as well as the Names by which they are expreffed; nor can we difcourfe accurately and minutely of the above-mentioned Arts, without having Recourfe to the Lan guage guage of that Climate. And if we defcend into the particular Callings and Profeflions of Men, they have all their peculiar Collections of Ideas, diftinguished by their several Names, and hardly known,, but to fuch as are converfant in that manner of Life. Thus Calcination, Cohobation, Filtration, &c. are Words ftanding for complex Ideas, frequently framed in the Minds of Chymifts, and therefore familiar to Men of that Employment. Yet as thefe, and fuch like Combinations, feldom occur in common Life, the Generality of Mankind we fee, are in a great meafure unacquainted with them. Hence different Sets of them prevail in different Coun tries, and Words in oneLanguage bave none to anfer them in another: XVIII. I MIGHT purfue thefe Speculations farther, and fhew how the feveral Fashions, Cuftoms, and Manners of one Nation, leading them to form many complex Notions, which come not fo naturally in the way of another; different Sets of Ideas prevail in different Countries, and of courfe have Names appropriated to them in one Language, to which there are no Words that answer in another. The Procedure and Forms of our Courts of Juftice, have introduced many Térms into the English Law, which ftand for Collections of Ideas, framed among no other People. Nor would it be poffible to render thefe Terms, by any fingle Words of another Language; because where the Ideas themselves prevail not, there are no Names provided to exprefs them. In this Cafe therefore, it becomes neceffary to ufe Circumlocutions, and enumerate the feveral Ideas comprehended in the Collection, if we would fo exprefs ourselves, as to be understood in the Language of other Nations. Nay, even among the fame People, the Change of Cuftoms and Opinions frequently brings new Sets of Ideas, which of courfe must be diftinguifhed by particular Names, while at the fame time, the Notions of former Ages grow into Difufe, and the Words anfwering them are either wholly laid afide, or employed in a Signification different from what they had before. XIX. THUS Languages are in a perpetual This too the Flux, and by degrees vary fo much from their original Frame, as to become unintelligible, even to the Defcendents of thofe who fpeak them. If we run back into the Ages of Chivalry in Eng-: land, when Tilts and Tournaments were in Fashion; how many complex Ideas, peculiar to that Mode of Life, fhall we find familiar among the Men of thofe Times, which are now little known or attended to? On the contrary, the Improve D 3 Caufe that Languages ard in a per pertal Flax. ments Book I. ments in Arts and Sciences, that have fince taken place, have led us into innumerable Views of Things, to which our Forefathers were perfect Strangers. But I fhall not push these Reflections any farther, believing that what has been faid, will be fufficient to fhew, the Original and Progress of our compound Ideas, and how the Mind is directed in the Choice of the Combinations it makes. We therefore proceed to the Confideration of abftract Ideas, which make the Subject of the following Section. General Ideas formed by the Abftration of the Mind, SECT. II. Of Abstract or Univerfal Ideas. I. H TAVING difpatched what was neceffary to be faid, concerning our compound Ideas, confidered merely as they are Combinations of the Understanding, it is now time to explain how we come by our general Notions, which ferve to reprefent to us a Multitude of Individuals, and are the Standards by which we rank Things into Sorts. And this, as we have before intimated, is done by the Abftraction of the Mind; which Act may be extended to all our Ideas, whether fimple, compound, or of Subftances. If for Inftance, we fix our Attention on any particular Colour, as Scarlet, we can leave out the Confideration of all prefent Circumftances, as the Subject in which it inheres, the Time and Place of feeing it, &c. and retaining only the Impreflion itself, make it a Reprefentative of that Quality or Appearance, wherever we chance to meet with it. It is thus that abftract and univerfal Ideas are framed; for the Mind regarding only the fcarlet Colour, which one Day it obferves perhaps in a Piece of Cloth, another in a Picture, and a third in the Rainbow; the Appearance is conceived to be the fame in all thefe Objects, and therefore is called by the fame Name. All the Perceptions of the Understanding particular. II. BUT to enter a little more closely into this Matter, and fhew that these our general Conceptions are the mere Creatures of the Underftanding; it may not be amifs to take notice, that all our Perceptions of Things, whether we derive them them from Senfation or Reflection, are of their own Nature particular, and reprefent to us fingle determinate Objects. When we fee a Horfe, for Inftance, in the Fields, our Idea is that of an Individual. If we hear a Sound, it is fomething particular, and different from what we hear at any other time. Every Perception of the Mind is diftinct from every other Perception; nay, and every Idea brought into view by the Imagination, as when we frame the Image of a Lion ftanding before us, is ftill fingular, and reprefents a single Object. The Idea of the Species reprefents what different In is common to dividuals. III. BUT when we come to take a View of thefe feveral Particulars, we readily obferve among fome of them a Refemblance, and framing to ourfelves an Idea of thofe Things, in which any of them are found to agree, we thereby get a general Notion, applicable to many Individuals. Thus Horfes are found to refemble one another, in Shape, Voice, and Structure of Parts. The Idea which takes in only the Particulars of this Refemblance, excluding what is peculiar to each fingle Animal, becomes of courfe common to all Creatures of that Kind, and is therefore the Reprefentative of a whole Clafs of Beings. Accordingly the Name of that general Idea, is given to every Animal, in which that Shape, Voice, and Structure is found; for the Word Horfe, implying only thefe Particulars, muft belong to all Creatures wherein they exift. This is the firft Step or Gradation in the forming of abstract Notions, when the Mind confines itself to the Confideration of Individuals, and frames an Idea that comprehends fuch only under it. The Rank or Clafs of Things anfwering to this Idea, is called Species in the Language of the Schools. So a Horfe is a certain Species of Animals, an Oak is a Species of Trees, and a Square is a Species of fourfided Figures. The Idea of the Genus re prefents what feverat Spe 1s common to cles. IV. WHEN we have thus learnt to rank Individuals into Sorts and Claffes according to the Refemblance found among them, the Mind proceeds next to confider the Species themfelves, and often in these too obferves a certain Likenefs. Whereupon throwing out all thofe Particulars, wherein the feveral Species are found to disagree, and retaining only fuch as are common to them all, we thereby frame a ftill more general Idea, comprehending under it a Variety of different Species. Thus a Sparrow, a Hawk, an Eagle, &c. are diftinct Species of Birds, which have each their peculiar Shape and Make. They nevertheless resemble |