Book I. one another, in being covered with Feathers, and provided with Wings, that bear them through the Air. Out of these Particulars we form a new Idea, including all the common Properties of the feathered Kind, and appropriating to it the Name Bird, mark by that Word, another Class of Things, of a higher Order than any of the former. This fuperior Divifion, which extends to several Species at once, is called in the Schools the Genus, and is the second Step the Mind takes in advancing to universal Notions.

The Mind may advanre by manifold Gradations, in rising from Particulars to Generals.

V. AND thus have I given a short, but I hope intelligible Account, of the Business of Genera and Species, about which so much has been faid in the Writings of Logicians. Species in Strictness and Propriety of Speech, is fuch a Rank or Class of Things, as comprehends under it only Individuals; Genus advances ftill higher, and takes in a Variety of distinct Species. It is however to be observed, that the Mind, in rifing from Particulars to Generals, does not confine itself to one or two Gradations, but may carry its Views through the whole Extent of Things, until at length it arrive at an Idea, embracing the univerfal Compass of Nature. For when we have ranked Things into Sorts, and reduced these again to the higher Order or Genus, these Genera are still found to resemble one another in fome Particulars; which being collected into one Idea, form a new and more comprehenfive Divifion of Things. Thus Bird is a Genus, embracing all the Varieties of the feathered Kind. Fish implies the several Species of living Creatures which inhabit the Waters. Quadruped and Infect are also univerfal Ideas, that take in many inferior Distributions and Claffes. Yet all these different Orders of Being, have this in common; that they are provided with organical Bodies, fitted for the Purposes of Life and spontaneous Motion. An Idea therefore comprehending only these laft Particulars, will equally belong to all the Divifions before enumerated, and the Word Animal, by which it is expressed, becomes a general Name for the several Creatures indued with Life, Senfe, and spontaneous Motion. If we are for carrying our Views still farther, and framing a yet more univerfal Notion, we can caft our Eyes upon both the animate and inanimate Parts of Nature; wherein we find this mutual Correfpondence, that they exist and continue in Being. This last Idea therefore of Being in general, comprehends under it all the Varieties of Things, and may be univerfally applied to whatever has çither Life or Existence; fo that in respect of the present Frame

RE

D

C

Frame of Nature, it is the highest and most universal Idea

we have.

Whence many
intermediate
Steps between
the bigbest
Genus and
lovest Species.

VI. In this Series of Notions, rifing one above another in the Degree of Universality; that Divifion, which comprehends under it several Genera, is called in the Schools the higher Genus; which Denomination continues, until we arrive at the last Advance of the Understanding, when being come to the most general of all Ideas, that admits not of a fuperior, it is diftinguished by the Name of the Genus generaliffimum. In like manner, the feveral Genera comprehended under a higher Genus, are in respect of it confidered as Species; and as these last too have Species under them, the inferior Divisions, are for Distinction's fake termed lower Species. Thus the Progreffion continues, and when we come to the lowest Subdivision of all, comprehending only Individuals, which as I have before intimated, conftitutes the proper Species, this the Schools denominate the Species specialissima. All that lie between it and the highest Diftribution of Things, are the intermediate Genera and Species, which are termed each in their turn, Genus generalius, or Species specialior, according as we confider them in the afcending or defcending Scale of our Ideas; or, to speak in the Language of Logicians, according to their Afcent or Defcent in Linea prædicamentali. I should not have entered so far into these verbal Difquifitions, had not the Terms here explained, been fuch as frequently occur in the Writings of Philosophers; infomuch that without some Knowledge of them, we must often be at a Loss, in the Prosecution of these Studies. Besides, it is both curious and useful, to fee the gradual Progress of the Mind, in its Advances from particular to general Conceptions; to observe it ranging its Ideas into Claffes, and establishing a just and regular Subordination in its Views and Notices of Things. This is the shortest Way to Knowledge, and affords the best Means of preferving the Order and due Connection of our Thoughts, so as to make them fubservient to the Increase of Science. For when we fee how Things comprehend, or are comprehended in one another, we are able to discover the mutual Dependence of all the several Branches of Knowledge, which leads us into the true and natural Method, of conducting our Understandings in the Search of Truth.

VII. FROM what has been said it is evident, that general Ideas are the Creatures and Inventions of the Understanding. Nature it is truc, in the Production of Things, makes many

General Ideas
the Creatures

of the Under-
pancing.

of

of them alike; but it is the Mind alone, that collects the Particulars in which they agree, into one Idea, and fets it up as a Representative of many Individuals. And now I think we may venture upon that much-agitated Question, Where do the Genera and Species of Things exist? To which I answer, in the Mind. Univerfality belongs not to Things themselves, it being apparent, that they are all particular in their Existence. However, as they often have many Properties in common, the Understanding by uniting these into one Conception, obtains a general Idea, under which it ranks all the several Objects wherein all these Properties are found. So far indeed we must allow, that the particular Combination of Properties, which constitutes the Genus and Species, exists in all the Individuals referred to that Genus or Species; but then it is in Conjunction with other Properties, by which these Individuals are diftinguished from one another. Thus the Collection of simple Ideas, fignified by the Word Bird, is to be found for instance in a Hawk, or any other fingle Animal, to which we apply that general Name; but the Notion itself, abstracted from all the Particulars to which it belongs, has evidently no Existence out of the Understanding. There is not a Being in Nature that can be called a Bird in general, or that does not neceffarily imply, in the very Conception of it, several simple Ideas, befides those marked by that Word. For the Name in this Case signifies no more, than an Animal covered with Feathers, and provided with Wings, without Regard either to Shape, Bulk, or the particular Time and Place of its Existence. These last Confiderations however, are inseparable from the Reality of Things, and therefore must be added to the general Idea, before we can conceive any thing conformable to it actually brought into Being.

Confidered o-
part they exift
only in the

Mind, but in

Conjun Elion
with o'ber
Ideas in the
Individuals

VIII. HENCE we fee at once, what fort of an Existence general Natures have. Confidered apart, and by themselves, they are wholly the Workmanship of the Understanding, and derive their Being and Reality from it; but viewed

in Conjunction with other Ideas, that co-exift with them in the several Objects of Nature, comprebended they are to be found in the Individuals to which they refer; and therefore according

under them.

to this way of Conception, may be faid to have an Existence in them. Thus, so long as the Ideas answering to the Words Man or Tree, continue general and undetermined, they have no real Objects answering them in Nature; Nature; nor can the Collections of fimple Ideas, marked by these Names, while others are fuppofed excluded, exift any where out of the Understanding. Nevertheless, as all the fimple Ideas included in the general Notion of Man, are to be found in every particular Man; and all those implied in the Notion of a Tree, in every particular Tree; hence the general Nature of Man, exists in every individual Man, as does the general Nature of a Tree, in every individual Tree.

Difference of
del
found and as
univerfal,

Pleas confi
dered as com-

IX. ONE Thing still remains to be obferved, with regard to these our general Ideas; that though many of them are evidently Combinations of different fimple Ideas, and according to that Way of confidering them, are included in the first Divifion of our complex Conceptions, those namely framed by the Composition of the Mind, yet we are carefully to diftinguish between an Idea as it is compound, and as it is universal. In the first Cafe, the Mind chicfly confiders the feveral Ideas that are combined together; or in other Words, all the Attributes, Qualities, or Parts, that are contained in any Idea. Thus the Idea of a Bird, includes Life, Senfe, fpontaneous Motion, a Covering of Feathers, Wings, &c. none of which can be left out, without destroying the very Nature of the Idea, and making it fomething quite different from what it was before. This Way of confidering Things, according to the Number of their Parts and Properties, is called by Logicians the Comprehenfion of an Idea. But the Univerfality of our Notions implies quite another Turn of Thinking, inasmuch as it fixes the Regard of the Mind, upon the Subjects to which our Ideas extend, or the Individuals and Species comprehended under them. In this Sense the Idea answering to the Word Bird, takes in the feveral Species of the feathered Creation, the Hawk, the Eagle, Sparrow, Lark, and innumerable others, to all which it may with equal Propriety be applied. And here it is remarkable, that the Idea lofes nothing of its Force or Comprehenfion, by being restricted to a particular Kind. When I fay the Bird of Jove, though in this Cafe the Idea is restrained to the Eagle alone, it still remains as diftinct, and includes as many fimple Ideas in its Composition, as when before it was extended to all the different Tribes of feathered Animals.

X. We fee therefore that our compound Ideas, may continue the fame in respect of their Attributes, or the Number of Parts, and yet vary confiderably in the Degree of Universality. The general Idea of Man is the fame, whether applied

The Compre
Extension of

benfion and

our Ideas.

to

4

to the whole human Race, or those of any particular Nation. When I affirm for instance of Mankind in general, that their Knowledge falls short of Perfection, and afterwards make the like Observation of the Men of the present Age; in both Cafes, the Word Man stands for one and the fame Collection of fimple Ideas; but in respect of the Individuals to which it is applied, there is a great and manifest Difference. That is, the Term Man, denotes one invariable compound Idea; which notwithstanding, confidered as a general Notion, may be contracted or enlarged at pleafure. And as in the former Cafe, the several Parts of the compound Idea, is called its Comprehension; so in the latter,. the Individuals to which the universal Idea is applied, is called its Extension. I might add many more Obfervations on this Subject, but chuse rather to stop here, having faid enough to explain the Difference between compound and abstract Ideas, and shew the Reason of my ranging them under distinct Heads.

F

Ideas of Relations exceeding numerous.

I.

SECT. III.

Of our Ideas of Relations.

C COME OME now to the third and last Division of those Ideas, which I confider as Creatures and Workmanship of the Understand

the

ing; such namely as arife, from the comparing of Things one with another. For the Mind in its Views, is not tied to fingle Objects; but can examine their References and Respects, in regard to others, brought under Confideration at the fame time. And when it does so, and thence derives new Notices of Things, the Ideas thus got are called Relations, and make I am apt to think the largest Class of all our Perceptions. For every single Object will admit of almost innumerable Comparifons with others, and in this Sense may become a very plentiful Source of Ideas to the Understanding. Thus if we compare one thing with another in respect of Bulk, we get the Ideas of greater, less, or Equality; if in refpect of Time, of older and younger; and fo for other Relations, which we can pursue at pleasure, almost without End; whence it is easy to conceive, how very extenfive this Tribe of our Perceptions must be.