Men chiefly determined to particular Comparisons by the Wants and Exigencies of Life. II. I SHALL not pretend to trace out these Ideas particularly, nor indeed fo much as to enumerate their feveral Divifions; it being enough to obferve, that here, as well as in the other kinds of our complex Ideas, we bound ourselves for the moft part to fuch Comparisons, as the Exigencies of Society, the Wants of Life, and the different Profeffions of Men, render neceflary; and are more or less accurate in tracing out the Relations of Things, according to the Degree of Importance they appear to have in these Refpects. The Relations of Men one to another, arifing either from the Ties of Blood, their feveral Ranks and Places in the Community, or a mutual Intercourfe of good Offices, being of great Weight and Concern in the Commerce of Life, have in a particular Manner engaged our Attention, and are therefore very minutely defcribed. For the fame Reason, Men have found it neceffary, to determine as exactly as poffible, the various Dependence of Things, as their Happiness is nearly connected with this Knowledge. When we confider Objects merely in refpect of Existence, as either giving or receiving it, we come by the Ideas of Caufe and Effect: Nor need I mention, how much the Welfare of Mankind depends, upon an extenfive View of Things, as they ftand connected in this Relation; it being evident, that the feveral Schemes and Purposes of Life, are all conducted upon a previous Suppofition, that certain known Caufes, will have their usual regular Effects, and fuch and fuch Actions, be attended with fuch and fuch Confequences. Relations of Creature, &c, Creator and III. BUT there are other Relations of this kind, befides those that merely regard Existence; as when we alfo take into the Account, the additional Gifts, of a Capacity for Happiness, and the Means of attaining it; which conftitutes the Relation of Creator and Creature, in the more folemn Acceptation of thefe Words. Again, when we confider the great Author of our Being, not only as the Creator of the Universe, but alfo as preferving and holding it together, and prefiding over the prefent Frame of Things with uncontrouled Dominion; he then appears under the Notion of a moral Governor, to whom we are accountable for our Actions, and the Ufe we make of thofe Powers and Faculties we derive from him. Now as it is of the higheft Confequence for Men, not to be unacquainted with thefe, and fuch like Relations; hence we find, that the wifeft Nations, and fuch as beft understood the true Application Book I. Application of the Powers of the Mind, have always made it their chief Study, to regulate and afcertain these Ideas, and trace them in all their Confequences. And thus we may in fome measure perceive, how the Mind proceeds in comparing its Ideas together, and by what Views it is chiefly governed, in framing the complex Notions of this Clafs, by which it reprefents the various Habitudes of Things. I fhall only add upon this Subject, these two Obfervations. Our Ideas of Relations very clear and di. jiinet. IV. FIRST that our Ideas of Relations are for the most part very clear and diftinct. For the comparing of things together, being a voluntary Act of the Mind, we cannot but fuppofe, that it must be acquainted with its own Views in the Comparifon; and of courfe, have a clear Conception of the Foundation of that Relation, it fets itself to enquire into. Thus the Relation of Caufe and Effect, implying only that one thing produces, or is produced by another, which Notions are always diftinctly fettled in the Understanding, before it goes about to make the Comparifon; it is evident, that the Idea reprefenting this mutual Respect of Objects, will be no lefs clear, than are the Notions themfelves, upon which the Relation is founded. And what is ftill more remarkable of the Ideas of this Clafs; they ceafe not to be distinct, even where the Subjects compared are but very imperfectly known. For I can well enough conceive that one thing has produced another, and that therefore they ftand related as Caufe and Effect, though my Ideas of the things themfelves may perhaps be very obfcure, and come far fhort of reprefenting their real Nature and Properties. I doubt not but it will be readily owned, that our Idea of the Univerfe, confidered as comprehending the whole Frame of created Things, is very inadequate; and I think it is still more apparent, that our Notion of the Supreme Being, comes not up to the Excellence and Perfection of his Nature. Yet we very well understand what is meant, by calling God the Author of the World; and though we comprehend not the Manner of his producing it, find no Difficulty in framing the Ideas, the relative Words Creator and Creature ftand for Ideas of Rela tions among the most important Con V. I HAVE yet another Obfervation to make upon this Subject; and it is, that our Ideas of Relations, are among the most important Conceptions of the Understanding, and afford the ceptions of the largeft Field, for the Exercife and Improvement of human Knowledge. Moft of our Enquiries Mind. regard regard relative Ideas, and are fet on foot with a View to inveftigate the mutual Habitudes of Things. The Mathematician has taken Quantity for his Province, and teaches how to compare Magnitudes of different Figures and Dimenfions, in order to judge with Certainty of their relative Properties. The Philofopher attaches himfelf to the Chain of Caufes and Effects, and endeavours to trace out the various Dependence of Things confidered in this Light. In fine, whither do all our Researches tend, but by means of certain known Properties and Relations, to find out others that stand fome how connected with them? As for the Importance of thefe Conceptions, no one can call that in Queftion, who reflects; that from our Relations to our Creator and one another, arife all the Duties of Morality and Religion; and that the Correfpondence of the feveral Objects of Nature, to the Organs of the Body, and Faculties of the Mind, is that by which alone we can judge, of what will procure us Happiness or Mifery. Whence it is evident, that without an exact Knowledge of thefe Relations, we must wander on in Life with great Uncertainty, and may often plunge into Calamities and Misfortunes, by thofe very Purfuits, from which we expected nothing but Joy and Pleasure. Recapitula tion. VI. THUS have I gone through the feveral Divifions of our Ideas, which I have endeavoured to reprefent in fuch a Manner, as their vaft Extent may moft eafily appear, and the Conduct of the Mind in framing them be diftinctly apprehended. I might eafily run into other Diftinctions, by confidering them as clear or obfcure, adequate or inadequate, true or false. But the Limits of this Tract will not allow my entering more fully into the Subject, and I think it the lefs needful, because the very Names are almost fufficient, to convey a Notion of these feveral Kinds of Ideas into the Mind. But as the Divifion explained above feems to be of great Importance, towards fettling in the Understanding a juft View of the Progrefs of human Knowledge, and the Steps by which it advances from one Degree of Improvement to another, I fhall here run over it again in as few Words as poffible, that the whole Process may be seen at once. Our Ideas are all derived into the Understanding, either by Senfation, or Reflection. This however is obfervable, that one and the fame Object often excites a Variety of Perceptions at once, which are nevertheless readily di inguifhed by the Mind, and appear each under a Form peculiar to itfelf. Thefe conftitute our primary and original Notices, and are cafily known from all all others, inasmuch as they are entirely void of Plurality, and cannot be divided into two or more different Ideas. They are alfo the Materials out of which the others are formed, and are therefore by Way of Diftinction called fimple Ideas. But the Mind, though it has no Power over thefe, either to fashion or deftroy them, can yet combine them in an infinite Number of Ways; and from their various Combinations, refult all our complex Ideas, which are of two principal Kinds. Firft fuch as are derived from without, and reprefent thofe Combinations of fimple Ideas, that have a real Exiftence in Nature. Of this Sort are all our Ideas of Subftances. Secondly the Conceptions formed by the Mind itself, arbitrarily uniting and putting together its Ideas. And as this makes by far the largeft Clafs, and comprehends all those Ideas, which may be properly termed our own, as being the real Workmanship of the Understanding; fo they fall very naturally under three diftinct Heads. For either the Mind combines feveral fimple Ideas together, in order to form them into one Conception, in which the Number and Quality of the Ideas united, are principally confider'd; and thus it is we come by all our compound Notions: or it fixes upon any of its Ideas, whether fimple, compound, or of Subftances, and leaving out the Circumftances of Time, Place, real Existence, and whatever renders it particular, confiders the Appearance alone, and makes that a Representative of all of the Kind; whence our abstract and univerfal Ideas are derived or laftly, it compares things one with another, examines their mutual Connections, and thereby furnishes itself with a new Set of Notions, known by the Name of Relations; which as has been already remarked, make by no means the leaft important Clafs of our Perceptions. This Divifion of our Ideas, as it feems to be the most natural, and truly to reprefent the Manner in which they are introduced into the Mind, fo I believe it will be found to comprehend them in all their Varieties. I fhall therefore now proceed to offer fome Obfervations upon Language, as being the great Inftrument, by which we are enabled to make our Ideas and Perceptions known to others. CHAP. I. CHA P. V. Of Words confidered as the Signs of our Ideas. WE and Words fur if the Means of re cording our ownThoughts E have feen how the Mind comes to be firft furnished with Ideas, and by what Methods it contrives to diverfify enlarge its Stock; let us now confider the Means of making known our Thoughts to others, that we may not only understand how Knowledge is acquired, but alfo in what Manner it may be communicated with the greateft Certainty and Advantage. For our Ideas, though manifold and various, are nevertheless all within our own Breafts, invisible to others, nor can of themselves be made appear. But God defigning us for Society, and to have Fellowship with those of our Kind, has provided us with Organs fitted to frame articulate Sounds, and given us also a Capacity of ufing those Sounds, as Signs of internal Conceptions. Hence fpring Words and Language; for having once pitched upon any Sound, to ftand as the Mark of an Idea in the Mind, Cuftom by Degrees establishes fuch a Connection between them, that the Appearance of the Idea in the Understanding, always brings to our Remembrance the Sound or Name by which it is expreffed; as in like manner the hearing of the Sound, never fails to excite the Idea for which it is made to stand. And thus it is eafy to conceive, how a Man may record his own Thoughts, and bring them again into View in any fucceeding Period of Life. For this Connection being once fettled, as the fame Sounds will always ferve to excite the fame Ideas; if he can but contrive to regifter his Words in the Order and Difpofition, in which the prefent Train of his Thoughts prefents them to his Imagination; it is evident he will be able to recall thefe Thoughts at Pleasure, and that too in the very Manner of their firft Appearance. Accordingly we find, that the Inventions of Writing and Printing, by enabling us to fix and perpetuate fuch perishable things as Sounds, have alfo furnished us with the Means of giving a Kind of Permanency to the Tranfactions of the Mind, infomuch that they may be in the fame Manner fubjected to our Review, as any other abiding Objects of Nature. VOL. II. E II. BUT |