On the Influence of Locke's Authority upon the Philosophical PART FIRST.-On the Beautiful, when presented immediately CHAPTER I.-General Observations on the Subject of In- CHAPTER II.-Progressive Generalizations of the Word Beauty, resulting from the natural Progress of the Mind.-Beauty of Colors-of Forms-of Motions.- Combinations of these.--Uniformity in Works of Art.- CHAPTER III.-Remarks on some of Mr. Burke's Princi- ples which do not agree with the foregoing Conclusions CHAPTER IV.-Continuation of the critical Strictures on Mr. Burke's fundamental Principles concerning Beau- CHAPTER VI.-Of the Application of the Theory of As- sociation to Beauty.-Farther Generalizations of this Word, in Consequence of the Influence of the asso- CHAPTER VII.-Continuation of the Subject.-Objections CHAPTER I.—Of Sublimity, in the literal Sense of the CHAPTER II.-Generalizations of the Word Sublimity, in Consequence of the Influence of religious Associations CHAPTER III.-Generalizations of Sublimity in Conse- quence of Associations resulting from the Phenomena of Gravitation, and from the other physical Arrange- ments with which our Senses are conversant CHAPTER IV.-Confirmation of the foregoing Theory from the natural Signs of Sublime Emotion.-Reciprocal In- fluence of these Signs on the Associations which sug- CHAPTER I.-General Observations on our acquired Powers of Judgment.-Application of these to the Subject of CHAPTER II.—Gradual Progress by which Taste is formed CHAPTER III.-Different Modifications of Taste.-Distinc- tion between Taste and the natural Sensibility to Beauty CHAPTER IV.-Continuation of the Subject.-Specific plea- sure connected with the Exercise of Taste.-Fastidious- ness of Taste.-Miscellaneous Remarks on this Power, PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION. CHAPTER FIRST. THE chief aim of the following dissertation is, to correct some prevailing mistakes with respect to the Philosophy of the Human Mind. In the introduction to a former Work, I have enlarged, at considerable length, upon the same subject; but various publications which have since appeared, incline me to think, that, in resuming it here, I undertake a task not altogether superfluous. Of the remarks which I am now to state, a few have a particular reference to the contents of this volume. Others are intended to clear the way for a different · series of discussions, which I hope to be able, at some future period to present to the public. I. In the course of those speculations on the Mind, to which I have already referred, and with which, I trust, that my present readers are not altogether unacquainted, I have repeatedly had occasion to observe, that "as our notions both of matter and of mind are merely relative; as we know the one only by such sensible qualities as extension, figure, and solidity, and the other by such operations as sensations, thought, and volition; we are certainly entitled to say, that matter and mind, considered as Objects of Human Study, are essentially different; the science of the former resting ultimately on phenomena exhibited to our senses, that of the latter on phenomena of which we are conscious. Instead, therefore, of objecting to the scheme of materialism, that its conclusions are false, it would be more accurate to say, that its aim is unphilosophical. It proceeds on a misapprehension of the extent and the limits of genuine science; the difficulty, which it professes to remove, being manifestly placed beyond the reach of our faculties. Surely, when we attempt to explain the nature of that principle, which feels, and thinks, and wills, by saying, that it is a material substance, or that it is the result of material organization, we impose on ourselves by words; forgetting that matter, as well as mind, is known to us by its qualities alone, and that we are equally ignorant of the essence of either." In the farther prosecution of the same argument, I have attempted to show, that the legitimate province of this department of philosophy extends no farther than to conclusions resting on the solid basis of observation and experiment; and I have, accordingly, in my own inquiries, aimed at nothing more, than to ascertain, in the first place, the Laws of our Constitution, as far as they can be discovered by attention to the subjects of our consciousness; and afterwards to apply these laws as principles for the synthetical explanation of the more complicated phenomena of the understanding. It is on this plan I have treated of the association of ideas, of memory, of imagination, and of various other intellectual powers; imitating, as far as I was able, in my reasonings, the example of those who are allowed to have cultivated the study of Natural Philosophy with the greatest success. The Physiological Theories which profess to explain how our different mental operations are produced by means of vibrations, and other changes in the state of the sensorium, if they are not altogether hypothetical and visionary, cannot be considered, even by their warmest advocates, as resting on the same evidence with those conclusions which are open to the examination of all men capable of exercising the power of Reflection; and, therefore, scientific distinctness requires, that these two different classes of propositions should not be confounded together under one common name. For my own part, I have no scruple to say, that I consider the physiological problem in question, as one of those which are likely to remain for ever among the arcana of nature, nor am I afraid of being contradicted by any competent and candid judge, how sanguine soever may be his hopes concerning the progress of future |