269 .266, 267 269-274 § 101. Thomas Brown (Works; Philosophy; Result). 276-278 § 102. Sir William Hamilton (Works; Philosophy; Gen- eral Conception of Philosophy; Phenomenology; Natural Realism and Natural Dualism; Latent Modifications; Necessary Cognition; The Law of the Conditioned and its Applications; Causa- 103. James Frederick Ferrier (Works; Philosophy; In- § 107. Pierre Paul Royer-Collard (Philosophy) § 108. Victor Cousin (Works; Philosophy; Genesis of § 109. Théodore Jouffroy (Works; Philosophy) .298-303 303, 304 § III. Auguste Comte (Works; Philosophy; Law of Hu- man Development; Characteristics and Problem of Positive Philosophy; Advantages of the Positive Philosophy; The Hierarchy of the Positive Scien- ces; Sociology; Religion of Humanity; Result) 305-312 § 113. Immanuel Kant (Works; Kant's Earlier Develop- dental Logic; The Analytic of Notions; The Categories; The Transcendental Deduction of the Categories; Analytic of Judgments; Schematism of the Categories; The System of Principles of the Pure Understanding; Ground of Distinction of Phenomena and Noumena; Transcendental Dia- lectic; Conceptions on Ideas of Pure Reason; Syllogisms; Dialectical Conclusions of Pure Rea son; Transcendental Paralogisms; Criticism of Rational Psychology; Antimony of Pure Reason; Criticism of Rational Cosmology; The Ideal of Pure Reason; Criticism of Transcendental The- ology; Transcendental Theory of Method; Cri- tique of Practical Reason; The Notion of Prac- tical Reason; The Analytic of Pure Practical Reason; The Notion of an Object of Pure Prac- tical Reason; The Motives of Pure Practical Rea- son; Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason; Metho- dology of Pure Practical Reason; Critique of Judgment; Introduction; Critique of Esthetical Judgment; Analytic; Dialectic of the Esthetic Faculty; Critique of Teleological Judgment: An- alytic; Dialectic of Teleological Judgment; \The- ory of Method; Moral Proof of the Existence of God; The Metaphysical Foundation of Natural Science; Introduction; Phoronomy; Dynamics; ·313-368 The General Character and the Main Divisions of Modern Philosophy. Modern Philosophy, as distinguished from Medieval Philosophy, is occupied with the immanent and concrete, rather than the transcendent and abstract; with the natural and the human, rather than the supernatural and the superhuman. As distinguished from Ancient Philosophy, it is occupied with the subject, rather than with the object; with thought, rather than with being. It may be quite easily divided into three great periods, as follows: 1. A period predominantly of reception and appropriation (though with considerable self-assertion as against mediævalism); 2. A period of original effort very largely destructive or negative (towards previous philosophy as well as the object of thought generally); 3. A period of equal originality, and more constructive or synthetic effort. Psychologically speaking, these periods may be viewed as, respectively, periods of (receptive) sense, (analytic) understanding, and (synthetic) reason; logically, as periods of thesis, antithesis, synthesis. The first period extends from the middle of the fifteenth century to the beginning of the seventeenth; the second, from the beginning of the seventeenth century to the third quarter of the eighteenth; and the third from the third quarter of the eighteenth century, onwards. DIVISION I. FIRST PERIOD OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. § 2. General Characteristics of the First Period of Modern Philosophy. - The beginnings of Modern Philosophy formed a part of the general human awakening in Europe in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. This awakening was, as every one is well aware, an awakening from a sort of "dogmatic slumber," in which human thought was wrapped up in the idea of a supra-mundane world, answering, as it now seems, to fancy and mere feeling, rather than to active sense, healthy understanding, and reason; in which, along with logical acuteness, there existed a certain enslavement to preconceived ideas, and to authority in intellectual things. At the beginning, Modern Philosophy was, on the one hand, a revolt against a philosophy which, both by its content (which was constituted by the abstract and transcendental) and by its form (which was either mystical or else pedantically logical) had come to be wanting in power to satisfy a real human interest; on the other hand, an endeavor to substitute for that barren philosophy something more worthy of a strong consciousness of human dignity as such, and of the wealth and grandeur of visible Nature. This double character attaches to almost every form of early Modern Philosophy, until, so to say, it reaches its majority, and even after that time; so that every new system, whatever else it may also be, is a protest against mere Scholasticism. The substitutions made for Scholasticism were in various directions, and of various degrees of completeness and originality. The revival of ancient learning and literature placed within the reach of the new impulse to philosophic thought- accompanying and supporting like impulses in literature, the arts, and the sciences a noble wealth of ancient philosophical literature, which was eagerly seized upon and made the basis for various schools of rehabilitated ancient philosophy. The new religious movement, Protestantism, found in ancient thinking (but to some extent also in medieval though nonscholastic mysticism) a stimulant and possible helper, which it associated with itself and adapted to its need. The cultivation of the natural sciences by both empirical and speculative methods furnished material and basis for a philosophy of Nature; the actual political conditions of the period, and the revival of the political doctrines of the ancients (particularly of Plato and Aristotle), presented occasions for the framing and putting forth of systems of political philosophy. It is possible to distinguish definite degrees (three in number) of originality or independence of philosophical effort in this first period of Modern Philosophy. There is (1) the relatively passive reception of the ancient systems, as such; (2) the adaptation of ancient and mediæval systems to religious or theological uses; (3) a relatively independent cultivation of philosophical conceptions into systems of Nature-philosophy on the one hand, and political philosophy on the other. We have, then, in the treatment of the first period of Modern Philosophy, three grand divisions, which may be denoted as follows: The Rehabilitation of Ancient Systems; The Association of Philosophy with (Protestant) Theology; The (Relatively) Independent Cultivation of Philosophy on its own Account. § 3. I. THE REHABILITATION OF ANCIENT SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. The ancient systems of thought rehabilitated were, naturally, principally those of (1) Plato and the Neo-Platonists; and of (2) Aristotle. Other systems rehabilitated were (3) Ciceronianism; (4) Stoicism; (5) Scepticism; (6) Ionicism; (7) Epicureanism. |