pleasurable and painful. Their causes are various, but are always, directly or indirectly, thinking beings. Love attended by appetite is benevolence; hatred, so attended, is anger. Benevolence implies a "desire of another's pleasure, and aversion of his pain." Love and humility together constitute the compound passion, respect. The will is indefinable, except as the "internal impression we feel and are conscious of when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body or new perception of our mind." There is no liberty of the will. Belief that there is, is merely a consequence of (1) a confusion between spontaneity, or that which is opposed to violence, and indifference, or negation of necessity and causes; (2) a false sensation, or experience of the liberty of indifference; (3) religious prejudice. The will is moved only by the prospect of pleasure or of pain reason or understanding alone neither causes nor prevents volition, and it merely "guides" the will. "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve them." There is in reality no conflict between reason and the passions in relation to the will. The supposition that reason influences the will is due to a misconception of certain passions, such as benevolence, resentment, love of life, which "produce but little emotion in the mind." They determine the will; reason does not. Passions move the will, not merely by their violence, or strength, and not always in proportion to that, but also by their permanence and habitualness. It is a law of the passions that they affect one another by association, and that they are greatly affected by custom and repetition. Custom begets a "facility in the performance of any action and an inclination towards it: and "from these we may account for all its other effects, however extraordinary." The imagination, by its power of enlivening our ideas, has great influence upon the passions, and hence upon the movement of the will. Of the "direct passions," - desire and aversion, joy and grief, hope and fear,-only the last two require special

attention. They imply uncertainty (of expectation): and are different mixtures of joy and grief with different degrees of the ingredient of uncertainty. Curiosity, or the love of truth, is not a desire of truth merely on its own account, but as possessing a certain utility, and capable of arousing in us sympathy with others.

III. Morals. The moral quality of actions is to be found not in any merely intellectual perception of relations, or act of reason, that may precede and determine them (since reason does not influence the will), but in the nature of an impulse produced by a feeling of pleasure or pain accompanying the idea of an object. Our decisions regarding moral rectitude are "perceptions:" morality is more "properly felt than judged of," though this feeling is so "soft and gentle that we are apt to confound it with an idea." "To have a sense of virtue" is merely to "feel a satisfaction" of a particular kind from the contemplation of character: to have a 66 sense of vice" is to "feel uneasiness in the same case." The sense of virtue may be natural or artificial (i. e., produced by "experience "). All virtuous actions derive their merit only from virtuous motives. The virtuous motive can never be a regard to the virtue of the action to affirm that it could, would be to argue in a circle. Neither self-love nor the love of mankind can be the principle of virtuous motivation, since the first is the source of all injustice and violence, and the second does not really exist. An action is virtuous which gives pleasure to a disinterested observer, the approbation or disapprobation of the observer depending upon the exercise of sympathy, which, therefore, is a chief source of moral distinction. Of the virtues, justice is to be regarded as artificial. The foundation of it is partly self-interest, partly also "morality," or the "pleasure received from the view of such actions as tend to the peace of society, and an uneasiness from such actions as are contrary to it," a disposition depending upon the force of public opinion and on private education. Of the natural virtues some have their peculiar

merit in their being agreeable to their possessors; others in their being so to other persons. Among the virtues whose peculiar merit consists in their usefulness to others than their possessors are modesty and benevolence. The merit of love is in its agreeableness to one's self, etc. Besides the virtues usually so termed, there are certain "natural abilities," which, as procuring for us the love and esteem of mankind, may be regarded as, in an important sense, virtues. In most of the virtues are to be found all the conditions requisite for the operation of sympathy, which is, without doubt, the chief source of moral distinctions.

IV. Religion.-According to Hume's own confession (as we have seen) the sceptical conclusions of his theory of knowledge were in some respects unsatisfactory; and he preferred to think that while he had confuted mere dogmatism, he had left room for faith or belief regarding possible objects transcending experience, rather than to feel that he had upheld absolute scepticism in that regard. Accordingly, he shows an inclination as Kant did, after him to look with favor upon the teleological argument for the being of a God; though he points out that that argument could only establish the existence of a Creator who, though he might be all-benevolent, could not, in view of the imperfection of the created world, be conceived as all-powerful. In a purely scientific point of view, neither the world of matter nor that of mind furnishes any warrant for our going beyond experience; and there would be no warrant for our stopping short of infinity itself in our regressive search for a cause of the world, if once we should step beyond the bounds of experience. Theoretically, the "whole matter of religion is a riddle, an enigma, an inexplicable mystery;" morally, there must be something in it. Result. In the doctrine of Hume we have empiricism resulting in scepticism. Hume simply carries farther the theory of Locke as it left the hands of Berkeley. On the principle of pure empiricism, mind and God as well as matter are nothing real. Hume is justified in calling the

object of knowledge only a bundle of merely individual "perceptions," if there is no bond between phenomena except what is given in sense as such. Is there no other bond; does the "mind" of itself contribute nothing towards knowledge? And does not its contribution objectify that of sense? The suggestion of this question seems to be the chief service to philosophy of Hume's teaching. The attempt (by Reid, Kant, and others) to answer it constitutes the beginning of a new epoch in the history of philosophy.

§ 72.

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz1 (1646–1716).— Leibnitz, who was a son of a professor in the University of Leipsic, where he was born, attended school in Leipsic and the universities of Leipsic and Jena. He became an omnivorous reader in his father's library, and acquired even before entering the university at the age of fifteen, a large acquaintance with ancient authors, the Scholastics, and the writings of the Protestant theologians. At the same time with his reading, he disciplined himself in habits of logical thinking and going to the roots and principles of things. At the universities he gave particular attention to the study of law, mathematics, and philosophy. Declining a professorship offered him at Altorf, he took up jurisprudence, and soon gained a recognition which secured him favor and high trust. He was sent (1692) by the Elector of Mainz on an embassy to the court of Louis XIV. and on a mission to London. At Paris and London he made the acquaintance of a number of men eminent in science and philosophy, Huyghens, the Dutch mathematician; Arnauld, the Cartesian; Newton; the English physicist Boyle; Oldenburg, the secretary of the Royal Society. On his way between Paris and London he tarried to see Spinoza, of whom Oldenburg was a close friend. At the same time he

1 Works of Leibnitz; Zeller's Geschichte der Neuern Philosophie;" Ueberweg, “History of Philosophy;" Erdmann; Noack; 'Encyclopædia Britannica."

is said to have carried on very actively his studies in science and philosophy, and was “able to announce an imposing list of discoveries and plans for discoveries arrived at by means of a new logical art, in natural philosophy, mathematics, mechanics, optics, hydrostatics, pneumatics, and nautical science, besides new ideas in law, theology, and politics, and a calculating machine for multiplying, dividing, extracting roots, as well as adding and subtracting." In 1676 his discovery of the Differential Calculus was announced. In the same year he became librarian of the ducal library at Hanover, and counsellor to the court. A number of other positions of distinction were held by him: he was appointed privy councillor of justice by several Governments, among them that of Russia, first president (and president for life) of the Berlin Society (after 1744 Academy) of Science; was made by Austria Baron of the Empire and Imperial Privy Councillor, etc. He was commissioned by each of the Governments of Germany, Russia, and Austria to plan an Academy of Science. His last years were embittered by controversy (with Newtonians), by the death of his friend and favorite pupil, Princess Sophie Charlotte, of the house of Brandenburg, and by the neglect of former friends and patrons. Only a single mourner, it is reported, followed his remains to the tomb; the French Academy alone, in the learned and scientific world, took cognizance of his death. Leibnitz is frequently placed on a level with Aristotle as to the originality and catholicity of his mind and attainments; and the comparison seems just, though Leibnitz hardly bears the same relation to modern philosophy that Aristotle does to the ancient. Personally, he is said to have been frank, benevolent, and inclined to conciliate favor.

Works. The philosophical works of Leibnitz fall naturally into two general groups, one of which consists of those writings suggesting or containing the exposition of his final and distinctive doctrine, and the other of writings, earlier in time, and expounding positions which proved to "Encyclopædia Britannica," art. Leibnitz.

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