DIVISION III. THIRD PERIOD OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. § 97. The Characteristics and Divisions of the Third Period of Modern Philosophy. If the Second Period of modern philosophy is characteristically a period of formal analysis and reflection, the Third Period- extending from the third quarter of the eighteenth century onwards — is a period of synthesis and speculative deduction. The problems of method and the origin of knowledge recur, but in closer relation with that of content and being; and this because being and knowledge are recognized as having a common centre, self-consciousness. Thought in this period is empiricistic, intuitionalistic, rationalistic, as in the second; but empiricism, intuitionism, rationalism, as forms of self-consciousness, are seen to have an organic relation. As regards the results of the thinking of this period, they cannot, in the nature of the case, be mere dogmatism nor mere scepticism in the theory of knowledge and being, nor unqualified mechanicism in the theory of nature, nor pure determinism in the theory of the will; they are, in fact, respectively, idealism (subjective or absolute), organicism, and what we may call, for want of a better term, "libertarianism." To a very large extent, systems in this period group themselves, in their actual historical connections, by nationalities, but may in general be grouped as follows, as regards the rubrics "empiricism," "intuitionism,” “rationalism": empiricistic are the English systems; intuitionalistic the Scotch, French, and Italian; rationalistic the German systems; miscellaneous, the American. The intuitionalistic systems always, of course, contain a large element of mere empiricism. The order in which it is most practicable to take up the systems is as follows: (1) the Scotch, (2) the French, (3) the German, (4) the Italian, (5) the English, (6) the American. § 98. (1) Scotch Systems. Of the Scotch systems of the Third Period, the following are here treated; viz., those of Thomas Reid, Dugald Stewart, Thomas Brown, Sir William Hamilton, James Ferrier. Ferrier does not belong to the "Scotch school," in the ordinary sense of the term "Scotch school," but is a decided opponent of its principles. But just on account of his opposition to those principles, is it convenient to place him in the same group with the other Scotch philosophers, though he is not even an intuitionist. § 99. Thomas Reid (1710-1796). — Reid, who was the son of a clergyman, was born not far from Aberdeen. He studied theology at Mareschal College, Aberdeen, where he graduated at the age of sixteen. He had as instructor in philosophy George Turnbull. From him Reid, it is said, learned more than from all other masters and writers put together. For ten years after graduation, Reid acted as librarian of the college, continuing his studies meanwhile. He presided as pastor over a parish in Aberdeenshire for some years (with indifferent success); and in 1752, on the merits of some brief treatises, among them one on Aristotle's Logic, was appointed professor of moral philosophy in King's College, Aberdeen. From 1764 to 1780 he occupied the chair of moral philosophy in the University of Glasgow. He is described as having been singularly modest, cautious, sincere, and devout, and as very positive in his convictions. Works. Reid's chief works are: "Enquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense (1764), "Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (1785), "Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind" (1788). These works had their origin chiefly in 1 McCosh, "Scottish Philosophy;" Noack; Porter's "Philosophy in Great Britain and America;" Works of Reid; etc. a purpose to refute Humian scepticism and LockianBerkeleyan subjective idealism. - Philosophy: Standpoint and Method. At first a Berkeleyan in philosophy, Reid, according to his own account of himself, was driven by an impulse received from the scepticism of Hume to the position which has come to be. known as the standpoint of "Common Sense." He at one time renounced philosophy (as ordinarily understood, at least), and declared that the hopeless condition of philosophy in his day was owing to the fact that philosophy had undertaken to sit in judgment on common sense. His philosophical importance, such as it is, seems to depend chiefly on his doctrine of sensation and perception, and of the a priori element in knowledge. We may notice also his classification of the powers of the mind. The method of philosophy is, according to Reid, the method of observation philosophy is the empirical science of mind. There are certain principles of the common human understanding which are the basis of all thought and science, as presupposed by every investigation. Such are the following: we think, remember, draw conclusions; "fresh and living memory equals in certainty and evidence consciousness itself;" we may have as clear and indubitable knowledge of the activities of our minds as of the external world; our thoughts are manifestations of a thinking principle which we call "ego; some things exist, not of themselves, but only in and by another as its property or characteristic ; there must for most of the activities of the mind be given something different from them, which is their object; there are certain things about which all men of all times and peoples agree; all things may be admitted about which there is agreement among sane-minded men. Sensation and Perception. We have immediate knowledge of the "external world; we do not conclude from a resemblance of an idea to an object to the existence and nature of the object, since we should have to know beforehand the object itself in order to compare the two. Such a mere resemblance, moreover, does not exist. The (Lockian) doctrine of representative ideas is therefore false, begging of the question. In perception there is not only a feeling, an "impression" produced upon or in sense, but an immediate primitive act of judgment affirming the existence of an object of the sensation. The sensation is a "sign or "suggestion," upon the occurrence of which the mind spontaneously and at once applies its inner principles to the determination of the object, and exercises belief in its existence as determined. The sensation is not to be considered as a ground of inference to the external world, since the act of perception is not a mediate but an immediate or direct act or process. Ideas regarded as individual existences which are intermediaries between objects and the mind, are mere fictions: ideas exist in and with (not merely after) the "primitive judgment " of perception, and become independent objects of the mind only in consequence of a "resolving and analyzing" of the natural and original judgment, or an act of "simple apprehension." Our knowledge of ourselves is as direct as that of the external world: "it is not by first having the notions of mind and sensation, and then comparing them together that we perceive the one to have the relation of a subject or substratum, and the other that of an act or operation; on the contrary, one of the related things to wit, sensation suggests to us both the correlate and the relation." In this doctrine of sensation and perception is contained, besides the refutation of the theory of representative ideas, the Humian notion of the individual independence of "perceptions," and the Lockian doctrine of knowledge as the perception of agreement or difference between two separately presented ideas; also a refutation of the doctrine that the mind is at first a mere tabula rasa. The mind, that is to say, contributes something of itself towards knowledge. "Common Sense." We ascribe to reason two offices, or two degrees. The first is to judge of things self-evident; the second, to draw conclusions which are not self-evident from those that are. The first of these is the province, and the sole province, of common sense. The principles of common sense (which it is important to determine, since every man is competent to judge of them, and opinions which contradict first principles are both false and absurd) are of two classes, contingent and necessary. Of the former class there are twelve, as follows: (1) Everything of which I am conscious exists; (2) The thoughts of which I am conscious are the thoughts of a being which I call myself, my mind, my person; (3) Those things did really happen which I distinctly remember; (4) We know our own personal identity and continued existence as far back as we can distinctly remember; (5) Those things do really exist which we distinctly perceive by our senses, and are what we perceive them to be; (6) We have some degree of power over our actions and the determination of our wills; (7) The natural faculties by which we distinguish truth and error are not fallacious; (8) There is life and intelligence in our fellow-men with whom we converse; (9) Certain features of the countenance, sounds of the voice, and gestures of the body indicate certain thoughts and dispositions of the mind; (10) There is a certain regard due to human testimony in matters of fact, and even to human authority in matters of opinion; (11) There are many events depending on the will of man in which there is a self-evident probability, greater or less according to circumstances; (12) In the phenomena of nature, what is to be will probably be like what has been in similar circumstances. Necessary truths are of the following classes: (1) grammatical principles; (2) logical axioms; (3) mathematical axioms; (4) axioms in matters of taste; (5) principles in morals, -- e. g., An unjust action has more demerit than an ungenerous one; (6) metaphysical principles, e. g., (a) The qualities we perceive by our senses must have a subject, which we call body, and the thoughts we are conscious of must have a subject, which we call mind; (b) Whatever begins to exist must have a cause which produced |