it; (c) Design and intelligence in the cause may be inferred with certainty from marks or signs of them in the effect. The principles of common sense are established upon the general consent of mankind, as shown particularly in the language of men.

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The "Powers of Man." The human "powers," or faculties," are, first of all, "intellectual" and "active." The intellectual powers are, external sense, memory, conception, abstraction, judgment, reasoning, taste, moral perception, consciousness, and the social operation of the mind. To sense-perception may be attributed direct. knowledge of external existence (including space); to memory an immediate knowledge of the past and of personal identity; to conception, the forming of notions of individual things, of the meanings of words (and of imaginary existences); to abstraction, the formation of general conceptions (universals have no existence except in the mind); to judgment, the framing of the principles of common sense; to reasoning, ratiocination; to taste, the being pleased or displeased, together with the power of judgment (the beauty and sublimity of objects of sense being "derived from the expression they exhibit of things intellectual, which alone have original beauty"). Active powers can be attributed only to subjects having thought, understanding, and will. There is no efficient cause in nature as known to "natural philosophy : a physical cause is not an agent; it does not act, but is acted on, and is passive as to its effect." Will (or the form of active power, which in itself is not directly known) is to be distinguished from desire and the affections. It is free (as we know directly from the testimony of consciousness, the fact of moral obligation, etc.). "I grant that all rational beings are influenced, and ought to be influenced, by motives. But the relation between motive and action is of a very different nature from the relation between an efficient cause and its effect. An efficient cause must be a being that exists and has the power to produce the effect. A motive is not a thing that exists. VOL. I. - - 18

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It is only a thing conceived in the mind of the agent. Motives imply liberty in the agent, otherwise they have no influence at all." The principles of action are mechanical (as instincts and habits), animal (appetites, desires, and affections), rational (regard for our good upon the whole, and a regard to duty). Duty, right and wrong, and the first principles of morals are discovered by the “moral faculty." Moral principles relate to virtue in general, to the different kinds of virtue, and to the comparison of virtues. Of the first sort an example is, Some things in human conduct merit approbation and praise, others blame and punishment; of the second, We ought to prefer a greater to a less good; of the third, Unmerited beneficence should yield to compassion to the miserable.1

Result. Reid is evidently to be classed as an intuitionist, with all his empiricism. From the fact of its antagonistic relation to the pronounced scepticism of Hume, Reid's intuitionism has a more critical and more positive character than that of Lord Cherbury, with which it may naturally be compared. Reid, though not usually regarded as the founder, is the chief, of the "Scotch school" of (empirical) intuitionists. His teachings have had not a little influence also outside of his own country: Rousseau in France, Jacobi, Fries, and others in Germany, owing a decided debt to him.

§ 100.

Dugald Stewart2 (1753-1828). - Dugald Stewart, who was a son of Matthew Stewart, professor of mathematics in the University of Edinburgh, was educated at Edinburgh High School and at Glasgow University. At Glasgow he gave special attention to mathematics and philosophy. He was a pupil and became a friend and follower of Reid. For a time he acted as a substitute for his father in the chair of mathematics, and then as associate professor of

1 See Porter.

2 See McCosh, Franck, Noack, etc.

mathematics, in the University of Edinburgh. During one session he lectured on morals in the same institution. In 1785 he took the chair of moral philosophy, which he occupied for the next twenty-seven years, exercising a large and wholesome influence for the promotion of philosophical culture.

Works. - Stewart's principal works are: "The Elements of the Human Mind" (three volumes, 1792, 1814, 1827); "Outlines of Moral Philosophy" (1793); "Philosophical Essays" (1810); "A General View of the Progress of Metaphysical, Ethical, and Political Philosophy since the Revival of Letters" (1815 and 1821, in the "Encyclopædia Britannica "); "The Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers" (1828).

Philosophy.Stewart, even more, if possible, than Reid, makes of philosophy the empirical science of mind. His general position is substantially that of Reid. Peculiar to him seem to be the following assertions: (1) Our conviction of the independence of the perceived object depends partly on the "repetition of the act of perception in reference to one and the same perceived object, partly on the natural belief of "common sense in a fixed order of nature; (2) There are three (instead of two) classes of sensible qualities, the third class (mathematical qualities) being constituted by extension, form, etc., which are posited directly as exterior, and are presupposed by the other primary qualities; (3) Though we are aware of both subject and object in perception, we are conscious, in the strict sense of the term, only of the former, certain of ourselves, or subject, only by inference from the sensation or the act of thinking; (4) The association of ideas (a topic to which Stewart gave extended attention) is not to be deduced from custom, but custom from the association of ideas; (5) Our power over the association of our ideas is not one of arbitrary will merely, but one of knowledge of the principles of cause and effect, ground and consequence; (6) Our ideas succeed one another

we are

in dreams according to the same law as in waking consciousness, the difference between the two states being due solely to the influence of the will.

SIOI.

Thomas Brown1 (1778-1820). — Brown, who was the son of a Presbyterian clergyman, was born near Edinburgh, educated in and near London, and at the University of Edinburgh. At the university he manifested the liveliest interest, and displayed great acuteness, in philosophical studies. He studied law, and afterwards medicine, and became in the latter a successful practitioner. In 1810 he was appointed adjunct professor of moral philosophy in the University of Edinburgh, having previously acted once as a substitute for Stewart during an illness of the latter. He died comparatively young, of overwork. Brown (like Stewart) was an eloquent lecturer.

Works. Philosophical works of Brown are, "An Inquiry into the Relations of Cause and Effect" (1804; 3d edition 1818); "Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (1820); "Physiology of the Human Mind (1820). He made contributions to the "Edinburgh Review," of which he was one of the founders, among them an article on Kant.

Philosophy. Under the same stimulus (the teachings of Hume) which called forth from Reid his peculiar antisceptical theories of perception and intuitive cognition in general, Brown put forth a doctrine that was almost more sceptical than otherwise, quite antagonistic in important respects to that of his predecessors in the Scotch school. Brown limits knowledge to phenomena. He rejects the notion of occult "powers" or "faculties" of the mind, and reduces the mind to a series of "states (if not quite to Hume's "bundle of perceptions"). These he brings under two general heads; viz., "simple suggestion," or the reproduction of the ideas of absent objects, and

1 McCosh, "Scottish Philosophy," etc.

"relative suggestion," or the perception of relation among ideas. Consciousness with Brown is not separate from the states of the mind, it is merely the "whole series of states " of the mind. External bodies are perceived through sensations of resistance (which must not be confounded with those of touch), outness, extension, interpreted by means of an intuited idea of cause; all that we really know being merely sensations. Regarding causation, Brown says: "When we say that B will follow A to-morrow, because A was followed by B to-day, we do not prove that the future will resemble the past, but we take for granted that the future is to resemble the past. We have only to ask ourselves why we believe in this similarity of sequence; and our very inability of stating any ground of inference may convince us that the belief which it is impossible for us not to feel is the result of some other principle of reasoning" (than from mere experience); namely intuition. (If we substitute "custom" for "intuition," we get Hume's doctrine of causation. Brown, in fact, says that the difference between Reid and Hume was one of terms rather than of opinion.) Brown gives a table of subjective categories, as follows: (1) "Coexistence," including "position," "resemblance or difference," "degree," "proportion," "comprehension," "whole and parts; (2) "Succession," including "casual priority," "causal priority." Emotions are "immediate," "retrospective," and "prospective." Will is mere desire, volition the strongest desire. The moral faculty consists of the "emotions" of "approbation" and "disapprobation." Brown strongly advocates the application of physical methods of inquiry to the study of the mind.

Result. In Brown the principle of intuitionism appears in closest union and also in sharpest contrast with its opposite, that of scepticism. Brown, it is obvious, deviates considerably from the positions of his predecessors in the Scotch school. His philosophy "occupies an intermediate place between the earlier Scotch school and