because the universe is rescued from contradiction as effectually by the supposition of one intelligence in connection with it as by the supposition of ten million, and reason never postulates more than is necessary. Therefore all absolute existences are contingent except one, etc. The ninth proposition (relating to the origin of knowledge) of the ontology is, together with its demonstration, as follows: Matter is not the cause of our perceptive cognitions; in other words, our knowledge of material things is not an effect proceeding from, and brought about by, material things. For matter is the particular part or peculiar element of some of our cognitions, of those which we term ' perceptions.' But the part of cognition cannot be the cause of a cognition. Therefore, etc." The question, What is the origin of knowledge? is unanswerable, because unaskable. No existence at all can be conceived by any intelligence anterior to and aloof from knowledge. Knowledge of existence, the apprehension of one's self and other things, is alone true existence.

Result. A strong light is thrown by Ferrier upon his own doctrines and their opposites by a wealth of accurate knowledge of the history of philosophy. The expressed and implied criticism in his teachings bear not alone upon doctrines which his immediate philosophical environment made it necessary to oppose, the doctrines of the "Scotch school," but upon doctrines of philosophers of every age.

§ 104.

(2) French Systems. It is particularly convenient to take up the French systems at this point, because they are, in a very noticeable degree, repetitions and continuations of the Scotch. We have to treat of Maine de Biran, Pierre Laromiguière, Pierre Paul Royer-Collard, Victor Cousin, Théodore Jouffroy, Robert de Lamennais, Auguste Comte. The last two named have no other than a merely national identity with the others of this group. Comte logically affiliates with the English group. Lamennais shows German influence.

§ 105.

Maine de Biran1 (1766-1824).—Maine de Biran spent most of his not very eventful life in retirement, engaged in reflection. He was at one time member of the company of "Life-Guards" of Louis XVI., and, again, of the Council of the Five Hundred, and of both Chambers, and was Councillor of State, etc. He several times carried off honors from the learned academies of Paris, Berlin, Copenhagen, etc. Personally, he is said Personally, he is said to have been a man of great modesty.

Works. We may mention of his works, which are chiefly psychological: (1) "Sur l'Influence de l'Habitude" (1803); (2) "Sur la Décomposition de la Pensée " (crowned by the Institut in 1805); "Apperception" (1811); "Nouvelles Considérations sur les Rapports du Physique et du Moral de l'Homme" (1811, published 1834); (3) "Essai sur les Fondements de la Psychologie et sur les Rapports avec l'Étude de la Nature" (published 1859); "Nouveaux Essais d'Anthropologie" (1823, posthumously published). These works represent (as indicated) three different stages of thought.

Philosophy: First Stage. Maine de Biran occupies, first, the general standpoint of Bacon, Locke, and Condillac, in whom he sees the true philosophers. He proposes to carry the method of physics over into metaphysics. The understanding is merely the ensemble of the habitudes of the brain. A distinction not made by Condillac - - has to be made between sensation as a passive, and perception as an active, condition of mind; the latter involving, as the former does not, a certain volitional activity. A distinction is also to be made between passively formed " customs" and active "habits."

Second Stage. The sensationalist theory (of Condillac) fails to explain the characteristic attribute of man. It takes as its basis the facts of animal life merely,—the facts

1 Franck; Cousin, "Fragments Philosophiques."

of unconscious affections in the physical nature of man. But the use of these facts to explain man's characteristic quality is a misuse of them. The animal is without real consciousness, does not know that it exists. Man feels and knows the me (moi). The me is to be distinguished from what is merely physical, and for the reason that it perceives itself and distinguishes itself from its object. It is an error to look for the me in fibres, as does the materialist; and it is equally an error to see its nature in the abstract conceptions of the a priori philosophers. The me does not present itself as object, but as subject. It is not to be comprehended as an absolute, independent of consciousness, but is apprehended in self-observation; and yet only on condition that it reveals itself, or acts, i. e., presents itself as will. Descartes said, Je pense, donc je suis; but we may more truthfully say, Je veux, donc je suis, — “ I will, therefore I am;" the will is the self-manifestation of the me. All attempts to derive the me, and also the feeling of personality, from mere sensation are vain. The me has a double character: (1) it is an individual force (not a substance; substance is the category of pantheism); (2) it is inseparably united to a resisting organism. This double character is directly evident to consciousness. From the consciousness of the me's activity we acquire the universal and necessary notions of force, causality, unity, liberty. These notions are not innate, since they depend on a prior activity of the will, but they are absolutely different in character from mere general ideas produced by external observation. They are sui generis; instead of becoming less real, as do ideas derived from sensible perceptions when made the subjects of abstraction, they become more so. It is only by the complete abuse of the spirit of system that the notion of liberty can be treated as a mere abstraction. The will, even when following the stimulus of desire, knows itself to be responsible and free. To understand completely human nature it is necessary to consider its two inseparable interacting elements

one of

which, affection, is variable and relative, while the other, the will, or me, is permanent and absolute in the successive modes of their combination. There result four "systems;" the affective system (le système affectif), the sensitive system (le système sensitif), the perceptive system (le système perceptif), and the reflective system (le système reflectif). The first comprehends the animal life, — pains, pleasures, instinctive phantasies, images, etc., but no will; the second self-consciousness, the localization of affections in the organs, referring intuitions to space, and associating the idea of cause with them, the beginning of memory and generalization, and will in the lowest degree; the third, attention, which involves a higher degree of volitional effort, the seeking of objects of knowledge, exercising active touch and judging of externality, distinguishing primary and secondary qualities, classification, formation of general ideas, intelligence being occupied in this system with external objects calling it forth; the fourth, all acts of intelligence concerned with its own nature, the me here distinguishing itself completely from its opposite, becoming completely conscious of the notions of which it is the source, -the universal and necessary ideas, and establishing upon them the mathematical and metaphysical sciences.

Third Stage.-There is something higher even than will. Will is incapable of being or becoming all that intelligence perceives. In the presence of the idea of the good, the will feels a certain defect in itself, requires aid. The mere light of reason is insufficient. God is the only succor, who is both the source of light in the world of intelligence, and of power in the sphere of will. The me conscious of its weakness, is in a new relation; it is presented with the alternative of submission to sensible nature, towards which its lower tendencies carry it, or of union with the divine nature, the need of which (union) its higher instincts make for it. The higher life thus opened to the me is the life of spirit, of love, instead of will; it is the life on which man turns towards the source of light and force, intelligence and

will, and identifies itself with God, the absolute Truth and absolute Good. Below this highest life are the "life of man (i. e., the life of will, including the systèmes sensitif, perceptif, et réflexif), and the "animal life" (système affectif). By will man rises out of the animal life, by love out of the "life of man,” into the life of spirit. This life is exalted above both Stoicism (which is self-assertion) and Quietism (which is all submission); it is a life of both will and submission, effort and prayer, the life of Christianity.

Result.— Maine de Biran may be said to have begun in France the revolt against sensationalism begun in Scotland by Reid, in Germany by Kant, etc. He is, indeed, sometimes styled the French Kant, and not inappropriately on other accounts than the one here implied. He is admitted to be an original thinker, — the most original of the French philosophers since Descartes, or perhaps Malebranche; and his thought is strongly marked by that twofold energy of self-distinction and self-identification which marks the thought of Kant (and German philosophy after him). Most of the French philosophers who follow in our account were largely indebted to him.

§ 106.

Pierre Laromiguière (1756-1839) was teacher of philosophy in Toulouse and at the École Normale in Paris. We mention his "Éléments de Métaphysique" (1788), and "Leçons de Philosophie, ou Essai sur les Facultés de l'Âme" (1815-1818). Laromiguière, once a close follower of Condillac, departs from the doctrine of his master in an important respect, in that he consciously makes the mind. essentially active instead of passive: with him, not mere sensation, but attention, is the primary faculty of the mind. This is in fact a revolt against the whole principle of sensationalism. From attention are deduced, on the one hand, comparison and reasoning, which together with it constitute the understanding; and on the other, desire, together with