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the rebels; they had already declared their intention of plundering the town; and, as they added, 'in spite of the French,' whom they now regarded and openly denounced as abettors of the Protestants,' much more than as their own allies.

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Justice, however, must be done to the rebels as well as to their military associates. If they were disposed to plunder, they were found uniformly to shrink from bloodshed and cruelty; and yet from no want of energy or determination. 'The peasantry never appeared to want animal courage,' says the Bishop, for they flocked together to meet danger whenever it was expected. Had it pleased Heaven to be as liberal to them of brains as of hands, it is not easy to say to what length of mischief they might have proceeded; but they were all along unprovided with leaders of any ability.' This is true; and yet it would be doing poor justice to the Connaught rebels, nor would it be drawing the moral truly as respects this aspect of the rebellion, if their abstinence from mischief, in its worst form, were to be explained out of this defect in their leaders. Nor is it possible to suppose this the Bishop's meaning, though his words seem to tend that way. For he himself elsewhere notices the absence of all wanton bloodshed, as a feature of this Connaught rebellion, most honorable in itself to the poor misguided rebels, and as distinguishing it very remarkably from the greater insurrection so recently crushed in the centre and the east. It is a circumstance,' says he, worthy of particular noof this civil commotion,

tice, that, during the whole time not a single drop of blood was shed by the Connaught rebels, except in the field of war. It is true the example and influence of the French went a great way to prevent sanguinary excesses. But it will not be deemed fair to ascribe to this cause alone the forbearance of which we

were witnesses, when it is considered what a range of country lay at the mercy of the rebels for several days after the French power was known to be at an end.'

To what then are we to ascribe the forbearance of the Connaught men, so singularly contrasted with the hideous. excesses of their brethren in the east? . Solely to the different complexion of the policy pursued by Government. In Wexford, Kildare, Meath, Dublin, &c., it had been judged advisable to adopt, as a sort of precautionary police, not for the punishment, but for the discovery of rebellious purposes, measures of the direst severity; not merely free-quarterings of the soldiery, with liberty (or even an express commission) to commit outrages and insults upon all who were suspected, upon all who refused to countenance such measures, upon all who presumed to question their justice; but, even under color of martial law, to inflict croppings and pitch-cappings, half-hangings, and the torture of the picketings; to say nothing of houses burnt, and farms laid waste, things which were done daily and under military orders; the purpose avowed being either vengeance for some known act of insurrection, or the determination to extort confessions. Too often, however, as may well be supposed, in such utter disorganization of society, private malice, on account of old family feuds, was the true principle at work. And many were thus driven by mere frenzy of just indignation, or, perhaps, by mere desperation, into acts of rebellion which else they had not meditated. Now, in Connaught at this time, the same barbarous policy was no longer pursued ; and then it was seen, that, unless maddened by ill-usage, the peasantry were capable of the very fullest self-control. There was no repetition of the Enniscorthy massacres; and it was impossible to explain honestly why there was

none, without, at the same time, reflecting back upon that atrocity some color of palliation.

These things duly considered, it must be granted that there was a spirit of unjustifiable violence in the Royal army on achieving their triumph. It is shocking, however, to observe the effect of panic, to excite and irritate the instincts of cruelty and sanguinary violence, even in the gentlest minds. I remember well, on occasion of the memorable tumults in Bristol, (autumn of 1831,) that I, for my part, could not read, without horror and indignation, one statement made, I believe, officially at that time, which yet won the cordial approbation of some ladies who had participated in the panic. I allude to that part of the report which represents several of the dragoons as having dismounted, resigned the care of their horses to persons in the street, and pursued the unhappy fugitives from the mob, up stairs and down stairs, to the last nook of their retreat. The worst criminals could not be known as such; and, even allowing that they could, vengeance so hellish and so unrelenting was not justified by houses burned or by momentary panics raised. Scenes of the same description were beheld upon the first triumph of the Royal cause in Connaught; and but for Lord Cornwallis, equally firm before his success and moderate in its exercise, they would have prevailed more extensively. The poor rebels were pursued with a needless ferocity on the re-capture of Killala. So hotly, indeed, did some of the conquerors hang upon the footsteps of the fugitives, that both rushed almost simultaneously, pursuers and pursued, into the terror-stricken houses of Killala; and in some instances the ball meant for a rebel, told with mortal effect upon a loyalist. Here, indeed, as in other cases of this rebellion, in candor it should be mentioned, that the Royal army was composed chiefly of militia regiments. The Bishop

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of Killala was assured by an intelligent officer of the King's army, that the victors were within a trifle of being beaten. I was myself told by a gentleman, who rode as a volunteer on that day, that, to the best of his belief, it was merely a mistaken order of the rebel chiefs, causing a false application of a select reserve at a very critical moment, which had saved his own party from a decisive repulse. It may be added, upon almost universal testimony, that the re-capture of Killala was abused, not only as respected the defeated rebels, but also as respected the loyalists of that town. The regiments that came to their assistance, being all militia, seemed to think that they had a right to take the property they had been the means of preserving, and to use it as their own whenever they stood in need of it. Their rapacity differed in no respect from that of the rebels, except that they seized upon things with less of ceremony and excuse, and that his Majesty's soldiers were incomparably superior to the Irish traitors in dexterity at stealing. In consequence, the town grew very weary of their guests, and were glad to see them march off to other quarters.'

The military operations in this brief campaign were discreditable, in the last degree, to the energy, to the vigilance, and to the steadiness of the Orange army. Humbert had been a leader against the royalists of La Vendée, as well as on the Rhine; consequently he was an ambidextrous enemy fitted equally for partisan warfare, and the tactics of regular armies. Keenly alive to the necessity under his circumstances of vigor and despatch, after occupying Killala on the evening of the 22d August, (the day of his disembarkation,) where the small garrison of 50 men, (yeomen and fencibles) had made a tolerable resistance; and after other trifling affairs, on the 26th, he had marched against Castlebar, with about 800 of his own men,

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and 1500 or 1000 of the rebels. Here was the advanced post of the Royal army. General Lake, (the Lord Lake of India,) and Major General Hutchinson, (the Lord Hutchinson of Egypt,) had assembled upon this point a respectable force; some say upwards of 4000, others not more than 1100; I heard from what may be considered respectable eye-witnesses, that the whole amount might be reckoned fairly at 2500. The disgraceful result is well known the French, marching all night over mountain roads, and through one pass which was thought impregnable, if it had been occupied by a battalion, instead of a captain's guard, surprised Castlebar on the morning of the 27th. I say surprised,' for no word, short of that, can express the circumstances of the case. About two o'clock in the morning, a courier had brought intelligence of the French advance; but from some unaccountable obstinacy at head-quarters, such as had proved fatal more than either once or twice in the Wexford campaign, his news was disbelieved; yet, if disbelieved, why, therefore, neglected? Neglected, however it was; and at seven, when the news was found to be true, the Royal army was drawn out in hurry and confusion to meet the enemy. The French, on their part, seeing our strength, looked for no better result for themselves than summary surrender, more especially as our artillery was well served, and soon began to tell upon their ranks. Better hopes first arose, as they afterwards declared, upon observing that many of the troops fired in a disorderly way, without waiting for the word of command; upon this they took new measures: in a few minutes a panic arose; and, in spite of all that could be done by the officers, the whole army ran. General Lake ordered a retreat; and then the flight became irretrievable. The troops reached Tuam, thirty miles distant, on that same day; and one small party of mounted men actually pushed

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