53. Prominent characteristics by which man is honorably distinguished from the other inhabitants of this world?

54. As a rational being, how is he distinguished from other animals? 55. What are some of the arguments by which we satisfy ourselves, independently of revelation, that man is destined to be an immortal being? 56. What do we understand by the liberty of a moral agent?

57. What do we understand by the responsibility and accountability of man?

58. How far is this law intimated to us by reason and the moral faculty; and how far does the course of nature countenance and support it? 59. On what does the happiness of man, in the present state, greatly depend?

60. Of what service to man is the present state of probation and discipline in which he is placed?

CHAPTER II.

THE VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLE.

SECTION I-ITS NATURE AND OPERATION.

61. THE voluntary principle is that power of the mind by which it determines to act, or not to act, in those cases which depend on its own determination: the act of the mind in thus determining, is denominated volition.

The will must be influenced before any active energy is put forth it becomes important therefore to ascertain those principles of our nature which, on account of their exerting this influence, have been termed active and moral; and to the operation of which we trace every virtue and every crime, from the deeds of beneficence by which the names of patriots and legislators have been consecrated, to the guilty ambition which treads in blood to the attainment of its object.

62. Those human actions which are performed independently of an act of the will, are termed involuntary.

There are others which, because they partake of the nature of voluntary and involuntary actions, are called mixed; they are under the power of the will, but are generally performed without it.

Voluntary actions may be distinguished from all others by this, that they are done with a view to some object; and proceed from the volitions of a being possessing reason and intelligence; whereas those which result from the principles called instincts, are generally, if not always, per

RELATION OF MOTIVES TO VOLITION.

37

formed without any previous conception of them. This remark applies also to things which, though originally done by conscious volition, are afterward performed by habit. Thus we often shut and open our eyes without the consciousness of any such operation.

63. Whatever incites man to act is called a principle of action. It is difficult to give a complete enumeration of the various exciting causes by which all men are influenced. It is to be observed also that the same train of actions may proceed from different principles: and again, actions which seem to spring from one or two principles may actually proceed from many.

[Dewar's Moral Philosophy.] 64. The chief springs of action in the constitution of man are, the appetites; the affections; the desires; the moral faculty, or conscience.

The nature of these we shall briefly set forth, after offering an explanation of the influence of motives.

61. How may this principle be described?

62. With respect to the will, how are human actions distinguished? 63. What do philosophers mean by a principle of action?

64. What are the chief principles or springs of action, in the constitution of man?

SECTION II.-INFLUENCE OF MOTIVES.

Nature of the relation between Volition and the circumstances on which its regularity depends.

65. THE circumstances in which we are placed, in so far as volition is regulated by them, are usually called motives. Motives therefore are not a distinct set of entities (existences), but any kind of entities whatsoever that influence volition. Pleasure, for instance, may be a motive; friendship, or enmity may be a motive; a favorable season may be a motive, an unfavorable season may be a motive; fire, water, snow, and ice, may each be a motive. everything in the universe which the mind can conceive, In short, may become a motive.

66. The relation between motives and volitions understood from the following observations:

may be

(1.) Nothing can be regarded as a motive unless we have some knowledge of it.

(2.) Motives do not operate physically or spontaneously,

or necessarily. So far as anything acts physically, it is never styled a motive.

If an

(3.) Motives do not supersede our own agency. organic impression excite a sensation, or an interesting perception excite an emotion, we are not active, but passive; we do not act, but are acted upon. But the case is totally different where motives are concerned. We ourselves then act; and motives, instead of destroying, or even impairing our agency, only afford us an opportunity of rightly exerting it. If a person, for instance, give a dollar for the relief of the distressed, the relief is the motive of his gift, but the action is nevertheless his own, and his agency in it is not in the slightest degree impaired by its proceeding from a motive.

67. Motives occur on all occasions, and must be of some use. Their only office, we suppose, is to afford knowledge to the understanding, and thus direct us in the exercise of volition. In reality, if they neither act as physical causes, nor impair our own agency, it is impossible to conceive them to have any other office; and when we look to facts, we find that this is the very office to which they are applied.

A person, for example, informs us that if we pursue a certain line of conduct, we shall experience good; that if we pursue another, we shall experience evil. In consequence of this information we choose the former and avoid the latter, and the information is styled the motive of our choice. But nothing seems more evident than that the information does not act on our will at all: it merely gives us passive knowledge, according to which we ourselves choose to act.

A connection certainly exists between motives and the will; but it is not a physical-it is merely a voluntary connection (some would call it a moral one), and is occasioned by the will itself. In other words, man himself chooses to act according to the knowledge which motives afford, and thus establishes a connection between them and his choice.

68. It may be said, by way of objection, that motives possess different degrees of power, and their different degrees of power can be nothing but their different degrees

of influence on the will.

This objection is easily answered. Motives obtain

INFLUENCE OF MOTIVES.

39

from us different degrees of preference; and it is these degrees of preference that constitute what are called their degrees of power. The expressions then, moral power and power of motives, though convenient, are really a species of misnomer, and are to be understood in the manner we have defined.

It appears also from this discussion that the mind, in view of the motive, and not the motive, begins the particular results that take place, and consequently, in the strict and proper sense of the expression, is their source.

69. Though in the use of volition we are not restricted to a particular course of action, it by no means follows that we shall conduct ourselves contingently or at random. On the contrary, being intelligent, as well as free agents, we will certainly conduct ourselves according to the circumstances in which we find ourselves placed.

It may be added, that to act according to a motive, is merely to perform an action for the attainment or accomplishment of something which the motive presents to us. [Ballantyne's Examination of the Human Mind.]

An executive This is an act

70. "External motives are not of such a nature, that volitions of a certain character invariably proceed from them, independently of the nature, and state, and feelings of the mind, which acts in view of them. But if a motive has any influence on the determination of the will, it is one of the antecedents on which the volition depends. Yet if it is an external object, it is not the immediate antecedent. This is an act or state of the mind. volition must be preceded by an emotion. or state of the mind. Before this emotion there must be an apprehension of the object. a state of the mind. Apprehension and emotion must both intervene, between the external object and the volition. The object then can have no influence on the volition, except by influencing the mind; in other words, here must be not only a motive, but an agent. The agent does not will without motives; nor do motives will without an agent."

can be felt,

This is also

71. "The concurrence of the mind, in giving efficacy to motives, is evident from the fact, that the same external object will excite in different minds, or even in the same mind at different times, very different feelings, and lead very different choices.

to

The influence of an external motive (or the action of the mind in view of it) will vary with the state of the mind to which it is presented. And the feelings excited in the mind will vary as the objects before it are changed. If motives and the state of the mind are not both concerned, in determining the acts of the will, then they must be determined either by the mind alone, so that whatever be the motives presented, its volitions will be the same; or by motives alone, so that whatever be the state of mind, the volitions will be the same." [Day on the Will.]

65. How may the term motives be defined?

66. By what observations will the way be prepared to understand the relation between motives and volition?

67. What then is the office of motives?

68. What objection may be advanced against the view of motives now given?

69. May it not be objected to this doctrine that the mind will thus act at random and contingently?

70. What influence upon our choice is exerted by the state or feelings of the mind?

71. How does it appear that a concurrence of the mind is necessary in giving efficacy to motives?

SECTION III.-INFLUENCE EXERTED UPON THE WILL, BY KNOWLEDGE, ATTENTION, AND MORAL HABITS.

IT is a well-known fact that the will of individuals is influenced differently with the same motives before them. The principles on which this fact can be explained, may be referred to the three heads of Knowledge, Attention, and Moral Habits.

(1.) Influence of Knowledge.

72. A primary and most essential element in the due regulation of the will is a correct knowledge of the truths and motives which tend to influence its determinations.

73. The highest class of these comprehends the truths of religious belief-a series of moral causes, the tendencies of which are of the most important kind, and calculated to exert a uniform influence upon every man who surrenders himself to their guidance.

74. The sacred writers speak in the strongest terms of the guilt attached to voluntary ignorance; and this guilt must be evident to every one who considers the clearness with which the highest truths are disclosed, and the in