knowledge. But to understand better the use and force of language as subservient to knowledge, we shall consider; 1st-To what, in the use of language, names are immediately applied: 2dly-Since all, except proper names, are general, we must consider what the sorts and kinds, that is the Species and Genera of things are, wherein they consist, and how they come to be made.-By these means, we shall the better discover the right use of words,-the natural advantages and defects of language,—and the remedies that ought to be used for avoiding the inconveniencies of obscurity or uncertainty in the signification of words; without which it is impossible to discourse with any clearness or order concerning knowledge for knowledge being conversant about propositions, and those most commonly universal ones, has greater connexion with words than perhaps is suspected.

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CHAP. II.

OF THE SIGNIFICATION OF WORDS.

THE comfort and advantage of society depending on the communication of thoughts, in order to make them known, some external sensible signs were neces

sary. To do this fully and quickly nothing was so fit as those articulate sounds which man finds himself able to make with so much ease and variety. Though words are by nature so well adapted to be the signs of ideas, yet the connexion between them is arbitrary, not natural, otherwise there would be but one language amongst men. The use of words being either to record our thoughts for own purposes, or to communicate them to others, they represent in their primary signification, only the ideas of him who uses them, however imperfectly his ideas may have been formed from things themselves. Words that are insignificant are signs of nothing. A child noticing nothing in a substance called Gold but the yellow colour, applies the word Gold only to his own idea of that colour; and therefore calls the same colour in a peacock's tail Gold: another adds great weight to the colour; and another adds fusibility and malleability to these: the word Gold equally expresses the idea of each person, but in each case denotes a different idea.-Though words can immediately signify nothing but the ideas in the mind of the speaker, yet men secretly refer them to two other things: 1st, to the ideas in other men's minds; and 2dly, to the reality of things. Men generally use words without examination in the common acceptation, and suppose them associated with ideas precisely the same in the minds of those they address:-and fre

quently wish to express not merely their own ideas, but the reality of things, and thus introduce obscurity and confusion into the signification of words.By constant use there is such a connexion between certain sounds, and the ideas they stand for, that the objects themselves could hardly excite their ideas more readily. This is manifest in all qualities and substances that are obvious and familiar to us.-We learn many words, from their constant use, before we know the ideas they stand for; and indeed men, not careful to settle their signification, too, often set their thoughts more on words than things: but words are only of use so far as there is a constant connexion between the sound and the idea. That words have no natural connexion with ideas, but are quite of arbitrary imposition, is evident from their so often failing to excite in others the ideas we make them the signs of.

ALL things that exist being particulars, it may be thought reasonable that words in their signification should be so too. Yet the greatest part of words

in all languages are general terms; which has not been the effect of neglect or chance, but of reason and necessity. It is impossible and useless to give each thing a distinct name: for in the application of names to things, the mind must have distinct ideas of things, and retain the peculiar appropriation of each name to its idea; but it is out of the power of human capacity to frame and retain distinct ideas of each particular thing. Besides, should any one apply distinct names to his ideas of particular things, he would not be understood, because these names would not excite the same ideas in those who were unacquainted with each distinct object. But, supposing it possible, it would not be of any great use in the advancement of knowledge; which though founded in particulars, enlarges itself by general views, to which things reduced into sorts under general names are properly subservient. Use requires these names, and the mind can contain them: yet where convenience demands it, as in the human species, men having most to do with men, each particular object obtains a distinct denomination. Hence cities, rivers, mountains, and frequently horses, &c. have particular names. We must next inquire how general terms are made, or where we find those general natures they represent. Words become general, by being made the signs of general ideas: and ideas become general, by separating from them the circumstances

of Time, Place, and any other ideas that may determine them to this or that particular existence. By this way of Abstraction they are made capable of representing more individuals than one; each of which, having in it a conformity to that abstract idea, is (as we say) of that sort. Nothing is more evident than that the ideas of children are all particular :— the Ideas and names of Nurse and Mamma are by them confined to individuals: when afterwards they observe many resemblances between the persons they have been used to and others, they frame an idea comprehending those particulars of agreement, and give it the name of man: thus they have a general name and a general idea: wherein they invent nothing, but only leave out of their complex ideas of Peter and James, Mary and Jane, what is peculiar to each, and retain what is common to all.-In the same way, observing several things to agree with and differ from man in certain qualities, they unite their similar qualities into one idea; thus, by leaving out the shape and some other properties signified by the name man, and retaining only a body with life, sense, and spontaneous motion, they give to this more general idea the name animal. So the mind proceeds to form those universal terms which stand for any of our ideas whatever, as being, thing: In short, the whole mystery of Genera and Species, so justly disregarded out of the schools, is nothing else but abstract ideas