to be settled in the minds of their scholars, in order to convince them of truths in particular instances, which were not so familiar to them as the Axioms they had learnt: though these particular truths, when well reflected on, are no less self-evident than the axioms themselves. The schools making disputation the touchstone of men's abilities, and the criterion of knowledge, adjudged the victory to him that kept the field: but as skilful combatants could always run out into an endless train of syllogisms, certain general propositions, mostly self-evident, were introduced into the schools; and these, being allowed by all, directed and limited the excursions of the disputants. Though it was accounted a glory in the schools obstinately to maintain any side of a question, even after conviction, I think the rational part of mankind will scarcely believe that such a practice could be admitted among the lovers of Truth and students of Religion or Nature: a practice likely to turn men's minds from the sincere search and love of Truth, and to make them doubt whether there be any such thing, at least, that is worth adhering to.

It is one thing to shew a man that he is in an error, and another to put him in possession of truth: but what truths can these maxims teach us, which are only about identical predications? Our knowledge begins with particulars, and gradually rises to generals; but we take afterwards the quite contrary course,

draw our knowledge into general propositions, and have recourse to them as the standards of truth and falsehood. Hence we get a habit of supposing that particular propositions derive their truth and evidence from their conformity with general ones.

Unless we have correct and settled notions of things, general maxims will confirm us in mistakes, and serve to prove contradictions. He who with Des Cartes shall consider Body to be nothing but Extension, may easily demonstrate that there is no vacuum and he who considers Body as possessing both extension and solidity, may as easily demonstrate that there is a vacuum. A child making whiteness one of the constant simple ideas in his complex one of man, may demonstrate by the maxim" it is impossible for the same to be and not to be," that a negro is not a man.

CHAP. VIII.

OF TRIFLING PROPOSITIONS.

ALL purely Identical Propositions contain no instruction in them: though they may sometimes serve to shew a man the absurdity he is guilty of, when by circumlocution or equivocal terms he denies -the same thing of itself; because no one will affirm visible contradictions in plain words. By identical

propositions I mean such only, where the same term, importing the same idea, is affirmed of itself.

Another sort of trifling is when a part of a complex idea is predicated of the name of the whole,a part of the definition of the word defined. Such are all propositions wherein the genus is predicated of the species,-more comprehensive of less comprehensive terms. What information does the proposition "Lead is a metal," convey to a man who knows the complex idea signified by the word Lead? since all the simple ideas comprised in the term metal were comprehended in the name Lead. To one indeed who knew the meaning of the word metal and not of the word lead, such a proposition is a shorter explanation than the enumeration of its sim、 ple ideas heaviness, fusibility, malleability.

To predicate any part of the definition of the term defined,—one of its simple ideas of the complex one, is also trifling: as, "all gold is fusible;" for fusibility is a simple idea comprehended in the name gold, and the signification of that name is supposed to be understood. Such propositions may serve to remind a disingenuous reasoner of the definition of his own terms; and are necessary in those cases where the hearer is not supposed to understand the terms used by the speaker.

Those propositions contain instructive truth, where something is affirmed of another, which is

a necessary consequence of its precise complex idea, but not contained in it: as "the external angle of all triangles is bigger than either of the opposite internal angles;" for this relation of the outward angle makes no part of the complex idea of a triangle.

We know so little of the real nature of things, and hence of what combinations of simple ideas may co-exist in substances, that general propositions concerning them are for the most part trifling and uncertain.

The worst sort of trifling, however, is the vague use of words; owing either to inadvertency, or to a desire of sheltering ignorance under obscurity of Language.

CHAP. IX.

OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF EXISTENCE.

HITHERTO we have considered only the essences of things, or our own ideas abstracted from all particular existence. Universal propositions, of whose truth or falsehood we can have certain knowledge, do not concern existence: but all particular propositions, which if made general would not be

certain, concern only existence: for they declare the accidental union or separation of ideas in things existing, which in their abstract natures have no known necessary connexion or repugnancy.

But leaving the nature of propositions to be considered elsewhere, let us enquire concerning our knowledge of Existence. I say then, we know our own existence by Intuition; the existence of God by Demonstration; and that of other things by Sensation.

We perceive, our own existence so certainly, that it is not capable of being proved. I cannot doubt of all other things, without perceiving my own existence for my perception of the existence of the thing doubting is as certain as my perception of the thought called doubt.

CHAP. X.

OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF A GOD.

THOUGH God has not given us any innate ideas of himself, he has furnished us with faculties to know him so far as is necessary to the end of our being. Though this be the most obvious truth that