or six syllogisms? indeed it is a view of the natural order of the connecting ideas that directs the order of the syllogisms. An ingenuous searcher after Truth needs no such forms to force him to allow the inference from the visible connexion of two ideas.

Nor are syllogisms of any use to detect the fallacies of rhetorical discourses; where, the fancy being struck with lively metaphorical representations, men do not easily perceive the true ideas on which the inference depends: but they need only strip the argumentation of those superfluous ideas which seem to shew a connexion where there is none, or at least conceal the want of it. Besides this, scholastic forms. are not less liable to fallacies than plainer ways of argumentation, but are rather adapted to entangle than. instruct the mind: and hence those who are baffled in that way are seldom convinced, except indeed of their adversary's superior skill in disputation. After all, every one knows what best fits his own sight; if the use of these spectacles has rendered them necessary to any one, I would not forbid them; only let him not conclude all to be in the dark, who use not the same helps.

Before I leave this subject I shall notice one manifest mistake in the rules of syllogism: viz. "that no syllogistical reasoning canbe right and conclusive, but what has at least one general proposition in it:" as if we could not reason about particulars; when rightly considered the immediate object of all our knowledge is nothing

but particulars. We can only reason about the ideas in our minds, which are all of them particular existences; and our reasoning about other things is only as they correspond with these ideas. The utmost of our knowledge then is the perception of the agreement or disagreement of particular ideas; and universality is but accidental to it; consisting in the correspondence of those ideas with more than one particular thing.

Our reason often fails us: 1st, Where our ideas fail: 2dly, When our ideas are confused, imperfect, or obscure; 3dly, When it wants intermediate ideas for shewing the relation of others; 4thly, When it begins with false principles; 5th, When it involves itself in dubious words.

There are four sorts of arguments which men commonly use to prevail on the assent of others, or to silence their opposition. The first is, to alledge the opinions of men whose learning, eminence, or some other cause has settled their reputation in the common esteem; so that it is thought a breach of modesty to question their authority. This is called argumentum ad verecundiam.-The second is, to require their adversary to admit what they alledge as a proof, or assign a better. This I call argumentum ad ignorantiam.-The third is, to press a man with consequences drawn from his own principles or concessions: called argumentum ad hominem.-The

fourth is, to use proofs drawn from any of the foundations of knowledge or probability: known by the name, argumentum ad judicium.

This last alone brings instruction with it: for, 1st, It argues not a man's opinion to be right, that I from any other consideration than conviction will not contradict him. 2nd, It proves not another man to be in the right way, nor that I ought to take the same, that I know not a better. 3d, It follows not that another is right from his shewing me that I am wrong. I may be modest, and not oppose another man's opinion; ignorant, and not able to pro ́duce a better; wrong, and be convinced of my error: This may dispose me for the reception of truth, but does not help me to it: arguments, and not my modesty, ignorance, or error, must do that.

"By what has been before said of Reason, we may be able to make some guess at the distinction. of things, into those that are according to, above, and contrary to Reason.

1st, According to Reason are such propositions, whose truth we can discover, by examining and tracing those ideas we have from Sensation and Reflection; and by natural deduction find to be true or probable. 2nd, Above Reason are such propositions, whose truth or probability we cannot by reason derive from those principles. 3d, Contrary to Reason are such propositions, as are inconsistent with,

or irreconcilable to our clear and distinct ideas. Thus, the existence of one GOD is according to Reason; the existence of more than one GOD contrary to Reason; the Resurrection of the Dead above Reason.

Farther, as above Reason may be taken in a double sense, viz. either as signifying above probability, or above certainty; so in that large sense also contrary to Reason is, I suppose, sometimes taken.

There is another use of the word Reason, wherein it is opposed to Faith; which, though it be in itself a very improper way of speaking, yet common use has so authorised it, that it would be folly either to oppose or hope to remedy it; only I think it may not be amiss to take notice, that however Faith be opposed to Reason, Faith is nothing but a firm assent of the mind: which if it be regulated, as is our duty, cannot be afforded to any thing, but upon good Reason, and so cannot be opposite to it.

He that believes, without having any Reason for believing, may be in love with his own Fancies; but neither seeks Truth as he ought, nor pays the obedience due to his Maker, who would have him use those discerning faculties he has given him, to keep him out of mistake and error. He that does not this to the best of his power, however he sometimes lights on Truth, is in the right but by Chance; and I know not whether the luckiness of the accident will excuse the

irregularity of his proceeding. This at least is certain, that he must be accountable for whatever mistakes he runs into; whereas he that makes use of the light and faculties GOD has given him, and seeks sincerely to discover Truth by those helps and abilities he has, may have this satisfaction in doing his duty as a rational creature, that, though he should miss Truth, he will not miss the Reward of it: For he governs his Assent right, and places it as he should, who in any case or matter whatsoever believes or disbelieves according as Reason directs him. He that does otherwise, transgresses against his own light, and misuses those faculties which were given him to no other end, but to search and follow the clearer evidence, and greater probability. But since Reason and Faith are by some men opposed, we will so consider them in the following chapter."

CHAP. XVIII.

OF FAITH AND REASON, AND THEIR DIS-
TINCT PROVINCES.

FROM what has been premised I think we may now lay down the measures and boundaries of Faith and Reason; the want of which has caused great