examination, determine on which side the probability rests. Where there is reason to suspect a fallacy in words, or that certain proofs of equal weight may be produced on the contrary side, there suspense or dissent are often voluntary actions: but where neither of these cases happens, I think a man can scarce refuse his assent to the more probable argument. Whether or not it be probable that a promiscuous jumble of letters should fall into a coherent discourse, or that a fortuitous concourse of atoms should frequently constitute the bodies of any species of animals, no one, I think, can hesitate in determining. The thing being in its own nature indifferent, and depending on testimony, when there is no reason to suppose as fair testimony against as for the matter of fact (that there was 1700 years ago such a man at Rome as Julius Cæsar) I think no rational man can refuse his assent. In less clear cases I think a man may suspend his assent, and content himself with the proofs he has, if they favour the opinion that suits his interest. But that any one should afford his assent to what appears to him less probable, appears to me as impossible as to believe the same thing probable and improbable at the same time:

As Knowledge is no more arbitrary than Perception, so Assent is no more in our power than Knowledge. With my eyes open, I cannot avoid seeing

objects in day-light; where the agreement of two ideas is perceived, I must have knowledge; and where I perceive the greater probability, I must give my assent: yet I can prevent both knowledge and assent, by stopping enquiry, and not employing my faculties in the search of Truth. How else could ignorance, error, or infidelity ever be a fault? In inany cases, where our assent either way is of no importance, the mind may render itself to the first comer. The foundation of Error then lies in wrong measures of Probability, as the foundation of Vice in wrong measures of Good.

The fourth and last wrong measure of probability I shall take notice of, and which keeps in ignorance or error more people than all the other together, is that which I have mentioned in the foregoing chapter, I mean, the giving up our Assent to the common received Opinions, either of our friends or party, neighbourhood or country. How many men have no other ground for their tenets than the supposed honesty, or learning, or number of those of the same profession? As if honest or bookish men could not err; or truth were to be established by the vote of the multitude; yet this, with most men, serves the turn. The tenet has had the attestation of reverend antiquity; it comes to me with the passport of former ages, and therefore I am secure in the reception I give it ;-other men have

been, and are of the same opinion, (for that is all is said) and therefore it is reasonable for me to embrace it. A man may more justifiably throw up Cross and Pile for his opinions, than take them up by such measures. All men are liable to error, and most men are, in many points, by passion or interest, under temptation to it. If we could but see the secret motives that influenced the men of name and learning in the world, and the leaders of parties, we should not always find, that it was the embracing of Truth for its own sake, that made them espouse the doctrines they owned and maintained. This at least is certain, there is not an opinion so absurd, which a man may not receive upon this ground. There is no error to be named, which has not had its professors; and a man shall never want crooked paths to walk in, if he thinks that he is in the right way, wherever he has the footsteps of others to follow.

But notwithstanding the great noise is made in the world about errors and opinions, I must do mankind that right as to say, There are not so many men in errors and wrong opinions, as is commonly supposed. Not that I think they embrace the Truth; but, indeed, because concerning those doctrines they keep such a stir about they have no thought, no opinion at all. For if any one should a little catechize the greatest part of the partizans of most

of the sects in the world, he would not find, concerning those inatters they are so zealous for, that they have any opinions of their own: much less would he have reason to think, that they took them upon the examination of arguments, and appearance of probability. They are resolved to stick to a party that education or interest has engaged them in; and there, like the common soldiers of an army, shew their courage and warmth as their leaders direct, without ever examining, or so much as knowing the cause they contend for. If a man's life shews that he has no serious regard for religion; for what reason should we think, that he beats his head about the opinions of his church, and troubles himself to examine the grounds of this or that doctrine? "Tis enough for him to obey his leaders, to have his hand and his tongue ready for the support of the common cause, and thereby approve himself to those who can give him credit, preferment, or protection in that society. Thus men become professors of, and combatants for those opinions they were never convinced of, nor proselytes to; no, nor never had so much as floating in their heads; and tho' one cannot say there are fewer improbable or erroneous opinions in the world than there are, yet this is certain, there are fewer that actually assent to them, and mistake them for Truths, than is imagined."

CHAP. XXI.

OF THE DIVISION OF THE SCIENCES.

"ALL that can fall within the compass of Human Understanding being either, 1st. The nature of Things, as they are in themselves, their relations, and their manner of operation :—or 2dly, That which Man himself ought to do, as a rational and voluntary agent, for the attainment of any end, especially happiness or 3dly, The ways and means whereby the knowledge of both the one and the other of these are attained and communicated:-I think, Science may be divided properly into these three

sorts.

1st, The Knowledge of Things, as they are in their own proper Beings, their constitutions, properties and operations, whereby I mean not only Matter and Body, but Spirits also, which have their proper natures, constitutions, and operations, as well as Bodies. This, in a little more enlarged sense of the word, I call booth, or natural Philosophy. The end of this is bare Speculative Truth, and whatsoever can afford the mind of man any such, falls under this branch, whether it be God