Billeder på siden
PDF
ePub

"Massachusett's Bay. The act passed the third of November, 1784, suspending the payment of interest.

"New-York. The act of the 12th of July, 1782, by which British creditors are precluded from the claim of interest before the first of January, 1786, for debts contracted prior to the first of January, 1783, and executions on the principal are forbidden to be levied until the expiration of three years after the evacuation of New York.

"The act of the seventeenth of March, 1783, confirmed by others in 1784 and 1785, &c.

66

Pennsylvania. The law passed soon after the peace, to restrain the recovery of British debts for a given period.

"Maryland. The act of October, 1780, allowing British debts to be paid into the Treasury; and that no provision is since made for it. The sum paid in is £144,574 9s. 4 d.

66

Virginia. By an edict of the governor, of the second of July, 1783, al British agents and factors who had arrived in that state, were ordered to depart the same; which restriction was removed by the legislature in November following, and the British agents and factors were permitted to return. By an act of October, 1784, all British debts are to be paid by seven equal payments; the first to be made the first of April, 1786, and so on annually. That no interest shall be allowed to British subjects between the nineteenth of April, 1775, and the third of March, 1783, the said time to be considered as one day. That no settlement made by bond or other specialty, shall bear interest. This act passed the house of delegates and senate, but did not at the same time receive all the formalities; therefore, it is doubtful whether it exists as a law. The sum paid into the treasury, on account of British creditors, £273,554 13s. 7d.

[ocr errors]

1

North

"North Carolina. Some acts of this state complained of, but not particularly mentioned.

"South Carolina. By an ordinance, passed the twenty-sixth of March, 1784, no suit shall be instituted for a debt previous to the twenty-sixth of February, 1782, until the first of January, 1785, when the interest only, which had accrued since January 1780, might be recovered; and on the first of January, 1786, one-fourth part of the principal, and all such interest as might be then due, and so on. By another act, of the twelfth of October, 1785, a debtor, during any period of a suit, is allowed to tender land, which, after being valued, the creditor is obliged to take at three-fourths of the valuation. These acts, and others, and the conduct of this state, are greatly complained of.

"Georgia. This state is charged with having passed laws and regulations similar to those of South Carolina, with the aggravated circumstance, that the judges from the bench have declared, that no suit shall be proceeded in, if brought by a British subject, while, on the contrary, they allow British subjects to be sued by their creditors.

"That no provision is made for the real property, confiscated and sold for public service, nor for money paid into the public treasury. His lordship observes, that most of the acts which interrupt and prevent the collection of British debts, in the preamble run thus: "Whereas, this state is determined to fulfil and carry into effect the treaty in all its parts," &c. Upon the whole, that a British merchant is in some states positively, in others virtually, prohibited by the legislature from recovering his property, which is a violation of the fourth article of the treaty of peace. In several of the states, judgment for interest for more than seven years, is actually suspended by law; whilst in others, although the courts appear to be open,

E 4

the

the lawyers are afraid to prosecute for British debts.

"Those creditors are deemed fortunate, who, upon giving up all claim to interest (which is equal to thirty, and, in some cases, to forty per cent.) can obtain security for the payment of the principal."

Upon receiving this letter from London, the old Congress, which was then in being, sent the following circular letter to the governors of the respective states,

"SIR,

"Our secretary for foreign affairs has transmitted to you copies of a letter to him from our minister at the court of London, of the fourth day of March, 1786, and of the papers mentioned to have been enclosed in it.

"We have deliberately and dispassionately examined and considered the several facts and matters urged by Britain as infractions of the treaty of peace on the part of America; and we regret, that in some of the states, too little attention appears to have been paid to the public faith, pledged by that treaty.

"Not only the obvious dictates of religion, morality, and national honour, but also the first principles of good policy, demand a candid and punctual compliance with engagements constitytionally and fairly made.

"Our national constitution having committed to us the management of the national concerns with foreign states and powers, it is our duty to take care that all the rights which they ought to enjoy, within our jurisdiction, by the laws of nations, and the faith of treaties, remain inviolate. And it is also our duty to provide that the essential interests and peace of the whole confederacy be

not

not impaired or endanged by deviations from the line of public faith, into which any of its members may, from whatever cause, be unadvisedly drawn.

"Let it be remembered, that the thirteen independent sovereign states have, by express delegation of power, formed and vested in us a general, though limited sovereignty, for the general and national purposes specified in the confederation. In this sovereignty, they cannot severally participate (except by their delegates) nor with it have concurrent jurisdiction: for the ninth article of the confederation most expressly conveys to us the sole and exclusive right and power of determining on war and peace,. and of entering into treaties and alliances, &c.

"When, therefore, a treaty is constitutionally made, ratified, and published by us, it immediately becomes binding on the whole nation, and superadded to the laws of the land, without the intervention or fiat of state legislatures. Treaties derive their obligation from being compacts between the sovereign of this, and the sovereign of another nation; whereas, laws or statutes derive their force from being acts of a legislature, competent to the passing of them.

"Hence it is clear, that treaties must be implicitly received and observed by every member of the nation; for, as state legislatures are not competent to the making of such compacts or treaties, so neither are they competent in that capacity authoritatively to decide on, or ascertain the construction and sense of them. When doubts arise respecting the construction of state laws, it is not unusual nor improper for the state legislatures, by explanatory or declaratory acts, to remove those doubts; but the case between laws and compacts or treaties, is, in this, widely different; for, when doubts

doubts arise respecting the sense and meaning of a treaty, they are so far from being cognizable by a state legislature, that the United States in Congress assembled have no authority to settle and determine them. For, as the legislature only, which constitutionally passes a law, has power to revise and amend it; so the sovereigns only, who are parties to the treaty, have power by mutual consent and posterior articles, to correct or explain it.

"In cases between individua's, all doubts respecting the meaning of a treaty, like all doubts respecting the meaning of a law, are, in the first instance, mere judicial questions, and are to be heard and decided in the courts of justice having cognizance of the causes in which they arise, and whose duty it is to determine them according to the rules and maxims established by the laws of nations for the interpretation of treaties. From these principles, it follows, of necessary consequence, that no individual state has a right, by legislative acts to decide and point out the sense in which their particular citizens and courts shall understand this or that article of a treaty.

"It is evident, that a contrary doctrine would not only militate against the common and established maxims and ideas relative to this subject, but would prove no less ludicrous in practice than it is irrational in theory; for, in that case, the same article of the same treaty might by law be made to mean one thing in New-Hampshire, and · another in New-York, and neither the one nor the other of them in Georgia.

"How far such legislative acts would be valid and obligatory, even within the limits of the state passing them, is a question which we hope never to have occasion to discuss. Certain, however, it is, that such acts cannot bind either of the con

tracting

« ForrigeFortsæt »