to be fuch as have been formerly imprinted; i. e. in view, and taken notice of before by the understanding:

Two defects

in the memory, oblivion and flowness.

§. 8. Memory, in an intellectual creature, is neceffary in the next degree to perception. It is of fo great moment, that where it is wanting, all the reft of our faculties. are in a great measure ufelefs: and we in our thoughts, reafonings, and knowledge, could not proceed beyond prefent objects, were it not for the affiftance of our memories, wherein there may be two defects.

First, That it lofes the idea quite, and fo far it produces perfect ignorance. For fince we can know nothing farther than we have the idea of it, when that is gone, we are in perfect ignorance.

Secondly, That it moves flowly, and retrieves not the ideas that it has, and are laid up in ftore, quick enough to ferve the mind upon occafion. This, if it be to a great degree, is ftupidity; and he, who, through this default in his memory, has not the ideas that are really preferved there, ready at hand when need and occafion calls for them, were almoft as good be without them quite, fince they ferve him to little purpofe. The dull man, who lofes the opportunity whilft he is fecking in his mind for thofe ideas that thould ferve his turn, is not much more happy in his knowledge than one that is perfectly ignorant. It is the bufinefs therefore of the memory to furnish to the mind thofe dormant ideas which it has prefent occafion for; in the having them ready at hand on all occafions, confifts that which we call invention, fancy, and quickness of parts.

§. 9. Thefe are defects, we may obferve, in the memory of one man compared with another. There is another defect which we may conceive to be in the memory of man in general, compared with fome fuperior created intellectual beings, which in this faculty may fo far excel man, that they may have conftantly in view the whole fcene of all their former actions, wherein no one of the thoughts they have ever had may flip out of

their fight. The omnifcience of God, who knows all things, paft, prefent, and to come, and to whom the thoughts of men's hearts always lie open, may fatisfy us of the poffibility of this. For who can doubt but God may communicate to thofe glorious fpirits, his immediate attendants, any of his perfections, in what proportions he pleafes, as far as created finite beings can be capable? It is reported of that prodigy of parts, monfieur Pascal, that till the decay of his health had impaired his memory, he forgot nothing of what he had done, read, or thought, in any part of his rational age. This is a privilege fo little known to moft men, that it feems almost incredible to thofe, who, after the ordinary way, measure all others by themselves; but yet, when confidered, may help us to enlarge our thoughts towards greater perfection of it in fuperior ranks of fpirits. For this of Mr. Pafcal was ftill with the narrownefs that human minds are confined to here, of having great variety of ideas only by fucceffion, not all at once: whereas the feveral degrees of angels may probably have larger views, and fome of them be endowed with capacities able to retain together, and conftantly fet before them, as in one picture, all their past knowledge at once. This, we may conceive, would be no small advantage to the knowledge of a thinking man, if all his past thoughts and reasonings could be always present to him. And therefore we may fuppofe it one of those ways, wherein the knowledge of feparate fpirits may exceedingly furpass ours.

Brutes have

memory.

§. 10. This faculty of laying up and retaining the ideas that are brought into the mind, feveral other animals feem to have to a great degree, as well as man. For to pafs by other inftances, birds learning of tunes, and the endeavours one may obferve in them to hit the notes right, put it paft doubt with me, that they have perception, and retain ideas in their memories, and ufe them for patterns. For it seems to me impoffible, that they fhould endeavour to conform their voices to notes (as it is plain they do) of which they had no ideas. For though I fhould

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grani

grant found may mechanically caufe a certain motion of the animal fpirits, in the brains of those birds, whilst the tune is actually playing; and that' motion may be continued on to the mufcles of the wings, and fo the bird mechanically be driven away by certain noises, because this may tend to the bird's prefervation: yet that can never be supposed a reason, why it fhould caufe mechanically, either whilft the tune is playing, much lefs after it has ceased, fuch a motion of the organs in the bird's voice, as fhould conform it to the notes of a foreign found; which imitation can be of no ufe to the bird's prefervation. But which is more, it cannot with any appearance of reafon be fuppofed (much lefs proved) that birds, without fenfe and memory, can approach their notes nearer and nearer by degrees to a tune played yesterday; which if they have no idea of in their memory, is no-where, nor can be a pattern for them to imitate, or which any repeated effays can bring them nearer to. Since there is no reafon why the found of a pipe fhould leave traces in their brains, which not at first, but by their after-endeavours, fhould produce the like founds; and why the founds they make themfelves, fhould not make traces which they fhould follow, as well as thofe of the pipe, is impoffible to con

ceive.

CHAP. XI.

Of Difcerning, and other Operations of the Mind.

No knowledge with

out difcern

ment.

§. I. NOTHER faculty we may take notice of in our minds, is that of difcerning and diftinguishing between the feveral ideas it has. It is not enough to have a confufed perception of fomething in general: unless the mind had a diftinct perception of different

objects

objets and their qualities, it would be capable of very little knowledge; though the bodies that affect us were as bufy about us as they are now, and the mind were continually employed in thinking. On this faculty of diftinguishing one thing from another, depends the evidence and certainty of feveral, even very general propofitions, which have paffed for innate truths; becaufe men, overlooking the true caufe why thofe propofitions find univerfal affent, impute it wholly to native uniform impreffions: whereas it in truth depends upon this clear difcerning faculty of the mind, whereby it perceives two ideas to be the fame, or different. But of this more hereafter.

The difference of wit

and judg

ment.

§. 2. How much the imperfection of accurately difcriminating ideas one from another lies either in the dulnefs or faults of the organs of fenfe; or want of acuteness, exercife, or attention, in the understanding; or hastinefs and precipitancy, natural to fome tempers, I will not here examine: it fuffices to take notice, that this is one of the operations, that the mind may reflect on and obferve in itself. It is of that confequence to its other knowledge, that fo far as this faculty is in itself dull, or not rightly made ufe of, for the diftinguishing one thing from another; fo far our notions are confufed, and our reafon and judgment difturbed or misled. If in having our ideas in the memory ready at hand confifts quickness of parts; in this of having them uncon→ fufed, and being able nicely to diftinguifh one thing from another, where there is but the leaft difference, confifts, in a great measure, the exactnefs of judg ment, and clearness of reafon, which is to be obferved in one man above another. And hence perhaps may be given fome reafon of that common obfervation, that men, who have a great deal of wit, and prompt memories, have not always the cleareft judgment, or deepest reafon for wit lying moft in the ailemblage of ideas, and putting thofe together with quicknefs and variety, wherein can be found any refemblance or congruity, thereby to make up pleasant pictures, and agree

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able

Book 2, able vifions in the fancy; judgment on the contrary, lies quite on the other fide, in feparating carefully, one from another, ideas, wherein can be found the leaft difference; thereby to avoid being mifled by fimilitude, and by affinity to take one thing for another. This is a way of proceeding quite contrary to metaphor and allufion, wherein for the most part lies that entertainment and pleafantry of wit, which ftrikes fo lively on the fancy, and therefore is fo acceptable to all people; because its beauty appears at first fight, and there is required no labour of thought to examine what truth or reafon there is in it. The mind, without looking any farther, refts fatisfied with the agreeableness of the picture, and the gaiety of the fancy: and it is a kind of an affront to go about to examine it by the fevere rules of truth and good reafon; whereby it appears, that it confifts in something that is not perfectly conformable

to them.

Clearnefs

alone hinders confufion.

§. 3. To the well diftinguishing our ideas, it chiefly contributes, that they be clear and determinate: and where they are fo, it will not breed any confusion or mistake about them, though the fenfes fhould (as fometimes they do) convey them from the fame object differently, on different occafions, and fo feem to err. For though a man in a fever should from fugar have a bitter tafte, which at another time would produce a fweet one; yet the idea of bitter in that man's mind, would be as clear and diftinct from the idea of fweet, as if he had tafted only gall. Nor does it make any more confufion between the two ideas of fweet and bitter, that the fame fort of body produces at one time one, and at another time another idea by the tafte, than it makes a confufion in two ideas of white and fweet, or white and round, that the fame piece of fugar produces them both in the mind at the fame time. And the ideas of orange-colour and azure, that are produced in the mind by the fame parcel of the infufion of lignum nephriticum, are no lefs diftinct ideas, than thofe of the fame colours, taken from two very different bodies.

5.4. The