phrafe borrowed from place, fignifying only its existence, not location; and when one can find out, and frame in his mind, clearly and diftinctly, the place of the universe, he will be able to tell us, whether it moves or ftands still in the undistinguishable inane of infinite Space: though it be true, that the word place has fometimes a more confused fenfe, and ftands for that space which any body takes up; and fo the universe is in a place. The idea therefore of place we have by the fame. means that we get the idea of space, (whereof this is but a particular limited confideration) viz. by our fight and touch; by either of which we receive into our minds the ideas of extenfion or distance.

Extenfion §. 11. There are fome that would perand body,not fuade us, that body and extenfion are the fame the fame. thing; who either change the fignification of words, which I would not fufpect them of, they having fo feverely condemned the philofophy of others, because it hath been too much placed in the uncertain meaning, or deceitful obfcurity of doubtful or infignificant terms. If therefore they mean by body and extenfion the fame that other people do, viz. by body, fomething that is folid and extended, whofe parts are feparable and moveable different ways; and by extenfion, only the space that lies between the extremities of thofe folid coherent parts, and which is poffeffed by them they confound very different ideas one with another. For I appeal to every man's own thoughts, whether the idea of space be not as diftinct from that of folidity, as it is from the idea of fcarlet colour? It is true, folidity cannot exist without extenfion, neither can fcarlet colour exift without extenfion: but this hinders not, but that they are diftinct ideas. Many ideas require others as neceffary to their exiftence or conception, which yet are very diftinct ideas. Motion can neither be, nor be conceived without space; and yet motion is not space, nor space motion: space can eixft without it, and they are very distinct ideas; and fo, I think, are thofe of fpace and folidity. Solidity is fo infeparable an idea from body, that upon that depends its filling of space, its contact, impulfe, and

com

353 communication of motion upon impulfe. And if it be a reafon to prove, that fpirit is different from body, be caufe thinking includes not the idea of extenfion in it; the fame reafon will be as valid, I fuppofe, to prove that space is not body, because it includes not the idea of folidity in it: fpace and folidity being as diftinct ideas, as thinking and extension, and as wholly feparable in the mind one from another. Body then and extenfion, it is evident, are two diftinct ideas. For,

§. 12. First, Extenfion includes no folidity, nor refiftance to the motion of body, as body does.

§. 13. Secondly, The parts of pure space are infeparable one from the other; fo that the continuity_cannot be separated neither really, nor mentally. For I demand of any one to remove any part of it from another, with which it is continued, even fo much as in thought. To divide and feparate actually, is, as I think, by removing the parts one from another, to make two fuperficies, where before there was a continuity; and to divide mentally, is to make in the mind two fuperfices, where before there was a continuity, and confider them as removed one from the other; which can only be done in things confidered by the mind as capable of being feparated; and by feparation, of acquiring new diftinct fuperficies, which they then have not, but are capable of; but neither of these ways of feparation, whether real or mental, is, as I think, compatible to pure space.

It is true, a man may confider fo much of fuch a fpace, as is answerable or commenfurate to a foot, without confidering the reft; which is indeed a partial confideration, but not fo much as mental feparation, or divifion; fince a man can no more mentally divide, without confidering two fuperficies feparate one from the other, than he can actually divide, without making two fuperficies disjoined one from the other: but a partial confideration is not feparating. A man may confider light in the fun, without its heat; or mobility in body, without its extenfion, without thinking of their feparation. One is only a partial confideration, terminating

terminating in one alone; and the other is a confideration of both, as exifting feparately.

S. 14. Thirdly. The parts of pure fpace are immoveable, which follows from their infeparability; motion being nothing but change of distance between any two things: but this cannot be between parts that are infeparable; which therefore must needs be at perpetual rest one amongst another.

Thus the determined idea of fimple fpace diftinguishes it plainly and fufficiently from body; fince its parts are infeparable, immoveable, and without refiftance to the motion of body.

The defini

tion of extenfion explains it not.

§. 15. If any one afk me, what this space, I fpeak of, is? I will tell him, when he tells me what his extenfion is. For to fay, as is ufually done, that extenfion is to have partes extra partes, is to fay only, that extenfion is excenfion: for what am I the better informed in the nature of extenfion, when I am told, that extenfion is to have parts that are extended, exterior to parts that are extended, i. e. extenfion confifts of extended parts? As if one afking, what a fibre was? I fhould answer him, that it was a thing made up of feveral fibres: would he thereby be enabled to understand what a fibre was better than he did before? Or rather, would he not have reafon to think, that my defign was to make sport with him, rather than feriously to inftruct him?

Divifion of beings into bodies and

§. 16. Those who contend that space and body are the fame, bring this dilemma: either this fpace is fomething or nothing; fpirits,proves if nothing be between two bodies, they not space and muft neceffarily touch: if it be allowed body the fame. to be fomething, they afk, whether it be body or fpirit? To which I anfwer, by another question, who told them that there was, or could be nothing but folid beings, which could not think, and thinking beings that were not extended? which is all they mean by the terms body and fpirit.

§. 17. If it be demanded (as usually it is) whether this fpace, void of body, be fubftance or accident; I fhall readily anfwer, I know not; nor fhall be ashamed to own my ignorance, till they that afk fhow me a clear diftinct idea of fubftance.

Substance which we

know not, no

proof against pace with out body;

§. 18. I endeavour, as much as I can, to deliver myfelf from those fallacies which we are apt to put upon ourselves, by taking words for things. It helps not our ignorance, to feign a knowledge where we have none, by making a noife with founds, without clear and diftinct fignifications. Names made at pleasure neither alter the nature of things, nor make us underftand them but as they are figns of and ftand for determined ideas. And I defire thofe who lay fo much ftrefs on the found of thefe two fyllables, fubftance, to confider whether applying it, as they do, to the infinite incomprehenfible God, to finite fpirit, and to body, it be in the fame fense; and whether it ftands for the fame idea, when each of thofe three fo different beings are called fubftances. If fo, whether it will thence follow, that God, fpirits, and body, agreeing in the fame common nature of fubftance, differ not any otherwise, than in a bare different modification of that fubftance; as a tree and a pebble being in the fame fenfe body, and agreeing in the common nature of body, differ only in a bare modification of that common matter: which will be a very harsh doctrine. If they fay, that they apply it to God, finite fpirit, and matter, in three different fignifications; and that it ftands for one idea, when God is faid to be a fubftance: for another, when the foul is called fubftance; and for a third, when a body is called fo; if the name fubftance ftands for three several diftinct ideas, they would do well to make known thofe diftinct ideas, or at least to give three diftinct names to them, to prevent in fo important a notion the confufion and errors that will naturally follow from the promifcuous ufe of fo doubtful a term; which is fo far from being fufpected to have three diftinct, that in ordinary ufe it has scarce one clear diftinct fignification; and if they can thus

make

make three diftinct ideas of fubftance, what hinders why another may not make a fourth?

Substance and acci

§. 19. They who first ran into the notion of accidents, as a fort of real beings dents, of lit- that needed fomething to inhere in, were tle ufe in phi- forced to find out the word fubftance to lofophy. fupport them. Had the poor Indian philofopher (who imagined that the earth alfo wanted fomething to bear it up) but thought of this word fubstance, he needed not to have been at the trouble to find an elephant to fupport it, and a tortoise to support his elephant: the word fubftance would have done it effectually. And he that inquired, might have taken it for as good an anfwer from an Indian philofopher, that fubftance, without knowing what it is, is that which fupports the earth; as we take it for a fufficient answer, and good doctrine, from our European philofophers, that fubftance, without knowing what it is, is that which fupports accidents. So that of fubftance, we have no idea of what it is, but only a confused obfcure one of what it does.

§. 20. Whatever a learned man may do here, an intelligent American, who inquired into the nature of things, would fcarce take it for a fatisfactory account, if defiring to learn our architecture, he should be told, that a pillar was a thing fupported by a bafis, and a bafis fomething that fupported a pillar. Would he not think himself mocked, inftead of taught, with fuch an account as this? And a ftranger to them would be very liberally inftructed in the nature of books, and the things they contained, if he should be told, that all learned books confifted of paper and letters, and that letters were things inhering in paper, and paper a thing that held forth letters: a notable way of having clear ideas of letters and papers! But were the Latin words inhæ rentia and fubftantia, put into the plain English ones that answer them, and were called fticking on and under-propping, they would better difcover to us the very great clearness there is in the doctrine of fubftance and accidents, and fhow of what use they are in deciding of questions in philosophy..

§. 25.