or alterations of our bodies, we come to have any fenfation by our organs, or any ideas in our underftandings; and whether thofe ideas do in their formation, any, or all of them, depend on matter or no : These are speculations, which, however curious and entertaining, I fhall decline, as lying out of my way in the defign I am now upon. It shall fuffice to my prefent purpose, to confider the difcerning faculties of a man, as they are employed about the objects, which they have to do with: And I fhall imagine I have not wholly mifemployed myfelf in the thoughts I fhall have on this occafion, if, in this hiftorical, plain method, I can give any account of the ways, whereby our understandings come to attain thofe notions of things we have, and can fet down any measures of the certainty of our knowledge, or the grounds of those perfuafions, which are to be found amongst men, fo various, different, and wholly contradictory; and yet afferted, fomewhere or other, with fuch affurance and confidence, that he that shall take a view of the opinions of mankind, obferve their oppofition; and at the fame time confider the fondness and devotion wherewith they are embraced, the refolution and eagernefs wherewith they are maintained, may perhaps have reafon to fufpect, that either there is no fuch thing as truth at all; or that mankind hath no fufficient means to attain a certain knowledge of it.

§. 3. It is, therefore, worth while to fearch Method, out the bounds between opinion and knowledge; and examine by what measures, in things, whereof we have no certain knowledge, we ought to regulate our affent, and nioderate our perfuafions. In order whereunto, I thali pursue this following method.

First, I fhall enquire into the original of those ideas, notions, or whatever elfe you please to call them, which a man obferves, and is confcious to himfelf he has in his mind; and the ways, whereby the understanding comes to be furnished with them.

Secondly, I fhall endeavour to fhew what knowledge the understanding hath by thofe ideas; and the certainty, evidence, and extent of it.

Thirdly,

Thirdly, I fhall make fome enquiry into the nature and grounds of faith, or opinion; whereby I mean that affent, which we give to any propofition as true, of whofe truth yet we have no certain knowledge: and here we fhall have occafion to examine the reasons and degrees of affent.

Ufeful to know the excomprehen

tent of our

§. 4. If, by this enquiry into the nature of the understanding, I can difcover the powers thereof; how far they reach; to what things they are in any degree propor- fion, tionate; and where they fail us: I fuppofe it may be of ufe to prevail with the bufy mind of man, to be more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its comprehenfion; to ftop when it is at the utmost extent of its tether; and to fit down in a quict ignorance of those things, which, upon examination, are found to be beyond the reach of our capacities. We fhould not then perhaps be fo forward, out of an affectation of an univerfal knowledge, to raise questions, and perplex ourfelves and others with difputes about things, to which our understandings are not fuited; and of which we cannot frame in our minds any clear or diftinct perceptions, or whereof (as it has perhaps too often happened) we have not any notions at all. If we can find out how far the understanding can extend its view, how far it has faculties to attain certainty, and in what cafes it can only judge and guefs; we may learn to content ourfelves with what is attainable by us in this state. §. 5. For, though the comprehenfion of our understandings comes exceeding fhort of the vast extent of things; yet we fhall have caufe enough to magnify the bountiful author of our being, for that proportion and degree of knowledge he has beftowed on us, fo far above all the reft of the inhabitants of this our manfion. Men have reason to be well fatisfied with what God hath thought fit for them, fince he hath given them (as St. Peter fays) πάντα πρὸς ζωὴν καὶ εὐσέβειαν, whatfoever is neceffary for the conveniencies of life, and information of virtue; and has put within the reach of their difcovery the comfortable provifion for this life, and the way that

B 2

Our capacity fuited to out ftate and con

cerns.

leads

leads to a better. How fhort foever their knowledge may come of an univerfal or perfect comprehenfion of whatfoever is, it yet fecures their great concernments, that they have light enough to lead them to the knowledge of their maker, and the fight of their own duties. Men may find matter fufficient to bufy their heads, and employ their hands with variety, delight and fatisfaction; if they will not boldly quarrel with their own conftitution, and throw away the bleffings their hands are filled with, because they are not big enough to grasp every thing. We fhall not have much reafon to complain of the narrownefs of our minds, if we will but employ them about what may be of ufe to us; for of that they are very capable: and it will be an unpardonable, as well as childish peevifhnefs, if we undervalue the advantages of our knowledge, and neglect to improve it to the ends for which it was given us, because there are fome things that are set out of the reach of it. It will be no excufe to an idle and untoward fervant, who would not attend his bufinefs by candle-light, to plead that he had not broad fun-fhine. The candle,, that is fet up in us, fhines bright enough for all our purposes. The difcoveries we can make with this, ought to fatisfy us; and we fhall then use our underftandings right, when we entertain all objects in that way and proportion that they are fuited to our faculties, and upon thofe grounds they are capable of being propofed to us; and not peremptorily, or intemperately require demonftration, and demand certainty, where probability only is to be had, and which is fufficient to govern all our concernments. If we will difbelieve every thing, becaufe we cannot certainly know all things; we hall do muchwhat as wifely as he, who would not ufe his legs, but fit ftill and perifh, because he had no wings to fly.

Knowledge

of our capacity, a cure

6. 6. When we know our own ftrength, we fhall the better know what to undertake with hopes of fuccefs: and when we have of fcepticifm well furveyed the powers of our own minds, and idlenefs. and made fome estimate what we may expect from them, we fhall not be inclined either to fit

ftill, and not fet our thoughts on work at all, in despair of knowing any thing; or, on the other fide, queftion every thing, and difclaim all knowledge, becaufe fome things are not to be understood. It is of great ufe to the failor, to know the length of his line, though he cannot with it fathom all the depths of the ocean. It is well he knows, that it is long enough to reach the bottom, at fuch places as are neceffary to direct his voyage, and caution him against running upon fhoals that may ruin him. Our business here is not to know all things, but those which concern our conduct. If we can find out those measures, whereby a rational creature, put in that ftate in which man is in this world, may, and ought to govern his opinions, and actions depending thereon, we need not to be troubled that fome other things escape our knowledge.

Occafion of

this essay.

$. 7. This was that which gave the firft rife to this effay concerning the understanding. For I thought that the first step towards fatisfying feveral enquiries, the mind of man was very apt to run into, was to take a furvey of our own understandings, examine our own powers, and fee to what things they were adapted. Till that was done, I fufpected we began at the wrong end, and in vain fought for fatisfaction in a quiet and fure poffeffion of truths that moft concerned us, whilft we let loose our thoughts into the vaft ocean of being; as if all that boundless extent were the natural and undoubted poffeffion of our understandings, wherein there was nothing exempt from its decifions, or that escaped its comprehenfion. Thus men extending their enquiries beyond their capacities, and letting their thoughts wander into those depths, where they can find no fure footing; it is no wonder, that they raife queftions, and multiply difputes, which, never coming to any clear refolution, are proper only to continue and increase their doubts, and to confirm them at last in perfect fcepticifm. Whereas, were the capacities of our understandings well confidered, the extent of our knowledge once difcovered, and the horizon found, which fets the bounds between the enlightened and dark parts of things, between what

B 3

what is, and what is not comprehenfible by us; men would perhaps with lefs fcruple acquiefce in the avowed ignorance of the one, and employ their thoughts and discourse with more advantage and fatisfaction in the

other.

What idea

§. 8. Thus much I thought neceflary to fay concerning the occafion of this enquiry

ftands for. into human understanding. But, before I proceed on to what I have thought on this fubject, I muft here in the entrance beg pardon of my reader for the frequent ufe of the word "idea, which he will find in the following treatife. It being that term, which, I think, ferves best to stand for whatfoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks; I have used it to express whatever is meant by phantafm, notion, fpecies, or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking; and I could not avoid frequently ufing it (1).

I prefume

(1) This modeft apology of our author could not procure him the free ufe of the word idea; but great offence has been taken at it, and it has been cenfured as of dangerous confequence: to which you may here fee what he answers. The world, faith the bishop of Worcester, hath ⚫ been ftrangely amufed with ideas of late; and we have been told, that ftrange things might be done by the help of ideas; and yet these ideas, at laft, come to be only common notions of things, which we must ⚫ make use of in our reafoning, You, (i. e. the author of the Effay concerning Human Understanding) fay in that chapter, about the existence of God, you thought it moft proper to exprefs yourfelf, in the most • ufual and familiar way, by common words and expreffions. I would you had done fo quite through your book; for then you had never given that occafion to the enemies of our faith, to take up your new way of ideas, as an effectual battery (as they imagined) againft the myfteries ⚫ of the Chriftian faith. But you might have enjoyed the fatisfaction of your ideas long enough before I had taken notice of them, unless I had found them employed about doing mischief."

To which our author (+) replies, It is plain, that that which your lordship apprehends, in my book, may be of dangerous confequence to the article which your lordship has endeavoured to defend, is my introducing nezy terms; and that which your lordship inftances in, is that of ideas. And the reafon your lordship gives in every of thefe places, why your lordfhip has fuch an apprehenfion of ideas, that they may be of dangerous confequence to that article of faith, which your lordship has

Answer to Mr. Locke's First Letter.

† In his Second Letter to the Bishop of Worcester.

endeavoured