I prefume it will be eafily granted me, that there are fuch ideas in men's minds; every one is conscious of them in himself, and men's words and actions will fatisfy him that they are in others.

Our firft enquiry then fhall be, how they come into the mind.

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endeavoured to defend, is because they have been applied to fuch poles. And I might (your lordship fays) have enjoyed the fatisfaction of my ideas long enough before you had taken notice of them, unlefs your lordship had found them employed in doing mischief. Which, at laft, as I humbly conceive, amounts to thus much, and no more, viz. That your lordship fears ideas, i. e. the term ideas, may, fome time or other, prove of very dangerous confequence to what your lordship has endeavoured to defend, because they have been made ufe of in arguing against it. For I am fure your lordship does not mean, that you apprehend the things, fignified by ideas, may be of dangerous confequence to the article of faith your lordship endeavours to defend, because they have been made ufe of againft it: For (befides that your lordship mentions terms) that would be to expect that thofe who oppofe that article, fhould oppofe it without any thoughts; for the things fignified by ideas, are nothing but the immediate objects of our minds in thinking: fo that unless any one can oppofe the article your lordship defends, without thinking on fomething, he muft ufe the things fignified by ideas; for he that thinks, must have fome immediate object of his mind in thinking, i.e. must have ideas,

But whether it be the name, or the thing; ideas in found, or ideas in fignification; that your lordship apprehends may be of dangerous confequencè to that article of faith, which your lordship endeavours to defend; it feems to me, I will not fay a new way of reafoning (for that belongs to me), but were it not your lordship's, I fhould think it a very extraordinary way of reafoning, to write against a book, wherein your lordship acknowledges they are not used to bad purposes, nor employed to do mifchief; only because you find that ideas are, by thofe who oppofe your lordship, employed to do mischief; and fo apprehend, they may be of dangerous confequence to the article your lordship has engaged in the defence of. For whether ideas as terms, or ideas as the immediate objects of the mind fignified by thofe terms, may be, in your lordship's apprehenfion, of dangerous confequence to that article; I do not fee how your lordship's writing against the motion of ideas, as ftated in my book, will at all hinder your oppofers, from employing them in doing mischief, as before,

However, be that as it will, fo it is, that your lordship apprehends these new terms, these ideas, with which the world kath, of båte, "been fo frangeby amused, (though at laft they come to be only common notions of things, as your lordship owns) may be of dangerous confequence to that article.

My lord, if any, in anfwer to your lordship's fermous, and in other pamphlets, wherein your lordship complains they have talked fo much of ideas, have been troublesome to your lordship with that term; it is not Arange that your lordship should be tired with that found; but how

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natural foever it be to our weak conftitutions, to be offended with any found, wherewith an importunate din hath been made about our ears; yet, my lord, I know your lordship has a better opinion of the articles of our faith, than to think any of them can be overturned, or fo much as fhaken, with a breath formed into any found, or term whatsoever,

Names are but the arbitrary marks of conceptions; and fo they be fufficiently appropriated to them in their ufe, I know no other difference any of them have in particular, but as they are of eafy or difficult pronunciation, and of a more or lefs pleafant found; and what particular antipathies there may be in men to fome of them, upon that account, is not eafy to be forefeen. This I am fure, no term whatfoever in itself bears, one more than another, any opposition to truth of any kind; they are only propofitions that do or can oppofe the truth of any article or doctrine and thus no term is privileged for being fet in oppofition to truth.

There is no word to be found, which may not be brought into a propofition, wherein the moft facred and moft evident truths may be oppofed but that is not a fault in the term, but him that ufes it. And therefore I cannot eafily perfuade my felf (whatever your lordship hath fid in the heat of your concern) that you have beltowed fo much pains upon my book, because the word idea is fo much ufed there. For though upon my faying, in my chapter about the existence of God, That I' fcarce ufed the word idea in that whole chapter,' your lordship wifhes, that I had done fo quite through my book: yet I must rather look upon that as a compliment to me, wherein your lordship wifhed, that my book had been all through fuited to vulgar readers, not ufed to that and the like terms, than that your lordship has fuch an apprehenfion of the word idea; or that there is any fuch harm in the use of it, instead of the word notion (with which your lordship feems to take it to agree in fignification), that your lordship would think it worth your while to fpend any part of your valuable time and thoughts about my book, for having the word idea fo often in it; for this would be to make your lordship to write only against an impropriety of fpeech. I own to your lordship, it is a great condefcenfion in your lordship to have done it, if that word have such a fhare in what your lordship has writ against my book, as fome expreffions would perfuade one; and I would, for the fatisfaction of your lordship, change the term of idea for a better, if your lordship, or any one, could help me to it; for, that notion will not fo well ftand for every immediate object of the mind in thinking, as idea does, I have (as I guefs) fomewhere given a reafon in my book, by fhewing that the term motion is more pecuTarly appropriated to a certain fort of thofe objects, which I call mixed modes and I think, it would not found altogether fo well, to fay, the notion of red, and the notion of a horse; as the idea of red, and the idea of a borje. But if any one thinks it will, I contend not; for I have no fondnefs for, nor an antipathy to, any particular articulate founds: nor do I think there is any fpell or fafcination in any of them.

But be the word idea proper or improper, I do not fee how it is the better or the worfe, because ill men have made ufe of it, or because it has been made ufe of to bad purposes; for if that be a reason to condemn, or lay it by, we muft lay by the terms, fcripture, reafon, perception, dif tind, clear, &c. Nay, the name of God himself will not efcape; for I do not think any one of thefe, or any other term, can be produced, which hath not been made ufe of by fuch men, and to fuch purposes.

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And

And therefore, if the unitarians in their late pamphlets have talked very much of, and firangely amufed the world with ideas; I cannot believe your lordship will think that word one jot the worfe, or the more dangerous, because they use it; any more than, for their use of them, you will think reafon or fcripture terms ill or dangerous. And therefore what your lordfhip fays, that I might have enjoyed the fatisfaction of my ideas long enough before your lordship had taken notice of them, unless you had found them employed in doing mischief; will, I prefume, when your lordship has confidered again of this matter, prevail with your lordship, to let me enjoy ftill the fatisfaction I take in my ideas, i. e. as much fatisfaction as I can take in fo small a matter, as is the ufing of a proper term, notwithstanding it bould be employed by others in doing mischief.

For, my lord, if I fhould leave it wholly out of my book, and fub, ftitute the word notion every where in the room of it; and every body elfe do fo too (though your lordship does not, I fuppofe, fufpect, that I have the vanity to think they would follow my example) my book would, it feems, be the more to your lordship's liking; but I do not fee how this would one jot abate the mischief your lordship complains of. For the unitarians might as much employ notions, as they do now ideas, to do wifchief; unless they are fuch fools to think they can conjure with this norable word idea; and that the force of what they fay, lies in the found, and not in the fignification of their terms.

This I am fure ot, that the truths of the Chriftian religion can be no more battered by one word than another; nor can they be beaten down or endangered by any found whatfoever. And I am apt to flatter myself, that your lordship is fatisfied that there is no harm in the word ideas, becaufe you fay, you should not have taken any notice of my ideas, if the enemies of our faith had not taken up my new way of ideas, as an effectual battery against the myfteries of the Chrifiian faith. In which place, by new way of ideas, nothing, I think, can be conftrued to be meant, but my expreffing myfelf by that of ideas; and not by other more common words, and of ancienter ftanding in the English language.

As to the objection, of the author's way by ideas being a new way, he thus answers; my new way by ideas, or my way by ideas, which often occurs in your lordship's letter, is, I confefs, a very large and doubtful expreffion; and may, in the full latitude, comprehend my whole clay; becaufe, treating in it of the understanding, which is nothing but the faculty of thinking, I could not well treat of that faculty of the mind, which confifts in thinking, without confidering the immediate objects of the mind in thinking, which I call ideas; and therefore in treating of the understanding, I guess it will not be thought frange, that the greateft part of my book has been taken up, in confidering what thefe objects of the mind, in thinking, are; whence they come; what use the mind makes of them, in its feveral ways of thinking; and what are the outward marks whereby it fignifies them to others, or records them for its own use. And this, in fhort, is my way by ideas, that which your lordship calls my new way by ideas: which, my lord, if it be new, it is but a new hiftory of an old thing. For I think it will not be doubted, that men always performed the actions of thinking, reafening, believing, and knowing, just after the fame manner they do now; though whether the fame account has heretofore been given of the way how they performed thefe actions, or wherein they confifted, I do not know. Were I as well read as your lordship, I fhould have been fafe from that gentle reprimand of your lordship's, for thinking my way of

Ideas, NEW, for want of looking into other men's thoughts, which appear is their books,

Your lordship's words, as an acknowledgment of your inftructions in the cafe, and as a warning to others, who will be fo bold adventurers as to Spin any thing barely out of their own thoughts, I shall fet down at large : And they run thus: Whether you took this way of ideas from the modern philofopher, mentioned by you, is not at all material; but I intended no reficetion upon you in it (for "that you mean, by my commending you as a scholar of fo great a master); I never meant to take from you the honour of your own inventions: and I do believe you when you fay, That you wrote from your own thoughts, and the ideas you had there. But many things may frem new 10 one, who converfes only with his own thoughts, which really are not fo; as be may find, when he looks into the thoughts of other men, which appear in their books. And therefore, although I have a just esteem for the invention of fuch, who can spin volumes barely out of their own thoughts; yet I am apt to think, they would oblige the world more, if, after they have thought fo much themselves, they would examine what thoughts others have had before them. concerning the fame things: that fo thofe may not be thought their own inventions which are common to themselves and others. If a man should try all the magnetical experiments himself, and publifh them as his own thoughts, he might take himself to be the inventor of them: but he that examines and compares with them what Gilbert, and others have done before him, will not diminish the praije of his diligence, but may wish he had compared his thoughts with other men's; by which the world would receive greater advantage, although he had loft the honour of being an original.

To alleviate my fault herein, I agree with your lordship, that many things may seem NEW, to one that converses only with his own thoughts, which really are not fo; but I must crave leave to fuggeft to your lordship, that if in the fpinning them out of his own thoughts, they feem new to him, he is certainly the inventor of them; and they may as juftly be thought his own invention, as any one's; and he is as certainly the inventor of them, as any one who thought on them before him: the diftinction of invention, or not invention, lying not in thinking first, or not first, but in borrowing, or not borrowing, our thoughts from another: and he to whom, fpinning them out of his own thoughts, they feem new, could nat certainly borrow them from another. So he truly invented printing in Europe, who without any communication with the Chinese, fpun it out of his own thoughts; though it were ever so true, that the Chinese had the ufe of printing, nay, of printing in the very fame way, among them, many ages before him. So that he that fpins any thing out of his own thoughts, that feems new to him, cannot ceafe to think it his own invention, fhould he examine ever fo far, what thoughts others have had before him, ing the fame thing, and fhould find by examining, that they had the fame thoughts too.

concern

But what great obligation this would be to the world, or weighty caufe of turning over and fooking into books, I confefs I do not fee. The great end to me, in converfing with my own or other men's thoughts, in matters of fpeculation, is to find truth, without being much concerned whether my own fpinning of it out of mine, or their spinning of it out of their own thoughts, helps me to it. And how little i affect the honour of an original, may be feen at that place of my book, where, if any where, that itch of vain-glory was likelieft to have fhewn itfelf, had I been fo over-run with it, as to need a cure. It is where I fpeak of cer

tainty,

tainty, in these following words, taken notice of by your lordship, in another place: I think I have fhewn wherein it is that certainty, real certainty confifts, which whatever it was to others, was, I confefs, to !me, heretofore, one of thofe defiderata, which I found great want of." Here, my lord, however new this feemed to me, and the more fo becaufe poffibly I had in vain hunted for it in the books of others; yet I fpoke of it as new, only to myfelf: leaving others in the undisturbed poffeffion of what either by invention, or reading, was theirs before; without affuming to myfelf any other honour, but that of my own ignorance, till that time, if others before had fhewn wherein certainty lay. And yet, my lord, if I had, upon this occafion, been forward to affume to myself the bonour of an original, I think I had been pretty fafe in it; fince I fhould have had your lordship for my guarantee and vindicator in that point, who are pleased to call it negu; and, as fuch, to write against it.

And truly, my lord, in this refpect, my book has had very unlucky ftars, fince it hath had the misfortune to displease your lordship, with many things in it, for their novelty; as new way of reasoning; new bypothefis about reafon; new fort of certainty; new terms; new way of ideas; new method of certainty; &c. And yet in other places, your lordship seems to think it worthy in me of your lordship's reflection, for faying. but what others have faid before; as where I fay, In the different make of men's tempers, and application of their thoughts, fome arguments prevail more on one, and fome on another, for the confirmation of the fame truth.' Your lordship alks, What is this different from what all men of understanding have faid? Again, I take it, your lordship meant not these words for a commendation of my book, where you fay, But if no more be meant by The fimple ideas that come in by fenfation, or reflection, and their being the foundation of our knowledge,' but that our notions of things come in, either from our fenfes or the exercise of our minds: as there is nothing extraordinary in the difcovery, fo your lordship is far enough from appofing that, wherein you think all mankind are agreed.

And again, But what need all this great noife about ideas and certainty, true and real certainty by ideas; if, after all, it comes only to this, that our ideas only reprefent to us fuch things, from whence we bring arguments to prove the truth of things?

But, the world hath been firangely amused with ideas of late; and we have been told, that strange things might be done by the help of ideas; and yet thefe ideas, at last, come to be only common nations of things, which we muft make use of in our reafoning. And to the like purpofe in other places.

Whether, therefore, at laft, your lordship will refolve, that it is new or no; or more faulty by its being new, muft be left to your lordship. This I find by it, that my book cannot avoid being condemned on the one fide or the other, nor do I fee a poffibility to help it. If there be readers that like only new thoughts; or, on the other fide, others that can bear nothing but what can be juftified by received authorities in print; I muft defire them to make themselves amends in that part which they like, for the difpleafure they receive in the other: but if any fhould be fo exact, as to find fault with both, truly, I know not well what to fay to them. The cafe is a plain cafe, the book is all over naught, and there is not a sentence in it, that is not, either for its antiquity or novelty, to be condemned, and fo there is a fhort end of it. From your lordhip, indeed, in particular, I can hope for fomething better; for your

lordship