lordship thinks the general defign of it fo good, that that, I flatter myfelf, would prevail on your lordship to preferve it from the fire.

But as to the way, your lordship thinks, I should have taken to prevent the having it thought my invention, when it was common to me with others, it unluckily fo tell out, in the fubject of my Effay of Human Understanding, that I could not look into the thoughts of other men to inform myself. For my defign being, as well as I could, to copy nature, and to give an account of the operations of the mind in thinking; I could look into no-body's understanding but my own, to fee how it wrought; nor have a profpect into other men's minds, to view their thoughts there; and obferve what fteps and motions they took, and by what gradations they proceeded in their acquainting themfelves with truth, and their advance in knowledge: what we find of their thoughts in books, is but the refult of this, and not the progrefs and working of their minds,` in coming to the opinions or conclufions they fet down and publifhed.

All therefore, that I can fay of my book, is, that it is a copy of my own mind, in its feveral ways of operation. And all that I can fay for the publishing of it is, that I think the intellectual faculties are made, and operate alike in most men; and that fome, that I fhewed it to before I published it, liked it fo well, that I was confirmed in that opinion. And therefore, if it fhould happen, that it fhould not be fo, but that fome men fhould have ways of thinking, reafoning, or arriving at certainty, different from others, and above those that I find my mind to ufe and acquiefce in, I do not fee of what ufe my book can be to them. I can only make it my humble requeft, in my own name, and in the name of thofe that are of my fize, who find their minds work, reason, and know in the fame low way that mine does, that thofe men of a more happy genius would fhew us the way of their nobler flights; and particularly would difcover to us their shorter or furer way to certainty, than by ideas, and the obferving their agreement or difagreement.

*

Your lordship adds, But now, it feems, nothing is intelligible but what fuits with the new way of ideas. My lord, The new way of ideas, and the old way of fpeaking intelligibly was always and ever will be the fame and if I may take the liberty to declare my fenfe of it, herein it confifts: 1. That a man ufe no words, but fuch as he makes the figns of certain determined objects of his mind in thinking, which he can make known to another. 2. Next, that he ufe the fame word steadily for the fign of the fame immediate object of his mind in thinking. 3. That he join thofe words together in propofitions, according to the grammatical rules of that language he fpeaks in. 4. That he unite those sentences in a coherent difcourfe. Thus, and thus only, I humbly conceive, any one may preferve himself from the confines and fufpicion of jargon, whether he pleases to call thofe immediate objects of his mind, which his words do, or should stand for, ideas or no.

*Mr. Locke's Third Letter to the Bishop of Worcester.

СНАР.

CHA P. II.

No Innate Principles in the Mind.

The way

fhewn how we come by any knowledge, fufficient toprove it

not innate.

It would

§. 1. T is an established opinion amongft some men, that there are in the understanding certain innate principles; fome primary notions, noiva voia, characters, as it were, ftamped upon the mind of man, which the foul receives in its very first being; and brings into the world with it. be fufficient to convince unprejudiced readers of the falfeness of this fuppofition, if I fhould only fhew (as I hope I fhall in the following parts of this difcourfe) how men, barely by the ufe of their natural faculties, may attain to all the knowledge they have, without the help of any innate impreffions; and may arrive at certainty, without any fuch original notions or principles. For I imagine any one will eafily grant, that it would be impertinent to fuppofe, the ideas of colours innate in a creature, to whom God hath given fight, and a power to receive them by the eyes, from external objects and no lefs unreasonable would it be to attribute feveral truths to the impreffions of nature, and innate characters, when we may obferve in ourselves faculties, fit to attain as cafy and certain knowledge of them, as if they were originally imprinted on the mind.

But because a man is not permitted without cenfure to follow his own thoughts in the fearch of truth, when they lead him ever fo little out of the common road; I fhall fet down the reafons, that made me doubt of the truth of that opinion, as an excufe for my mistake, if I be in one; which I leave to be confidered by those, who, with me, difpofe themselves to embrace truth, wherever they find it.

§. 2. There is nothing more commonly taken for granted, than that there are certain principles, both speculative and

prac

General af

fent the great argument.

tical (for they fpeak of both) univerfally agreed upon by all mankind: which therefore, they argue, muft needs be constant impreffions, which the fouls of men receive in their first beings, and which they bring into the world with them, as neceffarily and really as they do any of their inherent faculties.

Univerfal confent

proves nothing innate.

§. 3. This argument, drawn from univerfal confent, has this misfortune in it, that if it were true in matter of fact, that there were certain truths, wherein all mankind agreed, it would not prove them innate, if there can be any other way fhewn, how men may come to that univerfal agreement, in the things they do confent in; which I prefume may be done.

"What is, is;" and, "it is impoffible for the fame thing to be, and not, to

be," not univerfally af fented to.

§. 4. But, which is worfe, this argument of univerfal confent, which is made ufe of to prove innate principles, feems to me a demonstration that there are none fuch; because there are none to which all mankind: give an universal affent. I fhall begin with the fpeculative, and inftance in those magnified principles of demonftration; "whatfoever is, is;" and, "it is impoffible for the fam thing to be, and not to be;" which, of all others, I think have the moft allowed title to innate. Thefe have fo fettled a reputation of maxims univerfally received, that it will, no doubt, be thought ftrange, if any one should seem to queftion it. But yet I take liberty to fay, that these propofitions are so far from having an univerfal affent, that there are great part of mankind to whom they are not so much as known.

Not on the mind naturally im

S. 5. For, firft, it is evident, that all children and idiots have not the leaft apprehenfion or thought of them: and the want printed, beof that is enough to deftroy that univerfal cause not known to affent, which must needs be the neceffary children, concomitant of all innate truths: it feeming idiots, &c. to me near a contradiction, to fay, that there are truths imprinted on the foul, which it perceives or underftands not: imprinting, if it fignify any thing, being nothing elfe, but the making certain truths to be per

ceived.

ceived. For to imprint any thing on the mind, without the mind's perceiving it, feems to me hardly intelligible. If therefore children and idiots have fouls, have minds, with those impreffions upon them, they muft unavoidably perceive them, and neceffarily know and affent to these truths; which fince they do not, it is evident that there are no fuch impreffions. For if they are not notions naturally imprinted, how can they be innate? and if they are notions imprinted, how can they be unknown? To fay a notion is imprinted on the mind, and yet at the fame time to fay, that the mind is ignorant of it, and never yet took notice of it, is to make this impreffion nothing. No propofition can be faid to be in the mind, which it never yet knew, which it was never yet confcious of. For if any one may, then, by the fame reason, all propofitions that are true, and the mind is capable of ever affenting to, may be faid to be in the mind, and to be imprinted: fince, if any one can be faid to be in the mind, which it never yet knew, it must be only, because it is capable of knowing it, and so the mind is of all truths it ever fhall know. Nay, thus truths may be imprinted on the mind, which it never did, nor ever fhall know: for a man may live long, and die at last in ignorance of many truths, which his mind was capable of knowing, and that with certainty. So that if the capacity of knowing, be the natural impreffion contended for, all the truths a man ever comes to know, will, by this account, be every one of them innate; and this great point will amount to no more, but only to a very improper way of speaking; which, whilft it pretends to affert the contrary, fays nothing different from thofe, who deny innate principles. For nobody, I think, ever denied that the mind was capable of knowing feveral truths. The capacity, they fay, is innate, the knowledge acquired. But then to what end fuch contest for certain innate maxims? If truths can be imprinted on the understanding without being perceived, I can fee no difference there can be, between any truths the mind is capable of knowing, in refpect of their original they must all be innate, or all adventitious: in vain shall a man go about to diftinguish them. He. 3 therefore,

therefore, that talks of innate notions in the understanding, cannot (if he intend thereby any diftinct fort of truths) mean fuch truths to be in the understanding, as it never perceived, and is yet wholly ignorant of. For if these words (to be in the understanding) have any propriety, they fignify to be understood: fo that, to be in the understanding, and not to be understood; to be in the mind, and never to be perceived; is all one, as to fay, any thing is, and is not, in the mind or underftanding. If therefore these two propofitions, "whatfoever is, is ;" and "it is impoffible for the fame thing to be, and not to be," are by nature imprinted, children cannot be ignorant of them; infants, and all that have fouls, muft neceffarily have them in their understandings, know the truth of them, and affent to it.

That men know them

when they come to the ufe of reafon, anfwered.

§. 6. To avoid this, it is ufually anfwered, That all men know and affent to them, when they come to the use of reason, and this is enough to prove them innate. I answer,

§. 7. Doubtful expreffions, that have fcarce any fignification, go for clear reafons, o' those, who being prepoffeffed, take not the pains to examine, even what they themselves fay. For to apply this anfwer with any tolerable fenfe to our prefent purpose, it muft fignify one of thefe two things; either, that, as foon as men come to the ufe of reafon, thefe fuppofed native infcriptions come to be known, and obferved by them or elfe, that the ufe and exercife of men's reafon affifts them in the difcovery of thefe principles, and certainly makes them known to them.

covered

them, that would not prove them innate.

§. 8. If they mean, that by the use of If reafon dif- reafon men may difcover thefe principles; · and that this is fufficient to prove them innate their way of arguing will ftand thus, (viz.) that, whatever truths reafon can certainly difcover to us, and make us firmly. affent to, thofe are all naturally imprinted on the mind: fince that univerfal affent, which is made the mark of them, amounts to no more but this; that by the ufe of reason, we are capable to come to a certain knowledge

of,