177 regular motions, neither of which motions do ever all at once exift, but only in the ideas I have of them in my memory derived from my fenfes or reflection; I can with the fame ease, and for the fame reason, apply it in my thoughts to duration antecedent to all manner of motion, as well as to any thing that is but a minute, or a day, antecedent to the motion, that at this very moment the fun is in. All things paft are equally and perfectly at reft; and to this way of confideration of them are all one, whether they were before the beginning of the world, or but yesterday: the measuring of any duration by fome motion depending not at all on the real co-existence of that thing to that motion, or any other periods of revolution, but the having a clear idea of the length of fome periodical known motion, or other intervals of duration in my mind, and applying that to the duration of the thing I would measure.

§. 29. Hence we fee, that fome men imagine the duration of the world, from its firft existence to this prefent year 1689, to have been five thousand fix hun dred and thirty-nine years, or equal to five thousand fix hundred and thirty-nine annual revolutions of the fun, and others a great deal more; as the Egyptians of old, who in the time of Alexander counted twenty three thousand years from the reign of the fun; and the Chinese now, who account the world three millions, two hundred and fixty-nine thousand years old, or more: which longer duration of the world, according to their computation, though I fhould not believe to be true, yet I can equally imagine it with them, and as truly un derftand, and fay one is longer than the other, as I un derftand, that Methufalem's life was longer than Enoch's. And if the common reckoning of five thoufand fix hundred and thirty-nine fhould be true (as it may be as well as any other affigned) it hinders not at all my imagining what others mean when they make the world one thoufand years older, fince every one may with the fame facility imagine (I do not fay believe) the world to be fifty thousand years old, as five thoufand fix hundred and thirty-nine: and may as well conceive the duration of fifty thousand years, as five thousand fix hundred and thirty-nine. Whereby it appears, that VOL. I.

N

to

to the measuring the duration of any thing by time, it is not requifite that that thing fhould be co-existent to the motion we measure by, or any other periodical revolution; but it fuffices to this purpose, that we have the idea of the length of any regular periodical appearances, which we can in our minds apply to duration, with which the motion or appearance never co-existed. b. 30. For as in the hiftory of the creation, delivered by Mofes, I can imagine that light exifted three days before the fun was, or had any motion, barely by thinking, that the duration of light, before the fun was created, was fo long as (if the fun had moved then, as it doth now) would have been equal to three of his di urnal revolutions; fo by the fame way I can have an idea of the chaos, or angels being created, before there was either light, or any continued motion, a minute, an hour, a day, a year, or one thousand years. For if I can but confider duration equal to one minute, before either the being or motion of any body, I can add one minute more till I come to fixty; and by the fame way of adding minutes, hours, or years (i. c. fuch or fuch parts of the fun's revolutions, or any other period, whereof I have the idea) proceed in infinitum, and fuppofe a duration exceeding as many fuch periods as I can reckon, let me add whilft I will: which I think is the notion we have of eternity, of whose infinity we have no other notion, than we have of the infinity of number, to which we can add for ever without end..

$31. And thus I think it is plain, that from those two fountains of all knowledge before-mentioned, viz. reflection and fenfation, we get ideas of duration, and the measures of it.

. For, first, by obferving what paffes in our minds, how our ideas there in train conftantly fome vanish, and others begin to appear, we come by the idea of fucceffion.

Secondly, by obferving a diftance in the parts of this fucceffion, we get the idea of duration.

Thirdly, By fenfation obferving certain appearances, at certain regular and feeming equidiftant periods, we get the ideas of certain lengths or measures of duration, as minutes, hours, days, years, &c.

Fourthly,

Fourthly, by being able to repeat those measures of time, or ideas of ftated length of duration in our minds, as often as we will, we can come to imagine duration, where nothing does really endure or exift; and thus we imagine to-morrow, next year, or seven years hence.

Fifthly, By being able to repeat ideas of any length of time as of a minute, a year, or, an age, as often as we will in our own thoughts, and adding them one to another, without ever coming to the end of fuch addition any nearer than we can to the end of number, to which we can always add; we come by the idea of eternity, as the future eternal duration of our fouls, as well as the eternity of that infinite Being, which must neceffarily have always exifted.

Sixthly, By confidering any part of infinite duration, as fet out by periodical measures, we come by the idea of what we call time in general.

CHA P. XV..

Of Duration and Expanfion, confidered together.

$.1.THOUGH

Both capable

of greater

and lefs.

we have in the precedent chapters dwelt pretty long on the confiderations of space and duration; yet they being ideas of general concernment, that have fomething very abftrufe and peculiar in their nature, the comparing them one with another may perhaps be of ufe for their illuftration; and we may have the more clear and distinct conception of them, by taking a view of them together. Distance or space, in its fimple abftract conception, to avoid confufion, I call expansion, to diftinguish it from extenfion, which by fome is used to exprefs this diftance only as it is in the folid parts of matter, and fo includes, or at leaft intimates the idea of body: whereas the idea of pure diftance includes no fuch thing. I prefer alfo the word expanfion to space, because space is often applied to diffance of fleeting fucceffive parts, which never exift together, as well as

to thofe which are permanent. In both these (viz. expanfion and duration) the mind has this common ides of continued lengths, capable of greater or lefs quantities for a man has as clear an idea of the difference of the length of an hour and a day, as of an inch and a foot.

Expanfion not bounded by matter.

§. 2. The mind, having got the idea of the length of any part of expansion, let it be a fpan, or a pace, or what length you

will, can, as has been faid, repeat that idea; and fo, adding it to the former, enlarge its idea of length, and make it equal to, two fpans, or two paces, and fo as often as it will, till it equals the diftance of any parts of the earth one from another, and increase thus, till it amounts to the distance of the fun, or remoteft ftar. By fuch a progreffion as this, fetting out from the place where it is, or any other place, it can proceed and pafs beyond all thofe lengths, and find nothing to stop its going on, either in, or without body. It is true, we can eafily in our thoughts come to the end of folid extenfion; the extremity and bounds of all body we have no difficulty to arrive at; but when the mind is there, it finds nothing to hinder its progrefs into this endless expanfion; of that it can neither find nor conceive any end. Nor let any one fay, that beyond the bounds of body, there is nothing at all, unlefs he will confine God within the limits of matter. Solomon, whofe undertanding was filled and enlarged with wifdom, seems to have other thoughts, when he fays, "heaven, and "the heaven of heavens, cannot contain thee:" and he, fthink, very much magnifies to himfelf the capacity of his own understanding, who perfuades himfelf, that he can extend his thoughts farther than God exifts, or imagine any expanfion where he is not.

Norduration by: motion.

§. 3. Juft fo is it in duration. The mind, having got the idea of any length of duration, can double, multiply, and enlarge it, not only beyond its own, but beyond the existence of all corporcal beings, and all the measures of time, taken from the great bodies of the world, and their motions. But yet every one eafily admits, that though we make

duration

Why men more cafily:

admit infinite durationthan

infinite ex

panfion.

duration boundless, as certainly it is, we cannot yet extend it beyond all being. God, every one easily allows, fills eternity; and it is hard to find a reafon, why any one should doubt, that he likewife fills immenfity. His infinite being is certainly as boundlefs one way as another; and methinks it afcribes a little too much to matter, to fay, where there is no body, there is nothing. §. 4. Hence, I think, we may learn the reason why every one familiarly, and without the leaft hesitation, fpeaks of, and fuppofes eternity, and sticks not to afcribe infinity to duration; but it is with more doubting and referve, that many admit, or fuppofe the infinity of space. The reafon whereof feems to me to be this, that duration and extenfion being used as names of affections belonging to other beings, we cafily conceive in God infinite duration, and we cannot avoid doing fo: but not attributing to him extention, but only to matter, which is finite, we are apter to doubt of the existence of expanfion without matter; of which alone we commonly fuppofe it an attribute. And therefore when men purfue their thoughts of space, they are apt to stop at the confines of body; as if Ipace were there at an end too, and reached no farther. Or if their ideas upon confideration carry them farther, yet they term what is beyond the limits of the univerfe imaginary space; as if it were nothing, because there is no body exifting in it. Whereas duration, antecedent to all body, and to the motions which it is measured by, they never term imaginary; because it is never fuppofed void of fome other real exiftence. And if the names of things may at all direct our thoughts towards the originals of men's ideas (as I am apt to think they may very much) one may have occafion to think by the name duration, that the continuation of existence, with a kind of refiftance to any deftructive force, and the continuation of folidity (which is apt to be confounded with, and, if we will look into the minute anatomical parts of matter, is little different from, hardness) were thought to have fome analogy, and gave occafion to words, fo near of kin as durare and durum effe. And