of, and affent to them; and, by this means, there will be no difference between the maxims of the mathematicians, and theorems they deduce from them: All muft be equally allowed innate; they being all discoveries made by the use of reason, and truths that a rational creature may certainly come to know, if he apply his thoughts rightly that way. It is falfe that reafon difco vers them. §. 9. But how can thefe men think the ufe of reafon neceffary, to difcover principles that are fuppofed innate, when reason (if we may believe them) is nothing else but the faculty of deducing unknown truths from principles, or propofitions, that are already known? That certainly can never be thought innate, which we have need of reafon to discover; unless, as I have faid, we will have all the certain truths, that reafon ever teaches us, to be innate. We may as well think the use of reafon neceffary to make our eyes discover visible objects, as that there should be need of reason, or the exercite thereof, to make the under ftanding fee what is originally engraven on it, and cannot be in the understanding before it be perceived by it. So that to make reafon discover thofe truths thus imprinted, is to fay, that the use of reafon discovers to a man what he knew before: and if men have those innate impreffed truths originally, and before the use of reason, and yet are always ignorant of them, till they come to the use of reafon; it is in effect to fay, that men know, and know them not, at the fame time. §. 10. It will here perhaps be faid, that mathemati cal demonstrations, and other truths that are not innate, are not affented to, as foon as propofed, wherein they are diftinguished from thefe maxims, and other innate truths. I fhall have occafion to fpeak of affent, upon the first propofing, more particularly by and by. I fhall here only, and that very readily allow, that these maxims and mathematical demonftrations are in this different; that the one have need of reafon, ufing of proofs, to make them out, and to gain our affent; but the other, as foon as understood, are, without any the leaft reafoning, embraced and affented to. But I withal beg leave to observe, that it lays open the weakness of VOL, I. this this fubterfuge, which requires the use of reason for the discovery of these general truths: fince it must be confeffed, that in their discovery there is no ufe made of reasoning at all. And I think thofe, who give this anfwer, will not be forward to affirm, that the knowledge of this maxim, "That it is impoffible for the fame thing to be, and not to be," is a deduction of our reafon. For this would be to destroy that bounty of nature they feem fo fond of, whilst they make the knowledge of those principles to depend on the labour of our thoughts. For all reafoning is fearch, and cafting about, and requires pains and application. And how can it with any tolerable fenfe be fuppofed, that what was imprinted by nature, as the foundation and guide of our reafon, fhould need the ufe of reason to discover it? §. 11. Those who will take the pains to reflect with a little attention on the operations of the understanding, will find, that this ready affent of the mind to fome truths, depends not, either on native infcription, or the ufe of reafon; but on a faculty of the mind quite diftinct from both of them, as we fhall fee hereafter, Reason, therefore, having nothing to do in procuring our affent to thefe maxims, if by faying, that men know and affent to them, when they come to the ufe of reafon, be meant, that the ufe of reafon affifts us in the knowledge of these maxims, it is utterly false; and were it true, would prove them not to be innate. The coming to the ufe of reafon, not the time we cometo know thefe maxims §. 12. If by knowing and affenting to them, when we come to the ufe of reafon, be meant, that this is the time when they come to be taken notice of by the mind; and that, as foon as children come to the ufe of reafon, they come alfo to know and affent to thefe maxims; this alfo is falfe and frivolous. First, It is falfe: Because it is evident thefe maxims are not in the mind fo early as the use of reafon: and therefore the coming to the ufe of reafon is falfly affigned, as the time of their difcovery. How many inftances of the use of reafon may we obferve in children, a long time before they have any knowledge of of this maxim, "That it is impoffible for the fame thing to be, and not to be?" And a great part of illiterate people, and favages, pass many years, even of their rational age, without ever thinking on this, and the like general propofitions. I grant, men come not to the knowledge of these general and more abftract truths, which are thought innate, till they come to the use of reafon; and I add, nor then neither. Which is fo, because, till after they come to the use of reafon, thofe general abstract ideas are not framed in the mind, about which thofe general maxims are, which are mistaken for innate principles; but are indeed discoveries made, and verities introduced and brought into the mind by the fame way, and difcovered by the fame fteps, as feveral other propofitions, which nobody was ever fo extravagant as to fuppofe innate. This I hope to make plain in the fequel of this difcourfe. I allow therefore a neceffity, that men fhould come to the use of reafon before they get the knowledge of thofe general truths; but deny, that men's coming to the ufe of reafon is the time of their discovery. are not dif tinguished from other knowable truths. §. 13. In the mean time it is obfervable, By this they that this faying, That men know and affent to these maxims, when they come to the use of reason, amounts in reality of fact to no more but this, That they are never known, nor taken notice of, before the use of reason, but may poffibly be affented to, fome time after, during a man's life; but when, is uncertain: and fo may all other knowable truths, as well as thefe; which therefore have no advantage nor diftinction from others, by this note of being known when we come to the use of reason; nor are thereby proved to be innate, but quite the contrary. §. 14. But, fecondly, were it true, that the precife time of their being known, and affented to, were, when men come to the ufe of reason, neither would that prove them innate. This way of arguing is as frivolous, as the fuppofition of itself is falfe. For by what kind of logic will it appear, C 2 If coming to reafon were that that any notion is originally by nature imprinted in the mind in its first conftitution, because it comes firft to be observed and affented to, when a faculty of the mind, which has quite a diftinct province, begins to exert itfelf? And therefore, the coming to the ufe of speech, if it were supposed the time that these maxims are first affented to (which it may be with as much truth, as the time when men come to the ufe of reafon) would be as good a proof that they were innate, as to say, they are innate, because men affent to them, when they come to the ufe of reafon. I agree then with thefe men of innate principles, that there is no knowledge of these general and felf-evident maxims in the mind, till it comes to the exercise of reason: but I deny that the coming to the use of reason is the precife time when they are first taken notice of; and if that were the precife time, I deny that it would prove them innate. All that can with any truth be meant by this propofition, that men affent to them when they come to the use of reason, is no more but this, that the making of general abstract ideas, and the understanding of general names, being a concomitant of the rational faculty, and growing up with it, children commonly get not those general ideas, nor learn the names that ftand for them, till, having for a good while exercifed their reafon about familiar and more particular ideas, they are, by their ordinary difcourfe and actions with others, acknowledged to be capable of rational converfation. If af fenting to thefe maxims, when men come to the use of reafon, can be true in any other fenfe, I defire it may be shown; or at leaft, how in this, or any other sense, it proves them innate. The steps by which the §. 15. The fenfes at firft let in particular ideas, and furnish the yet empty cabinet; mind attains and the mind by degrees growing familiar feveral truths with fome of them, they are lodged in the memory, and names got to them. Afterwards the mind, proceeding farther, abftracts them, and by degrees learns the use of general names. In this manner the mind comes to be furnished with ideas and language, the ma terials terials about which to exercife its difcurfive" faculty: and the use of reafon becomes daily more vifible, as thefe materials, that give it employment, increase. But though the having of general ideas, and the use of general words and reafon, ufually grow together; yet, I fee not, how this any way proves them innate. The knowledge of fome truths, I confefs, is very early in the mind; but in a way that shows them not to be inmate. For, if we will obferve, we fhall find it ftill to be about ideas, not innate, but acquired: It being about those first which are imprinted by external things, with which infants have earlieft to do, which make the most frequent impreffions on their fenfes. In ideas thus got, the mind difcovers that fome agree, and others differ, probably as foon as it has any use of memory; as foon as it is able to retain and perceive diftinct ideas. But whether it be then, or no, this is certain, it does fo long before it has the use of words, or comes to that, which we commonly call "the use of reafon." For a child knows as certainly, before it can speak, the difference between the ideas of fweet and bitter (i. e. that fweet is not bitter) as it knows afterwards (when it comes to fpeak) that wormwood and fugar-plums are not the fame thing. §. 16. A child knows not that three and four are equal to seven, till he comes to be able to count seven, and has got the name and idea of equality and then, upon explaining those words, he presently affents to, or rather perceives the truth of that propofition. But neither does he then readily affent, because it is an innate truth, nor was his affent wanting till then, because he wanted the use of reafon; but the truth of it appears to him, as foon as he has fettled in his mind the clear and distinct ideas, that these names ftand for and then he knows the truth of that propofition, upon the fame grounds, and by the fame means, that he knew before, that a rod and a cherry are not the fame thing; and upon the fame grounds alfo, that he may come to know afterwards, "that it is impoffible for the fame thing to be, and not to be," as fhall be more fully fhown here C 3 after, |