after. So that the later it is before any one comes to have those general ideas, about which thofe maxims are ; or to know the fignification of those general terms that ftand for them; or to put together in his mind the ideas they stand for; the later alfo will it be before he comes to affent to thofe maxims, whofe terms, with the ideas they ftand for, being no more innate than those of a cat or a weefel, he muft ftay till time and obfervation have acquainted him with them; and then he will be in a capacity to know the truth of these maxims, upon the first occafion that shall make him put together those ideas in his mind, and obferve whether they agree or difagree, according as is expreffed in those propofitions. And therefore it is, that a man knows that eighteen and nineteen are equal to thirty-feven, by the fame selfevidence, that he knows one and two to be equal to three yet a child knows this not fo foon as the other; not for want of the ufe of reason, but because the ideas the words eighteen, nineteen, and thirty-feven stand for, are not fo foon got, as thofe which are fignified by one, two, and three.

Affenting as

foon as propofed and understood, proves them not innate,

§. 17. This evafion therefore of general affent, when men come to the ufe of reafon, failing as it does, and leaving no difference between those fuppofed innate, and other truths, that are afterwards acquired and learnt, men have endeavoured to fecure an univerfal affent to those they call maxims, by faying, they are generally affented to as foon as propofed, and the terms they are propofed in, underftood: feeing all men, even children, as foon as they hear and underftand the terms, affent to these propofitions, they think it is fufficient to prove them innate. For fince men never fail, after they have once understood the words, to acknowledge them for undoubted truths, they would infer, that certainly thefe propofitions were first lodged in the understanding, which, without any teaching, the mind, at the very firft propofal, immediately clofes with, and affents to, and after that never doubts again.

ffuch an affent be a mark of innate, one and two are equal to three; that fweetness is nefs;" and a thousand the like, muft be

then "that

not bitter

innate.

§. 18. In anfwer to this, I demand "whether ready affent given to a propofition upon first hearing, and understanding the terms, be a certain mark of an innate principle?" If it be not, fuch a general affent is in vain urged as a proof of them: if it be faid, that it is a mark of innate, they must then allow all such propofitions to be innate, which are generally affented to as foon as heard, whereby they will find themfelves plentifully stored with innate principles. For upon the fame ground, viz. of affent at first hearing and understanding the terms, that men would have thofe maxims pafs for innate, they must also admit fcveral propofitions about numbers to be innate and thus, that one and two are equal to three; that two and two are equal to four; and a multitude of other the like propofitions in numbers, that every body affents to at first hearing and understanding the terms, must have a place amongst these innate axioms. Nor is this the prerogative of numbers alone, and propofitions made about feveral of them; but even natural philofophy, and all the other fciences, afford propofitions, which are fure to meet with affent as foon as they are understood. That two bodies cannot be in the fame place, is a truth, that nobody any more sticks at, than at these maxims, "that it is impoffible for the fame thing to be, and not to be; that white is not black: that a fquare is not a circle; that yellowness is not fweetnefs:" thefe and a million of fuch other propo fitions, as many at leaft as we have diftinct ideas of, every man in his wits, at first hearing, and knowing 'what the names ftand for, muft neceffarily affent to. If thefe men will be true to their own rule, and have affent at first hearing and understanding the terms, to be a mark of innate, they must allow, net only as many innate propofitions as men have diftinét ideas; but as many as men can make propofitions wherein different ideas are denied one of another. Since every propofition, wherein one different idea is denied of another,

will as certainly find affent at first hearing and underftanding the terms, as this general one, "it is impoffi ble for the fame thing to be, and not to be;" or that which is the foundation of it, and is the easier understood of the two, the fame is not different:" by which account they will have legions of innate propofitions of this one fort, without mentioning any other. But fince no propofition can be innate, unless the ideas, about which it is, be innate; this will be, to suppose all our ideas of colours, founds, taftes, figure, &c. innate; than which there cannot be any thing more oppofite to reafon and experience. Univerfal and ready äffent upon hearing and understanding the terms is (I grant) a mark of felf-evidence: but felf-evidence, depending not on innate impreffions, but on fomething elfe (as we fhall fhow hereafter) belongs to feveral propofitions, which nobody was yet fo extravagant as to pretend to be innate.

Such lefs

ge

fitionsknown

before these univerfal maxims.

§. 19. Nor let it be faid, That thofe more neral propo- particular felf-evident propofitions, which are affented to at first hearing, as, that one and two are equal to three; that green is not red; &c; are received as the confe quences of thofe more univerfal propofitions, which are looked on as innate principles; fince any one, who will but take the pains to obferve what paffes in the understanding, will certainly find, that thefe, and the like lefs general propofitions, are cer tainly known, and firmly affented to, by those who are utterly ignorant of thofe more general maxims; and fo, being earlier in the mind than thofe (as they are called) first principles, cannot owe to them the affent wherewith they are received at first hearing.

One and one equal to two, &c. not gene ral nor ufe

§. 20. If it be faid, that" thefe propofitions, viz. two and two are equal to four; red is not blue; &c.; are not general maxims, nor of any great ufe:" Ianfwer, that makes nothing to the argument of univerfal affent, upon hearing and understanding. For, if that be the certain mark of innate, whatever.

ful, anfwered

propo

propofition can be found, that receives general affent as Toon as heard and understood, that must be admitted for an innate propofition, as well as this maxim, "that it is impoffible for the fame thing to be, and not to be;" they being upon this ground equal. And as to the difference of being more general, that makes this maxim more remote from being innate; thofe general and abstract ideas being more strangers to our first apprehenfions, than those of more particular felf-evident propofitions; and therefore it is longer before they are admitted and affented to by the growing understanding. And as to the ufefulness of thefe magnified maxims, that perhaps will not be found fo great as is generally conceived, when it comes in its due place to be more fully confidered.

Thefe maxknown fomeims not being times till propofed, proves them not innate.

S. 21. But we have not yet done with affenting to propofitions at first hearing and understanding their terms; it is fit we first take notice, that this, inftead of being a mark that they are innate, is a proof of the contrary: fince it fuppofes, that several, who understand and know other things, are ignorant of these principles, till they are propofed to them; and that one may be unacquainted with these truths, till he hears them from others. For if they were innate, what need they be propofed in order to gaining affent, when, by being in the understanding, by a natural and original impreffion, (if there were any fuch) they could not but be known before? Or doth the propofing them, print them clearer in the mind than nature did? If fo, then the confequence will be, that a man knows them better, after he has been thus taught them, than he did before. Whence it will follow, that thefe principles may be made more evident to us by others teaching, than nature has made them by impreffion; which will ill agree with the opinion of innate principles, and give but little authority to them; but, on the contrary, makes them unfit to be the foundations of all our other knowledge, as they are pretended to be. This cannot be denied, that men grow first acquainted

acquainted with many of these self-evident truths, upon their being proposed: but it is clear, that whofoever does fo, finds in himself, that he then begins to know a propofition, which he knew not before; and which, from thenceforth, he never queftions: not because it was innate, but because the confideration of the nature of the things contained in those words, would not suffer him to think otherwise, how, or whenfoever he is brought to reflect on them. And if whatever is affented to at first hearing and understanding the terms, muft pafs for an innate principle, every well-grounded obfervation, drawn from particulars into a general rule, must be innate. When yet it is certain, that not all, but only fagacious heads light at firft on thefe obfervations, and reduce them into general propofitions, not innate, but collected from a preceding acquaintance, and reflection on particular inftances. Thefe, when obferving men have made them, unobferving men, when they are propofed to them, cannot refufe their affent to.

Implicitly known before propofing, fignifies, that

the mind is capable of understanding them, or elfe fignifies nothing.

§. 22. If it be faid, "the understanding hath an implicit knowledge of these principles, but not an explicit, before this first hearing," (as they must, who will fay, "that they are in the understanding before they are known") it will be hard to conceive what is meant by a principle imprinted on the understanding the understanding implicitly; unless it be this, that the mind is capable of underftanding and affenting firmly to fuch propofitions. And thus all mathematical demonftrations, as well as first principles, must be received as native impreffions on the mind: which I fear they will fcarce allow them to be, who find it harder to demonftrate a propofition, than affent to it when demonftrated. And few mathematicians will be forward to believe, that all the diagrams they have drawn, were but copies of those innate characters which nature had engraven upon their minds.