The argument of affenting on first hearing. fuppofition is upon a falic

of no prece dent teach

ing. Under which, that men are

§. 23. There is, I fear, this farther weaknefs in the foregoing argument, which would perfuade us, that therefore thofe maxims are to be thought innate, which men admit at first hearing, because they affent to propofitions, which they are not taught, nor do receive from the force of any argument or demonftration, but a bare explication or understanding of the terms. there feems to me to lie this fallacy, fuppofed not to be taught, nor to learn any thing de novo; when, in truth, they are taught, and do learn fomething they were ignorant. of before. For first it is evident, that they have learned the terms, and their fignification; neither of which was born with them. But this is not all the acquired knowledge in the cafe: the ideas themselves, about which the propofition is, are not born with them, no more than their names, but got afterwards. So that in all propofitions that are affented to at first hearing, the terms of the propofition, their ftanding for fuch ideas, and the ideas themfelves that they stand for, being neither of them innate; I would fain know what there is remaining in fuch propofitions, that is innate. For I would gladly have any one name that propofition, whofe terms or ideas were either of them innate. We by degrees get ideas and names, and learn their appropriated connexion one with another; and then to propofitions, made in fuch terms, whose fignification we have learnt, and wherein the agreement or disagreement we can perceive in our ideas, when put together, is expreffed, we at first hearing affent; though to other propofitions, in themselves as certain and evident, but which are concerning ideas, not fo foon or fo eafily got, we are at the fame time no way capable of affenting. For though a child quickly affents to this propofition," that an apple is not fire," when, by familiar acquaintance, he has got the ideas of thofe two different things diftinctly imprinted on his mind, and has learnt that the names apple and fire ftand for them; yet it will be fome years after, perhaps, beforè

the

the fame child will affent to this propofition, " that it is impoffible for the fame thing to be, and not to be:" because that, though, perhaps, the words are as easy to be learnt, yet the fignification of them being more large, comprehensive, and abstract, than of the names annexed to thofe fenfible things the child. hath to do with, it is longer before he learns their precife meaning, and it requires more time plainly to form in his mind those general ideas they ftand for. Till that be done, you will in vain endeavour to make any child affent to a propofition made up of fuch general terms: but as foon as ever he has got thofe ideas, and learned their names, he forwardly clofes with the one, as well as the other of the forementioned propofitions, and with both for the fame reafon; viz. because he finds the ideas he has in his mind to agree or difagree, according as the words ftanding for them, are affirmed or denied one of another in the propofition. But if propo fitions be brought to him in words, which ftand for ideas he has not yet in his mind; to fuch propofitions, however evidently true or falfe in themselves, he affords neither affent nor diffent, but is ignorant. For words being but empty founds, any farther than they are figns of our ideas, we cannot but affent to them, as they correspond to those ideas we have, but no farther than that. But the fhowing by what steps and ways knowledge comes into our minds, and the grounds of feveral degrees of affent, being the business of the following difcourfe, it may fuffice to have only touched on it here, as one reason that made me doubt of those innate principles.

Not innate, because not

affented to.

S. 24. To conclude this argument of univerfal confent, I agree with thefe defenders of innate principles, that if they are innate, they muft needs have univerfal affent. For that a truth fhould be innate, and yet not affented to, is to me as unintelligible, as for a man to know a truth, and be ignorant of it, at the fame time. But then, by these men's own confeffion, they cannot be innate; fince they are not affented to by thofe who un

derstand

derstand not the terms, nor by a great part of those who do understand them, but have yet never heard nor thought of thofe propofitions; which, I think, is at leaft one half of mankind. But were the number far lefs, it would be enough to destroy universal affent, and thereby fhow thefe propofitions not to be innate, if children alone were ignorant of them.

Thefe max

ims not the first known.

§. 25. But that I may not be accused to argue from the thoughts of infants, which are unknown to us, and to conclude from what paffes in their understandings before they exprefs it; I fay next, that these two general propofitions are not the truths that firft poffefs the minds of children, nor are antecedent to all acquired and adventitious notions; which, if they were innate, they must needs be, Whether we can determine it or no, it matters not, there is certainly a time when children begin to think, and their words and actions do affure us that they do fo. When therefore they are capable of thought, of knowledge, of affent, can it rationally be fuppofed, they can be ignorant of thofe notions that nature has imprinted, were there any fuch? Can it be imagined, with any appearance of reason, that they perceive the impreffions from things without, and be at the fame time ignorant of thofe characters which nature itself has taken care to ftamp within? Can they receive and affent to adventitious notions, and be ignorant of those which are fuppofed woven into the very principles of their being, and imprinted there in indelible characters, to be the foundation and guide of all their acquired knowledge, and future reafonings? This would be, to make nature take pains to no purpofe; or, at leaft, to write very ill; fince its characters could not be read by thofe eyes, which faw other things very well; and thofe are very ill fuppofed the clearest parts of truth, and the foundations of all our knowledge, which are not first known, and without which the undoubted knowledge of feveral other things may be had. The child certainly knows, that the nurfe that feeds it, is neither the cat it plays with, nor the blackmoor it is

afraid of; that the wormseed or mustard it refufes, is not the apple or fugar it cries for; this it is certainly and undoubtedly affured of: but will any one fay, it is by virtue of this principle, " that it is impoffible for the fame thing to be, and not to be," that it fo firmly affents to these, and other parts of its knowledge? Or that the child has any notion or apprehenfion of that propofition at an age, wherein yet, it is plain, it knows a great many other truths? He that will fay, children join these general abstract speculations with their fucking bottles and their rattles, may, perhaps, with justice, be thought to have more paffion and zeal for his opinion, but lefs fincerity and truth, than one of that age.

And fo not innate.

§. 26. Though therefore there be several general propofitions, that meet with conftant and ready affent, as foon as propofed to men grown up, who have attained the ufe of more general and abstract ideas, and names ftanding for them; yet they not being to be found in thofe of tender years, who nevertheless know other things, they cannot pretend to univerfal affent of intelligent perfons, and fo by no means can be fuppofed innate it being impoffible, that any truth which is innate fif there were any fuch) fhould be unknown, at least to any one who knows any thing elfe: fince, if they are innate truths, they must be innate thoughts; there being nothing a truth in the mind, that it has never thought on. Whereby it is evident, if there be any innate truths in the mind, they must neceffarily be the first of any thought on; the first that appear there.

Not innate, because they appear leaft, where what is innate shows itself cleareft,

§. 27. That the general maxims, we are difcourfing of, are not known to children, idiots, and a great part of mankind, we have already fufficiently proved; whereby it is evident, they have not an univerfal affent, nor are general impreffions. But there is this farther argument in it against their being innate, that these characters, if they were native and original impreffions, fhould appear fairest

1

and cleareft in those persons in whom yet we find no footsteps of them: and it is, in my opinion, a strong prefumption, that they are not innate; fince they are leaft known to thofe, in whom, if they were innate, they must needs exert themselves with most force and vigour. For children, idiots, favages, and illiterate people, being of all others the leaft corrupted by cuf tom, or borrowed opinions; learning and education haying not caft their native thoughts into new moulds, nor, by fuperinducing foreign and ftudied doctrines, confounded those fair characters nature had written there; one might reasonably imagine, that. in their minds these innate notions fhould lie open fairly to every one's view, as it is certain the thoughts of children do. It might very well be expected, that these principles fhould be perfectly known to naturals, which being ftamped immediately on the foul (as these men fuppofe) can have no dependance on the conftitutions or organs of the body, the only confeffed difference between them and others. One would think, according to these men's principles, that all thefe native beams of light (were there any fuch) fhould in those who have no referves, no arts of concealment, shine out in their full luftre, and leave us in no more doubt of their being there, than we are of their love of pleafure, and abhorrence of pain. But alas, amongst children, idiots, favages, and the grofsly illiterate, what general maxims are to be found? what univerfal principles of knowledge? Their notions are few and narrow, borrowed only from thofe objects they have had moft to do with, and which have made upon their fenfes the frequenteft and ftrongeft impreffions. A child knows his nurfe and his cradle, and by degrees the play-things of a little more advanced age: and a young, favage has, perhaps, his head filled with love and hunting, according to the fafhion of his tribe. But he that from a child untaught, or a wild inhabitant of the woods, will expect thefe abftract maxims and reputed principles of fcience, will, I fear, find himself mistaken. Such kind of general propofitions are fel

dom