before fluid is become hard and confiftent, without containing any idea of the action whereby it is done.

Mixed modes made alfo of other ideas.

§. 12. I think I fhall not need to remark here, that though power and action make the greatest part of mixed modes, marked by names, and familiar in the minds and mouths of men; yet other fimple ideas, and their feveral combinations, are not excluded: much lefs, I think, will it be neceffary for me to enumerate all the mixed modes, which have been fettled, with names to them. That would be to make a dictionary of the greatest part of the words made ufe of in divinity, ethicks, law, and politicks, and several other fciences. All that is requifite to my prefent defign, is, to fhow what fort of ideas those are which I call mixed modes, how the mind comes by them, and that they are compofitions made up of fimple ideas got from fenfation and reflec tion: which, I fuppofe, I have done.

Ideas of fubftances how made.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of our complex Ideas of Subftances.

§. I.

T

HE mind being, as I have declared, furnished with a great number of the fimple ideas, conveyed in by the fenfes, as they are found in exterior things, or by reflection on its own operations, takes notice alfo, that a certain number of thefe fimple ideas go conftantly together; which being prefumed to belong to one thing, and words being fuited to common apprehenfions, and made ufe of for quick dispatch, are called, fo united in one fubject, by one name; which, by inadvertency, we are apt afterward to talk of, and confider as one fimple idea, which indeed is a complication of many ideas together: because, as I have faid, not imagining how thefe fimple ideas can fubfift by themselves, we accustom ourselves to fuppofe some sub

9

ftratum

Our idea of fubftance in

general.

ftratum wherein they do fubfift, and from which they do refult; which therefore we call fubftance (1). §. 2. So that if any one will examine himself concerning his notion of pure fubftance in general, he will find he has no other idea of it at all, but only a fuppofition of he knows not what fupport of fuch qualities, which are capable of producing fimple ideas in us; which qualities are commonly called accidents. If any one fhould be asked, what is the subject wherein colour or

weight

(1) This fection, which was intended only to show how the individuals of diftinct fpecies of fubftances came to be looked upon as fimple ideas, and fo to have fimple names; viz. from the fuppofed fubftratum or fubftance, which was looked upon as the thing itfelf in which inhered, and from which refulted that complication of ideas, by which it was represented to us, hath been mistaken for an account of the idea of subtance in general; and as fuch, hath been reprefented in thefe words; But how comes the general idea of substance to be framed in our minds? Is this by abftracting and enlarging fimple ideas? No But it is by a complication of many fimple ideas together: becaufe, not imagining how thefe fimple ideas can fubfift by themfelves, we accuftom ourselves • to fuppofe fome fubftratum wherein they do fubfift, and from whence they do refult; which therefore we call fubftance.' And is this all, indeed, that is to be faid for the being of fubftance, That we accustom ourfelves to fuppofe a fubftratum? Is that custom grounded upon true reafon, or not? If not, then accidents or modes muft fubfift of themfelves; and thefe fimple ideas need no tortoife to fupport them: for figures and colours, &c. would do well enough of themselves, but for fome fancies men have accustomed themselves to.

To which objection of the bishop of Worcester, our author anfwers thus: Herein your lordship feems to charge me with two faults: one, That I make the general idea of fubftance to be framed, not by abstracting and enlarging fimple ideas, but by a complication of many fimple ideas together: the other, as if I had faid, the being of fubftance had no other foundation but the fancies of men.

As to the first of these, I beg leave to remind your lordship, that I fay in more places than one, and particularly Book 3. Chap. 3. §. 6. and Book 1, Chap. 11. §. 9. where, ex profeffo, I treat of abftraction and general ideas, that they are all made by abftracting, and therefore could not be understood to mean, that that of substance was made any other way; however my pen might have flipt, or the negligence of expreffion, where I might have fomething elfe than the general idea of fubftance in view, might make me feem to fay fo.

That I was not fpeaking of the general idea of fubftance in the paffage your lordship quotes, is manifeft from the title of that chapter, which In his first letter to the bishop of Worcester.

weight inheres, he would have nothing to fay, but the folid extended parts: and if he were demanded, what is it that folidity and extenfion adhere in, he would not be in a much better cafe than the Indian beforementioned, who, faying that the world was fupported by a great elephant, was afked what the elephant refted on; to which his answer was, a great tortoife. But being again preffed to know what gave fupport to the broad-backed tortoife, replied, fomething, he knew not what. And thus here, as in all other cafes where

we

is, Of the complex ideas of fubftances: and the first section of it, which your lordship cites for those words you have fet down.

In which words I do not obferve any that deny the general idea of fubftance to be made by abstracting, nor any that fay it is made by a complication of many fimple ideas together. But fpeaking in that place of the ideas of diftinct fubftances, fuch as man, horfe, gold, &c. I fay they are made up of certain combinations of fimple ideas, which combinations are looked upon, each of them, as one fimple idea, though they are many; and we call it by one name of fubftance, though made up of modes, from the custom of fuppofing a fubftratum, wherein that combination does fubfift. So that in this paragraph I only give an account of the idea of distinct fubftances, such as oak, elephant, iron, &c. how, though they are made up of diftinct complications of modes, yet they are looked on as one idea, called by one name, as making distinct forts of fubftance.

But that my notion of fubftance in general, is quite different from thefe, and has no fuch combination of fimple ideas in it, is evident from the immediate following words, where I fay,* The idea of pure fubftance in general, is only a fuppofion of we know not what fupport of fuch qualities as are capable of producing fimple ideas in us.' And these two I plainly diftinguifh all along, particularly where I fay, whatever therefore be the fecret and abstract nature of substance in general, all the ideas we have of particular diftinct fubftances, are nothing but ⚫ feveral combinations of fimple ideas, co-exifting in fuch, though un• known cause of their union, as makes the whole subsist of itself.'

The other thing laid to my charge, is, as if I took the being of fubftance to be doubtful, or rendered it fo by the imperfect and ill-grounded idea I have given of it. To which I beg leave to fay, that I ground not the being, but the idea of fubftance, on our accuftoming ourfelves to fuppofe fome fubftratum; for it is of the idea alone I fpeak there, and not of the being of fubftance. And having every where affirmed and built upon it, that a man is a fubftance, I cannot be fuppofed to question or doubt of the being of fubftance, till I can queftion or doubt of my own being. Farther, I fay, +Senfation convinces us, that there are + Ib. §. 29.

B. 2. C. 23. §. 2.

• folid

we ufe words without having clear and diftinct ideas, we, talk like children; who being queftioned what fuch a thing is, which they know not, readily give this fatisfactory answer, that it is fomething: which in truth fignifies no more, when fo ufed either by children or men, but that they know not what; and that the thing they pretend to know and talk of, is what they have no diftinct idea of at all, and fo are perfectly ignorant of it, and in the dark. The idea then we have, to which we give the general name substance, being nothing but the fuppofed, but unknown fupport of thofe qualities we find exifting, which we imagine cannot fubfift, "fine re fubftante," without fomething to fupport

⚫ ones.

folid, extended fubftances; and reflection, that there are thinking So that, I think, the being of fubftance is not shaken by what I have faid and if the idea of it fhould be, yet (the being of things depending not on our ideas) the being of fubftance would not be at all fhaken by my faying, we had but an obfcure imperfect idea of it, and that that idea came from our accuftoming ourselves to fuppofe fome fubftratum; or indeed, if I fhould fay, we had no idea of substance at all. For a great many things may be, and are granted to have a being, and be in nature, of which we have no ideas. For example: it cannot be doubted but there are distinct species of feparate fpirits, of which yet we have no diftinct ideas at all: it cannot be queftioned but fpirits have ways of communicating their thoughts, and yet we have no idea of it at all.

The being then of fubftance being safe and secure, notwithstanding any thing I have faid, let us fee whether the idea of it be not fo too. Your lordship afks, with concern, And is this all, indeed, that is to be faid for the being (if your lordfhip please, let it be the idea) of fubftance, that we accuftom ourselves to fuppofe a fubftratum! Is that cuftom grounded upon true reafon or no? I have faid that it is grounded upon this, That we cannot conceive how fimple ideas of fenfible qualities 'fhould fubfift alone; and therefore we fuppofe them to exift in, and to ⚫ be fupported by fome common fubject; which fupport we denote by the ⚫ name fubftance.' Which, I think, is a true reafon, because it is the fame your lordship grounds the fuppofition of a fubftratum on, in this very page; even on the repugnancy to our conceptions, that modes and accidents fhould fubfift by themselves. So that I have the good luck to agree here with your lordship: and confequently conclude, I have your approbation in this, that the fubftratum to modes or accidents, which is our idea of substance in general, is founded in this, that we cannot ⚫ conceive how modes or accidents can fubfift by themselves."

* B. 2. C. 23. §. 4.

them,

them, we call that fupport fubftantia; which, according to the true import of the word, is in plain English, ftanding under or upholding (1).

Of the forts of fubftance.

S. 3. An obfcure and relative idea of subftance in general being thus made, we come to have the ideas of particular forts of fubftances, by collecting fuch combinations of fimple ideas, as are by experience and obfervation of men's fenfes taken notice of to exift together, and are therefore fupposed to flow from the particular internal conftitution,

or

(1) From this paragraph, there hath been raifed an objection by the bishop of Worcester, as if our author's doctrine here concerning ideas, had almost discarded fubftance out of the world: his words in this paragraph, being brought to prove, that he is one of the gentlemen of this new way of reafoning, that have almost difcarded substance out of the reafonable part of the world. To which our author replies: This, my lord, is an accufation, which your lordship will pardon me, if I do not readily know what to plead to, because I do not underBand what it is almost to difcard fubftance out of the reasonable part of the world. If your lordship means by it, that I deny, or doubt, that there is in the world any fuch thing as fubftance, that your lordship will acquit me of, when your lordship looks again into this 23d chapter of the fecond book, which you have cited more than once; where you will find thefe words, §. 4. When we talk or think of any particular fort af • corporeal fubftances, as horfe, ftone, &c. though the idea we have of ⚫ either of them, be but the complication or collection of thofe feveral • fimple ideas of fenfible qualities, which we use to find united in the thing called horfe or ftone; yet, because we cannot conceive how they fhould fubfift alone, nor one in another, we fuppofe them exifting in, ⚫and fupported by fome common fubject, which fupport we denote by the name fubftance; though it is certain, we have no clear or diftinét idea of that thing we fuppofe a fupport.' And again, §. 5. The fame happens concerning the operations of the mind, viz. thinking, ⚫reafoning, fearing, &c. which we confidering not to fubfift of themfelves, nor apprehending how they can belong to body, or be produced by it, we are apt to think these the actions of fome other fubftance, which we call fpirit; whereby yet it is evident, that having no other idea or no.ion of matter, but fomething wherein those many fenfible qualities, which affect our fenfes, do fubfift, by fuppofing a fubftance, wherein thinking, knowing, doubting, and a power of moving, &c. do fubfift, we have as clear a notion of the nature or substance of fpirit, as we have of body; the one being fuppofed to be (without knowing what it is) the fubitratum to thofe fimple ideas we have from

* In his firft letter to that bishop.