idea of motion, but change of distance with other beings that are confidered as at reft; and finding, that fpirits, as well as bodies, cannot operate but where they are, and that fpirits do operate at feveral times in feveral places; I cannot but attribute change of place to all finite fpirits; (for of the infinite fpirit I fpeak not here.) For my foul being a real being, as well as my body, is certainly as capable of changing diftance with any other body, or being, as body itfelf; and fo is capable of motion. And if a mathematician can confider a certain distance, or a change of that dif tance between two points, one may certainly conceive a diftance, and a change of diftance between two fpirits and fo conceive their motion, their approach or removal, one from another.

§. 20. Every one finds in himself, that his foul can think, will, and operate on his body in the place where that is; but cannot operate on a body, or in a place an hundred miles diftant from it. No-body can imagine, that his foul can think, or move a body at Oxford, whilft he is at London; and cannot but know, that, being united to his body, it conftantly changes place all the whole journey between Oxford and London, as the coach or horfe does that carries him, and I think may be faid to be truly all that while in motion; or if that will not be allowed to afford us a clear idea enough of its motion, its being feparated from the body in death, I think, will; for to confider it as going out of the body, or leaving it, and yet to have no idea of its motion, feems to me impoffible.

§. 21. If it be faid by any one, that it cannot change place, because it hath none, for the fpirits are not in loco, but ubi; I fuppofe that way of talking will not now be of much weight to many, in an age that is not much difpofed to admire, or fuffer themfelves to be deceived by fuch unintelligible ways of fpeaking. But if any one thinks there is any fenfe in that diftinction, and that it is applicable to our prefent purpose, I defire him to put it into intelligible English; and then from thence draw a reafon to how, that immaterial fpirits are not capable of motion. Indeed motion cannot be attributed

attributed to God; not because he is an immaterial, but because he is an infinite fpirit.

Idea of foul and body

compared.

§. 22. Let us compare then our complex, idea of an immaterial fpirit with our complex idea of body, and fee whether there be any more obfcurity in one than in the other, and in which moft. Our idea of body, as I think, is an extended folid fubftance, capable of communicating motion by impulfe: And our idea of foul, as an immaterial fpirit, is of a fubftance that thinks, and has a power of exciting motion in body, by willing or thought. Thefe, I think, are our complex ideas of foul and body, as contra diftinguifhed; and now let us examine which has moft obfcurity in it, and difficulty to be apprehended. I know, that people, whofe thoughts are immerfed in matter, and have fo fubjected their minds to their fenfes, that they feldom reflect on any thing beyond them, are apt to fay, they cannot comprehend a thinking thing, which perhaps is true: but I affirm, when they confider it well, they can no more comprehend an extended thing.

Cohesion of

folid parts in body as hard to be conceived as

thinking in a

foul.

§. 23. If any one fay, he knows not what it is thinks in him; he means, he knows not what the fubftance is of that thinking thing: no more, fay I, knows he what the fubftance is of that folid thing. Farther, if he says he knows not how he thinks I anfwer, neither knows he how he is extended; how the folid parts of body are united, or cohere together to make extenfion. For though the preffure of the particles of air may account for the cohesion of feveral parts of matter, that are groffer than the particles of air, and have pores lefs than the corpufcles of air; yet the weight, or pref fure of the air, will not explain, nor can be a cause of the coherence of the particles of air themselves. And if the preffure of the æther, or any fubtiler matter than the air, may unite, and hold faft together the parts of a particle of air, as well as other bodies; yet it cannot make bonds for itfelf, and hold together the parts that make up every the leaft corpufcle of that materia

fubtilis.

fubtilis. So that that hypothefis, how ingeniously fo ever explained, by fhowing, that the parts of fenfible bodies are held together by the preffure of other external infenfible bodies, reaches not the parts of the æther itfelf: and by how much the more evident it proves, that the parts of other bodies are held together by the external preffure of the æther, and can have no other conceivable caufe of their cohesion and union, by fo much the more it leaves us in the dark concerning the cohesion of the parts of the corpufcles of the æther itfelf; which we can neither conceive without parts, they being bodies, and divisible; nor yet how their parts cohere, they wanting that cause of cohesion, which is given of the cohefion of the parts of all other bodies.

§. 24. But, in truth, the preffure of any ambient fluid, how great foever, can be no intelligible cause of the cohesion of the folid parts of matter. For though fuch a preffure may hinder the avulfion of two polished fuperficies, one from another, in a line perpendicular to them, as in the experiment of two polifhed marbles; yet it can never, in the leaft, hinder the separation by a motion, in a line parallel to those surfaces. Because the ambient fluid, having a full liberty to fucceed in each point of space, deferted by a lateral motion, refifts fuch a motion of bodies fo joined, no more than it would refift the motion of that body, were it on all fides environed by that fluid, and touched no other body and therefore, if there were no other cause of cohesion, all parts of bodies must be easily feparable by fuch a lateral fliding motion. For if the preffure of the æther be the adequate cause of cohesion, wherever that cause operates not, there can be no cohesion. And fince it cannot operate against fuch a lateral feparation, (as has been shown) therefore in every imaginary plane, interfecting any mafs of matter, there could be no more cohcfion, than of two polifhed furfaces, which will always, notwithstanding any imaginable preffure of a fluid, eafily flide one from another. So that, perhaps, how clear an idea foever we think we have of the extenfion of body, which is nothing but the cohefion of

folid parts, he that fhall well confider it in his mind, may have reason to conclude, that it is as cafy for him to have a clear idea, how the foul thinks, as how body is extended. For fince body is no farther, nor otherwife extended, than by the union and cohesion of its folid parts, we fhall very ill comprehend the extenfion of body, without understanding wherein confists the union and cohefion of its parts; which feems to me as incomprehenfible, as the manner of thinking, and how it is performed.

§. 25. I allow it is ufual for most people to wonder how any one fhould find a difficulty in what they think they every day obferve. Do we not fee, will they be ready to fay, the parts of bodies ftick firmly together? Is there any thing more common? And what doubt can there be made of it? And the like, I fay, concerning thinking and voluntary motion: Do we not every moment experiment it in ourselves: and therefore can it be doubted? The matter of fact is clear, I confefs; but when we would a little nearer look into it, and confider how it is done, there I think we are at a lofs, both in the one, and the other; and can as little understand how the parts of body cohere, as how we ourselves perceive, or move. I would have any one intelligibly explain to me, how the parts of gold, or brafs, (that but now in fufion were as loofe from one another, as the particles of water, or the fands of an hour-glafs) come in a few moments to be fo united, and adhere fo ftrongly one to another, that the utmost force of men's arms cannot feparate them: a confidering man will, I fuppofe, be here at a lofs, to fatisfy his own, or another man's understanding.

§. 26. The little bodies that compofe that fluid we call water, are fo extremely fmall, that I have never heard of any one, who by a microfcope (and yet I have heard of fome that have magnified to ten thousand; nay, to much above a hundred thousand times) pretended to perceive their distinct bulk, figure, or motion and the particles of water are alfo fo perfectly loofe one from another, that the leaft force fenfibly Separates them. Nay, if we confider their perpetual VOL. I. motion,

motion, we must allow them to have no cohesion one with another and yet let but a fharp cold come, they unite, they consolidate, these little atoms cohere, and are not, without great force, feparable. He that could find the bonds that tie these heaps of loofe little bodies together fo firmly; he that could make known the cement that makes them ftick fo faft one to another: would difcover a great, and yet unknown fecret: and yet when that was done, would he be far enough from making the extenfion of body (which is the cohefion of its folid parts) intelligible, till he could fhow wherein confifted the union, or confolidation of the parts of thofe bonds, or of that cement, or of the leaft particle of matter that exifts. Whereby it appears, that this primary and fuppofed obvious quality of body will be found, when examined, to be as incomprehenfible as any thing belonging to our minds, and a folid extended fubftance as hard to be conceived as a thinking im material one, whatever difficulties fome would raise against it.

27. For to extend our thoughts a little farther, that preffure, which is brought to explain the cohesion of bodies, is as unintelligible as the cohesion itself. For if matter be confidered, as no doubt it is, finite, let any one fend his contemplation to the extremities of the universe, and there fee what conceivable hoops, what bond he can imagine to hold this mafs of matter in so close a preffure together; from whence fteel has its firmnefs, and the parts of a diamond their hardness' and indiffolubility. If matter be finite, it must have its extremes; and there must be fomething to hinder it from scattering afunder. If, to avoid this difficulty, any one will throw himself into the fuppofition and abyss of infinite matter, let him confider what light he thereby brings to the cohefion of body, and whether he be ever the nearer making it intelligible, by refolving it into a fuppofion, the moft abfurd and moft incomprehenfible of all other: So far is our extenfion of body (which is nothing but the cohefion of folid parts) from being clearer, or more diftinct, when we 6

would