Creation,

generation, making alteration.

§. 2. Having thus, from what our fenfes are able to difcover, in the operations of bodies on one another, got the notion of

caufe and effect, viz. that a cause is that which makes any other thing, either fimple idea, fubftance or mode, begin to be: and an effect is that which had its beginning from fome other thing: the mind finds no great difficulty to distinguish the feveral originals of things into two foits.

First, when the thing is wholly made new, fo that no part thereof did ever exift before; as when a new particle of matter doth begin to exift, in rerum natura, which had before no being, and this we call creation.

Secondly, when a thing is made up of particles, which did all of them before exift, but that very thing fo conftituted of pre-exifting particles, which, confidered all together, make up fuch a collection of fimple ideas as had not any existence before; as this man, this egg, rofe, or cherry, &c. And this, when referred to a fubftance, produced in the ordinary courfe of nature by internal principle, but fet on work, and received from fome external agent or caufe, and working by infenfible ways, which we perceive not, we call generation; when the cause is extrinfecal, and the effect produced by a fenfible feparation, or juxta-pofition of difcernible parts, we call it making; and fuch are all artificial things. When any fimple idea is produced, which was not in that fubject before, we call it alteration. Thus a man is generated, a picture made, and either of them altered, when any new fenfible quality or fimple idea is produced in either of them, which was not there before; and the things thus made to exift, which were not there before, are effects; and those things, which operated to the existence, causes. In which, and all other caufes, we may obferve, that the notion of caufe and effect has its rife from ideas, received by fenfation, or reflection; and that this relation, how comprehenfible foever, terminates at last in them. For to have the idea of caufe and effect, it fuffices to confider any fimple idea, or fubftance, as beginning to exift by the operation of fome other, without knowing the manner of that operation.

§. 3. Time and place are alfo the founda- Relations of tions of very large relations, and all finite time. beings at least are concerned in them. But having already fhown, in another place, how we get these ideas, it may fuffice here to intimate, that most of the denominations of things, received from time, are only relations. Thus when any one fays, that queen Elizabeth lived fixty-nine, and reigned forty-five years, these words import only the relation of that duration to fome other, and mean no more than this, that the duration of her existence was equal to fixty-nine, and the duration of her government to forty-five annual revolutions of the fun; and fo are all words, anfwering, how long. Again, William the Conqueror invaded England about the year 1066, which means this, that taking the duration from our Saviour's time till now, for one entire great length of time, it fhows at what diftance this invafion was from the two extremes and fo do all words of time, anfwering to the question, when, which fhow only the diftance of any point of time, from the period of a longer duration, from which we measure, and to which we thereby confider it as related.

§. 4. There are yet, befides thofe, other words of time, that ordinarily are thought to ftand for pofitive ideas, which yet will, when confidered, be found to be relative, fuch as are young, old, &c. which include and intimate the relation any thing has to a certain length of duration, whereof, we have the idea in our minds. Thus having fettled in our thoughts the idea of the ordinary duration of a man to be feventy years, when we fay a man is young, we mean that his age is yet but a fmall part of that which ufually men attain to: and when we denominate him old, we mean that his duration is run out almoft to the end of that which men do not ufually exceed. And fo it is but comparing the particular age, or duration of this or that man, to the idea of that duration which we have in our minds, as ordinarily belonging to that fort of animals: which is plain, in the application of thefe names to other things for a man is called young at twenty years, and very young at feven years old; but yet a

Y 2

horfe

horfe we call old at twenty, and a dog at feven years; because in each of thefe, we compare their age to dif ferent ideas of duration, which are fettled in our minds, as belonging to these several forts of animals, in the ordinary courfe of nature. But the fun and ftars, though they have out-lafted feveral generations of men, we call not old, because we do not know what period God hath fet to that fort of beings. This term belonging pro perly to those things, which we can obferve in the ordinary courfe of things, by a natural decay, to come to an end in a certain period of time; and fo have in our minds, as it were, a ftandard to which we can compare the feveral parts of their duration; and, by the relation they bear thereunto, call them young or old: which we cannot therefore do to a ruby or diamond, things whose ufual periods we know not.

Relations of place and extenfion.

§. 5. The relation alfo that things have to one another in their places and diftances, is very obvious to obferve; as above, below, a mile diftant from Charing-crofs, in England, and in London. But as in duration, fo in extenfion and bulk, there are fome ideas that are relative, which we fignify by names that are thought pofitive; as great and little are truly relations. For here also having, by obfervation, fettled in our minds the ideas of the bigness of feveral fpecies of things from those we have been moft accustomed to, we make them as it were the ftandards whereby to denominate the bulk of others. Thus we call a great apple, such a one as is bigger than the ordinary fort of thofe we have been used to; and a little horfe, fuch a one as comes not up to the fize of that idea, which we have in our minds, to belong ordinarily to horfes: and that will be a great horfe to a Welthman, which is but a little one to a Fleming; they two having, from the different breed of their countries, taken feveral-fized ideas to which they compare, and in relation to which they denominate their great and their little.

Abfolute terms often ftand for reFations.

$. 6. So likewife weak and ftrong are but relative denominations of power, compared to fome ideas we have at that time of preator or lefs power. Thus when we

fay

fay a weak man, we mean one that has not fo much ftrength or power to move, as usually men have, or ufually those of his fize have: which is a comparing his ftrength to the idea we have of the ufual ftrength of men, or men of fuch a fize. The like, when we fay the creatures are all weak things; weak, there, is but a relative term, fignifying the difproportion there is in the power of God and the creatures. And fo abundance of words, in ordinary fpeech, ftand only for relations (and perhaps the greatest part) which at first fight feem to have no fuch fignification: v. g. the fhip has necessary stores. Neceffary and stores are both relative words; one having a relation to the accomplishing the voyage intended, and the other to future ufe. All which relations, how they are confined to and terminate in ideas derived from fenfation or reflection, is too obvious to need any explication.

§. 1.

CHAP. XXVII.

Of Identity and Diversity.

fifts.

NOTHER occafion the mind Wherein often takes of comparing, is the identity con very being of things; when confidering any thing as exifting at any determined time and place, we compare it with itfelf exifting at another time, and thereon form the ideas of identity and diverfity. When we fee any thing to be in any place in any inftant of time, we are fure (be it what it will) that it is that very thing, and not another, which at that fame time' exifts in another place, how like and undiftinguishable foever it may be in all other refpects and in this confifts identity, when the idea it is attributed to, vary not at all from what they were that moment wherein we confider their former exiftence, and to which we compare the prefent. For we never finding, nor conceiving it poffible, that two things of the fame kind fhould exift in the fame place at the fame time, we rightly conclude, that whatever exifts any where at any time, excludes all of the fame kind, and is there itfelf alone. When therefore we demand, whether any thing

Book 2. be the fame or no; it refers always to fomething that existed such a time in fuch a place, which it was certain at that inftant was the fame with itself, and no other. From whence it follows, that one thing cannot have two beginnings of exiftence, nor two things one beginning; it being impoffible for two things of the fame kind to be or exift in the fame inftant, in the very fame place, or one and the fame thing in different places. That therefore that had one beginning, is the fame thing; and that which had a different beginning in time and place from that, is not the fame, but diverse. That which has made the difficulty about this relation, has been the little care and attention used in having precife notions of the things to which it is attributed.

fubftances.

. 2. We have the ideas but of three Identity of forts of fubftances; 1. God. 2. Finite intelligences. 3. Bodies. First, God is without beginning, eternal, unalterable, and everywhere; and therefore concerning his identity, there can be no doubt. Secondly, finite fpirits having had each its determinate time and place of beginning to exift, the relation to that time and place will always determine to each of them its identity, as long as it exifts. Thirdly, the fame will hold of every particle of matter, to which no addition or fubtraction of matter being made, it is the fame. For though these three forts of fubftances, as we term them, do not exclude one another out of the fame place; yet we cannot conceive but that they must neceffarily each of them exclude any of the fame kind out of the fame place: or elfe the notions and names of identity and diverfity would be in vain, and there could be no fuch diftinction of fubftances, or any thing elfe one from another. For example could two bodies be in the fame place at the fame time, then thofe two parcels of matter muft be one and the fame, take them great or little; nay, all bodies must be one and the fame. For by the fame reason that two particles of matter may be in one place, all bodies may be in one place: which, when it can be fuppofed, takes away the diftinction of identity and diverfi one and more, and renders it

f

ridiculous.