dom mentioned in the huts of Indians, much less are they to be found in the thoughts of children, or any impreffions of them on the minds of naturals. They are the language and bufinefs of the fchools and academies of learned nations, accustomed to that fort of converfation or learning, where difputes are frequent : thefe maxims being fuited to artificial argumentation, and useful for conviction; but not much conducing to the difcovery of truth, or advancement of knowledge. But of their small ufe for the improvement of knowledge, I shall have occafion to speak more at large, 1.4. c. 7. Recapitulation. §. 28. I know not how abfurd this may feem to the mafters of demonftration: and probably it will hardly down with any body at first hearing. I must therefore beg a little truce with prejudice, and the forbearance of cenfure, till I have been heard out in the fequel of this discourse, being very willing to fubmit to better judgments. And fince I impartially fearch after truth, I fhall not be forry to be convinced that I have been too fond of my 'own notions; which I confefs we are all apt to be, when application and ftudy have warmed our heads with them. Upon the whole matter, I cannot fee any ground to think these two fpeculative maxims innate, fince they are not univerfally affented to; and the affent they fo generally find, is no other than what feveral propofitions, not allowed to be innate, equally partake in with them; and fince the affent that is given them, is produced another way, and comes not from natural infcription, as I doubt not but to make appear in the following difcourfe. And if thefe firft principles of knowledge and science are found not to be innate, no other fpeculative maxims can (I suppose) with better right pretend to be fo CHAP. 3. 1. Ċ HA P. III. No Innate Practical Principles. No moral principles fo generally received, as the forementiontive maxims. clear, and fo F thofe fpeculative maxims, whereof we difcourfed in the foregoing chapter, have not an actual univerfal affent from all mankind, as we there proved, it is much more vifible concerning practical principles, that they come fhort of an univerfal reception: and I think it will be hard to inftance any one moral rule, which can pretend to fo general and ready an affent as, "what is, is;" or to be fo manifeft a truth as this, "that it is impoffible for the fame thing to be, and not to be." Whereby it is evident, that they are farther removed from a title to be innate; and the doubt of their being native impreffions on the mind, is ftronger against those moral principles than the other. Not that it brings their truth at all in queftion: they are equally true, though not equally evident, Thofe fpeculative maxims carry their own evidence with them: but moral principles require reasoning and discourse, and some exercise of the mind, to discover the certainty of their truth. They lie not open as natural characters engraven on the mind; which, if any fuch were, they must needs be visible by themfelves, and by their own light be certain and known to every body. But this is no derogation to their truth and certainty, no more than it is to the truth or certainty of the three angles of a triangle being equal to two right ones; because it is not fo evident, as "the whole is bigger than a part;" nor fo apt to be affented to at first hearing. It may fuffice, that these moral rules are capable of demonftration; and therefore it is our own fault, if we come not to a certain knowledge of them. But the ignorance wherein many men are of them, and the flownefs of affent wherewith others receive them, are manifeft proofs that they are VOL. I. D not not innate, and fuch as offer themfelves to their view without fearching. Faith and juftice not owned as principles by all men. I §. 2. Whether there be any fuch moral principles, wherein all men do agree, appeal to any, who have been but moderately converfant in the hiftory of mankind, and looked abroad beyond the smoke of their own chimnies. Where is that practical truth, that is univerfally received without doubt or question, as it must be, if innate? Juftice, and keeping of contracts, is that which most men feem to agree in. This is a principle, which is thought to extend itself to the dens of thieves, and the confederacies of the greatest villains; and they who have gone fartheft towards the putting off of humanity itself, keep faith and rules of juftice one with another. I grant that out-laws themfelves do this one amongst another; but it is without receiving these as the innate laws of nature. They practise them as rules of convenience within their own communities: but it is impoffible to conceive, that he embraces juftice as a practical principle, who acts fairly with his fellow highwayman, and at the fame time plunders or kills the next honeft man he meets with. Juftice and truth are the common ties of fociety; and therefore, even out-laws and robbers, who break with all the world befides, muft keep faith and rules of equity amongst themselves, or elfe they cannot hold together. But will any one fay, that thofe that live by fraud or rapine, have innate principles of truth and justice which they allow and affent to? Objection. Though men deny them in their practice, yet they admit them in their §. 3. Perhaps it will be urged, that the tacit affent of their minds agrees to what their practice contradicts. I anfwer, first, I have always thought the actions of men the beft interpreters of their thoughts. But fince it is certain, that moft men's practices, and fome men's open profeffions, have either queftioned or denied these principles, it is impoffible to establish an univerfal confent, (though we fhould look for it only amongst grown men) without which it is impoffible to conclude them thoughts, an fwered. innate. innate. Secondly, it is very ftrange and unreasonable, to fuppofe innate practical principles, that terminate only in contemplation. Practical principles derived from nature are there for operation, and muft produce conformity of action, not barely fpeculative affent to their truth, or elfe they are in vain diftinguished from fpeculative maxims. Nature, I confefs, has put into man a defire of happiness, and an averfion to misery : thefe indeed are innate practical principles, which (as practical principles ought) do continue conftantly to operate and influence all our actions without ceafing: thefe may be obferved in all perfons and all ages, fteady and univerfal; but thefe are inclinations of the appetite to good, not impreffions of truth on the understanding. I deny not, that there are natural tendencies imprinted on the minds of men; and that, from the very first inftances cf fenfe and perception, there are fome things that are grateful, and others unwelcome to them; fome things that they incline to, and others that they fly: but this makes nothing for innate characters on the mind, which are to be the principles of knowledge, regulating our practice. Such natural impreffions on the understanding are fo far from being confirmed hereby, that this is an argument against them; fince, if there were certain characters imprinted by nature on the understanding, as the principles of knowledge, we could not but perceive them conftantly operate in us and influence our knowledge, as we do thofe others on the will and appetite; which never ceafe to be the conftant fprings and motives of all our actions, to which we perpetually feel them ftrongly impelling us. $4. Another reafon that makes me doubt of any innate practical principles, is, that I think there cannot any one moral rule be propofed, whereof a man may not juftly demand a reason: which would be perfectly ridicu lous and abfurd, if they were innate, or fo much as felf-evident; which every innate principle muft needs be, and not need any proof to afcertain its truth, nor want any reason to gain it approbation. He would be thought void of common fenfe, who afked on the one D 2 Moral rules need a proof, ergo not in nate. fide, 36 fide, or on the other fide went to give, a reason, why it is impoffible for the fame thing to be, and not to be. It carries its own light and evidence with it, and needs no other proof: he that understands the terms, aflents to it for its own fake, or elfe nothing will ever be able to prevail with him to do it. But fhould that most unfhaken rule of morality, and foundation of all focial virtue, "that one fhould do as he would be done unto," be propofed to one who never heard it before, but yet is of capacity to understand its meaning, might he not without any abfurdity ask a reason why? and were not he that propofed it bound to make out the truth and reasonableness of it to him? which plainly fhows it not to be innate; for if it were, it could neither want nor receive any proof; but muft needs (ar leaft, as soon as heard and understood) be received and affented to, as an unquestionable truth, which a man can by no means doubt of. So that the truth of all thefe moral rules plainly depends upon fome other antecedent to them, and from which they must be deduced; which could not be, if either they were innate, or fo much as felf-evident. Inftance in §. 5. That men fhould keep their comkeeping com- pacts, is certainly a great and undeniable pacts. rule in morality. But yet, if a christian, who has the view of happinefs and mifery in another life, be afked why a man must keep his word, he will give this as a reafon; becaufe God, who has the power of eternal life and death, requires it of us. But if an Hobbift be asked why, he will anfwer, because the public requires it, and the Leviathan will punifh you, if you do not. And if one of the old philofophers had been asked, he would have anfwered, because it was difhoneft, below the dignity of a man, and oppofite to virtue, the higheft perfection of human nature, to do otherwife. Virtue generally approved, not because innate, • but because profitable. §. 6. Hence naturally flows the great variety of opinions concerning moral rules, which are to be found among men, according to the different forts of happiness they have a profpect of, or propofe to them felves: |