337 against those who would place thinking in a system of fleeting animal fpirits, I leave to be confidered. But yet to return to the question before us, it must be allowed, that if the fame consciousness (which, as has been shown, is quite a different thing from the fame numerical figure or motion in body) can be transferred from one thinking substance to another, it will be posfible that two thinking fubftances may make but one perfon. For the fame confcioufnefs being preserved, whether in the fame or different fubftances, the perfonal identity is preserved.

14. As to the fecond part of the queftion, "whe"ther the fame immaterial fubftance remaining, there "may be two diftinct perfons?" which queftion feems to me to be built on this, whether the fame immaterial being, being confcious of the action of its paft duration, may be wholly stripped of all the consciousness of its past existence, and lofe it beyond the power of ever retrieving again; and fo as it were beginning a new account from a new period, have a consciousness that cannot reach beyond this new ftate. All those who hold pre-existence are evidently of this mind, fince they allow the foul to have no remaining conscioufnefs of what it did in that pre-exiftent ftate, either wholly separate from body, or informing any other body; and if they fhould not, it is plain, experience would be against them. So that perfonal identity reaching no farther than confcioufnefs reaches, a preexiftent fpirit not having continued fo many ages in a ftate of filence, muft needs make different perfons. Suppose a Chriftian Platonift or Pythagorean fhould, upon God's having ended all his works of creation the feventh day, think his foul hath exifted ever fince and would imagine it has revolved in feveral human bodies, as I once met with one, who was perfuaded his had been the foul of Socrates; (how reasonably I will not difpute; this I know, that in the poft he filled, which was no inconfiderable one, he paffed for a very rational man, and the prefs has fhown that he wanted not parts or learning) would any one fay, that he being not confcious of any of Socrates's actions or thoughts, VOL. I.

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Book 2. could be the fame perfon with Socrates? Let any one reflect upon himself, and conclude that he has in himfelf an immaterial fpirit, which is that which thinks in him, and in the conftant change of his body keeps him the fame and is that which he calls himself: let him alfo fuppofe it to be the fame foul that was in Neftor or Therfites, at the fiege of Troy (for fouls being, as far as we know any thing of them in their nature, indifferent to any parcel of matter, the fuppofition has no apparent absurdity in it) which it may have been, as well as it is now the foul of any other man: but he now having no confcioufnefs of any of the actions either of Neftor or Therfites, docs or can he conceive himself the fame perfon with either of them? can he be concerned in either of their actions? attribute them to himfelf, or think them his own more than the actions of any other men that ever existed? So that this confcioufnefs not reaching to any of the actions of either of thofe men, he is no more one felf with either of them, than if the foul or immaterial spirit that now informs him, had been created, and began to exift, when it began to inform his present body; though it were ever so true, that the fame spirit that informed Neftor's or Therfites's body, were numerically the fame that now informs his. For this would no more make him the fame perfon with Neftor, than if fome of the particles of matter that were once a part of Neftor, were now a part of this man; the fame immaterial fubftance, without the fame conscioufnefs, no more making the fame perfon by being united to any body, than the fame particle of matter, without confcioufnefs united to any body, makes the fame perfon. But let him once find himself confcious of any of the actions of Neftor, he then finds himself the fame perfon with Neftor.

§. 45. And thus we may be able, without any difficulty, to conceive the fame perfon at the refurrection, though in a body not exactly in make or parts the fame which he had here, the fame confcioufnefs going along with the foul that inhabits it. But yet the foul alone, in the change of bodies, would fcarce to any one, but to him that makes the foul the man, be enough to make

339 make the fame man. For fhould the foul of a prince, carrying with it the confcioufnefs of the prince's paft life, enter and inform the body of a cobler, as foon as deferted by his own foul, every one fees he would be the fame person with the prince, accountable only for the prince's actions: but who would fay it was the fame man? The body too goes to the making the man, and would, I guefs, to every body determine the man in this cafe; wherein the foul, with all its princely thoughts about it, would not make another man: but he would be the fame cobler to every one befides himfelf. I know that, in the ordinary way of speaking, the fame person, and the fame man, ftand for one and the fame thing. And indeed every one will always have a liberty to speak as he pleases, and to apply what articulate founds to what ideas he thinks fit, and change them as often as he pleases. But yet when we will inquire what makes the fame fpirit, man, or perfon, we must fix the ideas of spirit, man, or perfon in our minds; and having refolved with ourfelves what we mean by them, it will not be hard to determine in either of them, or the like, when it is the fame, and when not. §. 16. But though the fame immaterial fubftance or foul does not alone, wherever it be, and in whatsoever state, make the fame man; yet it is plain confcioufnefs, as far as ever it can be extended, should it be to ages paft, unites existences and actions, very remote in time, into the fame perfon, as well as it does the existences and actions of the immediately preceding moment: fo that whatever has the confcioufnefs of present and past actions, is the fame perfon to whom they both belong. Had I the fame confcioufnefs that I faw the ark and Noah's flood, as that I faw an overflowing of the Thames laft winter, or as that I write now; I could no more doubt that I who write this now, that faw the Thames overflowed laft winter, and that viewed the flood at the general deluge, was the fame felf, place that felf in what fubftance you please, than that I who write this am the fame myfelf now whilft I write (whether I confift of all the fame fubftance, material or immaterial, or no) that I was yesterday. For as to this

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Confcioufnefs makes the fame perfon.

point

point of being the fame felf, it matters not whether this prefent felf be made up of the fame or other subftances; I being as much concerned, and as justly accountable for any action that was done a thousand years fince, appropriated to me now by this felf-confcioufnefs, as I am for what I did the last moment.

nefs.

Self depends §. 17. Self is that confcious thinking on confciouf- thing whatever fubftance made up of, (whether spiritual or material, fimple or compounded, it matters not) which is fenfible, or confcious of pleasure and pain, capable of happiness or mifery, and fo is concerned for itself, as far as that consciousness extends. Thus every one finds, that whilft comprehended under that conscioufnefs, the little finger is as much a part of himself, as what is moft fo. Upon feparation of this little finger, fhould this confcioufnefs go along with the little finger, and leave the reft of the body, it is evident the little finger would be the perfon, the fame perfon; and felf then would have nothing to do with the reft of the body. As in this cafe it is the consciousness that goes along with the fubftance, when one part is feparate from another, which makes the fame perfon, and conftitutes this infeparable felf; fo it is in reference to fubftances remote in time. That with which the confcioufnefs of this prefent thinking thing can join itself, makes the fame perfon, and is one felf with it, and with nothing elfe; and fo attributes to itself, and owns all the actions of that thing as its own, as far as that consciousness reaches, and no farther; as every one who reflects will perceive.

Objects of

§. 18. In this perfonal identity, is foundPeward and ed all the right and juftice of reward and punishment. punishment; happiness and mifery being that for which every one is concerned for himself, and not mattering what becomes of any fubftance not joined to, or affected with that confcioufnefs. For as it is evident in the inftance I gave but now, if the confcioufnefs went along with the little finger when it was cut off, that would be the fame felf which was concerned for the whole body yesterday, as making part itself, whofe actions then it cannot but admit as its own now. Though if the fame body should ftill live, and immediately,

of

immediately, from the feparation of the little finger, have its own peculiar confcioufnefs, whereof the little finger knew nothing; it would not at all be concerned for it, as a part of itfelf, or could own any of its actions, or have any of them imputed to him.

§. 19. This may fhow us wherein perfonal identity confifts; not in the identity of fubftance, but, as I have faid, in the identity of conscioufnefs; wherein, if Socrates and the prefent mayor of Queenborough agree, they are the fame perfon: if the fame Socrates waking and fleeping do not partake of the fame confcioufnefs, Socrates waking and fleeping is not the fame perfon. And to punish Socrates waking for what fleeping Socrates thought, and waking Socrates was never confcious of; would be no more of right, than to punish one twin for what his brother-twin did, whereof he knew nothing, because their outfides were fo like, that they could not be diftinguished; for fuch twins have been feen.

§. 20. But yet poffibly it will still be objected, fuppose I wholly lose the memory of fome parts of my life beyond a poffibility of retrieving them, fo that perhaps I fhall never be confcious of them again; yet am I not the fame person that did thofe actions, had those thoughts that I once was confcious of, though I have now forgot them? To which I anfwer, that we must here take notice what the word I is applied to; which, in this cafe, is the man only. And the fame man being prefumed to be the fame perfon, I is cafily here fuppofed to ftand alfo for the fame perfon. But if it be poffible for the fame man to have diftinct incommunicable consciousness at different times, it is past doubt the fame man would at different times make different perfons; which, we fee, is the fense of mankind in the folemneft declaration of their opinions; human laws not punishing the mad man for the fober man's actions, nor the fober man for what the mad man did, thereby making them two perfons: which is fomewhat explained by our way of speaking in English, when we fay fuch an one is not himself, or is befide himself; in which phrases it is infinuated, as if thofe who now, or at least first used them, thought that felf was changed, the felf-fame perfon was no longer in that man. §. 21.

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