distinct bulks, which is the subject and foundation of divifion, comes, after a little progreflion, to be confounded, and almost loft in obfcurity. For that idea, which is to reprefent only bignefs, must be very obfcure and confufed, which we cannot diftinguish from one ten times as big, but only by number; fo that we have clear diftinct ideas, we may fay, of ten and one, but no diftinct ideas of two fuch extenfions. It is plain from hence, that when we talk of infinite divifibility of body, or extenfion, our diftinct and clear ideas are only of numbers; but the clear diftinct ideas of extenfion, after fome progrefs of divifion, are quite loft and of fuch minute parts we have no diftinct ideas at all: but it returns, as all our ideas of infinite do, at last to that of number always to be added; but thereby never amounts to any diftinct idea of actual infinite parts. We have, it is true, a clear idea of divifion, as often as we think of it; but thereby we have no more a clear idea of infinite parts in matter, than we have a clear idea of an infinite number, by being able ftill to add new numbers to any affigned numbers we have endless divifibility giving us no more a clear and diftinct idea of actually infinite parts, than endless addibility (if I may fo fpeak) gives us a clear and diftinct idea of an actually infinite number; they both being only in a power ftill of increafing the number, be it already as great as it will. So that of what remains to be added (wherein confifts the infinity) we have but an obfcure, imperfect, and confufed idea; from or about which we can argue or reafon with no certainty or clearness, no more than we can in arithmetick, about a number of which we have no fuch diftinct idea as we have of 4 or 100; but only this relative obfcure one, that compared to any other, it is ftill bigger and we have no more a clear pofitive idea of it when we fay or conceive it is bigger, or more than 400,000,000, than if we fhould fay it is bigger than 40, or 4; 400,000,000 having no nearer a proportion to the end of addition, or number, than 4. For he that adds only 4 to 4, and fo proceeds, fhall as foon come to the end of all addition, as he that adds 400,000,000

393. to 400,000,000. And fo likewife in eternity, he that has an idea of but four years, has as much a pofitive compleat idea of eternity, as he that has one of 400,000,000 of years: for what remains of eternity beyond either of these two numbers of years is as clear to the one as the other; i. e. neither of them has any clear pofitive idea of it at all. For he that adds only four years to 4, and so on, fhall as foon reach eternity, as he that adds 400,000,000 of years, and fo on; or, if he please, doubles the increase as often as he will: the remaining abyfs being ftill as far beyond the end of all these progreffions, as it is from the length of a day or an hour. For nothing finite bears any proportion to infinite; and therefore our ideas, which are all finite, cannot bear any. Thus it is alfo in our idea of extenfion, when we increase it by addition, as well as when we diminish it by divifion, and would enlarge our thoughts to infinite space. After a few doublings of thofe ideas of extenfion, which are the largest we are accustomed to have, we lose the clear distinct idea of that space: it becomes a confufedly great one, with a furplus of ftill greater; about which, when we would argue or reason, we fhall always find ourfelves at a lofs; confufed ideas in our arguings and deductions from that part of them which is confused always leading us into confufion.

CHA P. XXX.

Of Real and Fantastical Ideas.

§. 1. BESIDES what we have already Real ideas

concerning ideas, other confiderations belong to them, in reference to things from whence they are taken,

are conformable to their archetypes.

or which they may be fuppofed to reprefent: and thus, I think, they may come under a threefold diftinction; and are,

First, either real or fantastical.

Secondly,

Secondly, adequate or inadequate.

Thirdly, true or falfe.

Firft, by real ideas, I mean fuch as have a foundation in nature; fuch as have a conformity with the real being and existence of things, or with their archetypes. Fantastical or chimerical I call fuch as have no foundation in nature, nor have any conformity with that reality of being to which they are tacitly referred as to their archetypes. If we examine the feveral forts of ideas before-mentioned, we fhall find, that,

Simple ideas all real.

§. 2. First, our fimple ideas are all real, all agree to the reality of things, not that they are all of them the images or reprefentations of what does exift; the contrary whereof, in all but the primary qualities of bodies, hath been already fhown. But though whitenefs and coldness are no more in fnow than pain is; yet those ideas of whitenefs and coldnefs, pain, &c. being in us the effects of powers in things without us, ordained by our Maker to produce in us fuch fenfations; they are real ideas in us, whereby we diftinguifh the qualities that are really in things themfelves. For thefe feveral appearances being defigned to be the mark, whereby we are to know and diftinguish things which we have to do with, our ideas do as well ferve us to that purpofe, and are as real distinguishing characters, whether they be only conftant effects, or clfe exact refemblances of fomething in the things themselves; the reality lying in that fteady correfpondence they have with the diftinct conftitutions of real beings. But whether they answer to thofe conftitutions, as to caufes or patterns, it matters not; it fuffices that they are conftantly produced by them. And thus our fimple ideas are all real and true, because they anfwer and agree to thofe powers of things which produce them in our minds; that being all that is requifite to make them real, and not fictions at pleafure. For in fimple ideas (as has been fhown) the mind is wholly confined to the operation of things upon it, and can make to itfelf no fimple idea, more than what it has received.

Complex

ideas are vo luntary combinations.

§. 3. Though the mind be wholly paffive in refpect of its fimple ideas; yet I think, we may fay, it is not fo in refpect of its complex ideas for those being combinations of fimple ideas put together, and united under one general name; it is plain that the mind of man ufes fome kind of liberty, in forming thofe complex ideas how elfe comes it to pafs that one man's idea of gold, or juftice, is different from another's? but because he has put in, or left out of his, fome fimple idea, which the other has not. The queftion then is, which of thefe are real, and which barely imaginary combinations? What collections agree to the reality of things, and what not? And to this I fay, That,

Mixed

modes made of confiftent ideas, are

real.

§. 4. Secondly, mixed modes and relations having no other reality but what they have in the minds of men, there is nothing more required to this kind of ideas to make them real, but that they be fo framed, that there be a poffibility of exifling conformable to them. Thefe ideas themfelves, being archetypes, cannot differ from their archetypes, and fo cannot be chimerical, unless any one will jumble together in them inconfiftent ideas. Indeed, as any of them have the names of a known language affigned to them, by which he that has them in his mind would fignify them to others, fo bare poffibility of exifting not enough; they must have a conformity to the ordinary fignification of the name that is given them, that they may not be thought fantastical: as if a man would give the name of justice to that idea, which common ufe calls liberality. But this fantafticalnefs relates more to propriety of fpeech, than reality of ideas: for a man to be undisturbed in danger, fedately to confider what is fittcft to be done, and to execute it fteadily, is a mixed mode, or a complex idea of an action which may exist. But to be undisturbed in danger, without using one's reafon or industry, is what is alfo poffible to be; and fo is as real an idea as the other. Though the first of

thefe,

thefe, having the name courage given to it, may, in respect of that name, be a right or wrong idea: but the other, whilft it has not a common received name of any known language affigned to it, is not capable of any deformity, being made with no reference to any thing but itself.

Ideas of fubftances are real, when they agree with the exiftence of things.

§. 5. Thirdly, our complex ideas of fubftances being made all of them in reference to things exifting without us, and intended to be representations of fubftances, as they really are; are no farther real, than as they are fuch combinations of fimple ideas, as are really united, and co-exift in things without us. On the contrary, thofe are fantastical which are made up of fuch collections of fimple ideas as were really never united, never were found together in any substance; v. g. a rational creature, confifting of a horse's head, joined to a body of human shape, or fuch as the centaurs are described: or, a body yellow, very malleable, fufible, and fixed; but lighter than common water: or an uniform, unorganized body, confifting, as to fenfe, all of fimilar parts, with perception and voluntary motion joined to it. Whether fuch fubftances as thefe can poffibly exift or no, it is probable we do not know: but be that as it will, thefe ideas of fubftances being made conformable to no pattern exifting that we know, and confifting of fuch collections of ideas, as no fubftance ever fhowed us united together, they ought to pass with us for barely imaginary; but much more are thofe complex ideas fo, which contain in them any inconfiftency or contradiction of their parts.

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