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true or falfe.

And thus much concerning the truth and falfhood of our ideas, in reference to their names. §. 13. Secondly, as to the truth and falfhood of our ideas, in reference to the real existence of things; when that is made the ftandard of their truth, none of them can be termed falfe, but only our complex ideas of fubftances.

As referred to real exiftences, none of our ideas can be false, but those of fubftances. First, fimple ideas in this fense not falfe, and why.

§. 14. First, our fimple ideas being barcly fuch perceptions as God has fitted us to receive, and given power to external objects to produce in us by established laws and ways, fuitable to his wifdom and goodness, though incomprehenfible to us, their truth confifts in nothing elfe but in fuch appearances as are produced in us, and must be fuitable to thofe powers he has placed in external objects, or elfe they could not be produced in us and thus anfwering thofe powers, they are what they should be, true ideas. Nor do they become liable to any imputation of falfhood, if the mind (as in moft men I believe it does) judges thefe ideas to be in the things themselves. For God, in his wisdom, having fet them as marks of diftinction in things, whereby we may be able to difcern one thing from another, and fo choose any of them for our uses, as we have occafion; it alters not the nature of our fimple idea, whether we think that the idea of blue be in the violet itself, or in our mind only; and only the power of producing it by the texture of its parts, reflecting the particles of light after a certain manner, to be in the violet itself. For that texture in the object, by a regular and constant operation, producing the fame idea of blue in us, it ferves us to diftinguish, by our eyes, that from any other thing, whether that diftinguishing mark, as it is really in the violet, be only a peculiar texture of parts, or elfe that very colour, the idea whereof (which is in us) is the exact resemblance. And it is equally from that appearance to be denominated blue, whether it be that real colour, or only a peculiar texture in it, that causes in us that idea: fince the name blue notes properly nothing but that mark of diftinétion that is in a violet, difcernible only by our eyes, whatever it confifts in:

that

that being beyond our capacities diftinctly to know, and perhaps would be of lefs ufe to us, if we had faculties to difcern.

Though one man's idea of

blue should be different from ano

ther's.

§. 15. Neither would it carry any imputation of falfhood to our fimple ideas, if by the different ftructure of our organs it were fo ordered, that the fame object should produce in feveral men's minds different ideas at the fame time; v. g. if the idea that a violet produced in one man's mind by his eyes were the fame that a marygold produced in another man's, and vice verfa. For fince this could never be known, because one man's mind could not pass into another man's body, to perceive what appearances were produced by thofe organs; neither the ideas hereby, nor the names would be at all confounded, or any falfhood be in either. For all things that had the texture of a violet, producing conftantly the idea that he called blue; and those which had the texture of a marygold, producing conftantly the idea which he as conftantly called yellow; whatever thofe appearances were in his mind, he would be able as regularly to dif tinguish things for his ufe by thofe appearances, and understand and fignify those distinctions marked by the names blue and yellow, as if the appearances, or ideas in his mind, received from thofe two flowers, were exactly the fame with the ideas in other men's minds. I am nevertheless very apt to think, that the fenfible ideas produced by any object in different men's minds, are most commonly very near and undifcernibly alike. For which opinion, I think, there might be many reafons offered: but that being befides my prefent bulinefs, I fhall not trouble my reader with them: but only mind him, that the contrary fuppofition, if it could be proved, is of little ufe, either for the improvement of our knowledge, or conveniency of life; and fo we need not trouble ourfelves to examine it.

§. 16. From what has been faid concerning our fimple ideas, I think it evident, that our fimple ideas can none of them be falfe in refpect of things exifting with

First, fimple ideas in this fense not

falle, and why.

out

out us.

For the truth of thefe appearances, or perceptions in our minds, confifting, as has been faid, only in their being anfwerable to the powers in external objects to produce by our fenfes fuch appearances in us; and each of them being in the mind, fuch as it is, fuitable to the power that produced it, and which alone it reprefents; it cannot upon that account, or as referred to fuch a pattern, be falfe. Blue and yellow, bitter or fweet, can never be false ideas: thefe perceptions in the mind are just fuch as they are there, anfwering the powers appointed by God to produce them; and fo are truly what they are, and are intended to be. Indeed the names may be mifapplied; but that in this refpect makes no falfhood in the ideas; as if a man ignorant in the English tongue should call purple fcarlet.

Secondly, modes not falfe.

§. 17. Secondly, neither can our complex ideas of modes, in reference to the effence of any thing really exifting, be falfe. Because whatever complex idea I have of any mode, it hath no reference to any pattern exifting, and made by nature: it is not supposed to contain in it any other ideas than what it hath; nor to reprefent any thing but fuch a complication of ideas as it does. Thus when I have the idea of fuch an action of a man, who forbears to afford himself fuch meat, drink, and `clothing, and other conveniencies of life, as his riches and estate will be fufficient to fupply, and his station requires, I have no false idea; but fuch an one as reprefents an action, either as I find or imagine it; and fo is capable of neither truth or falfehood. But when I give the name frugality or virtue to this action, then it may be called a falfe idea, if thereby it be fuppofed to agree with that idea, to which, in propriety of fpeech, the name of frugality doth belong; or to be conformable to that law, which is the ftandard of virtue and vice.

Thirdly,

ideas of fubftances when

§. 18. Thirdly, our complex ideas of fubftances, being all referred to patterns in things themselves, may be falfe. That they are all falfe, when looked upon as the reprefentations of the unknown effences of things, is fo

falfe.

evident,

evident, that there needs nothing to be faid of it. I fhall therefore pafs over that chimerical fuppofition, and confider them as collections of fimple ideas in the mind taken from combinations of fimple ideas exiting together conftantly in things, of which patterns they are the fuppofed copies: and in this reference of them to the existence of things, they are falfe ideas. 1. When they put together fimple ideas, which in the real existence of things have no union; as when to the thape and fize that exift together in a horfe is joined, in the fame complex idea, the power of barking like a dog: which three ideas, however put together into one in the mind, were never united in nature; and this therefore may be called a falfe idea of an horse. 2. Ideas of fubftances are, in this refpect, alfo falfe, when from any collection of fimple ideas that do always exift together, there is separated, by a direct negation, any other fimple idea which is conftantly joined with them. Thus, if to extenfion, folidity, fufibility, the peculiar weightiness, and yellow colour of gold, any one join in his thoughts the negation of a greater degree of fixedness than is in lead or copper, he may be faid to have a falfe complex idea, as well as when he joins to those other fimple ones the idea of a perfect abfolute fixedness. For either way, the complex idea of gold being made up of fuch fimple ones as have no union in nature, may be termed falfe. But if we leave out of this his complex idea, that of fixednefs quite, without either actually joining to, or feparating of it from the reft in his mind, it is, I think, to be looked on as an inadequate and imperfect idea, rather than a falfe one; fince though it contains not all the fimple ideas that are united in nature, yet it puts none together but what do really exift together.

§. 19. Though in compliance with the ordinary way of fpeaking I have fhowed in what fenfe, and upon what ground our ideas may be fometimes called true or falfe; yet if we will look a little nearer into the matter, in all cafes where any idea is called. true or falfe, it is from fome judgment that

Truth or falfhood always fupposes affirmation or nega

tion.

the mind makes,

makes, or is fuppofed to make, that is true or falfe. For truth or falfhood, being never without fome affirmation or negation, exprefs or tacit, it is not to be found but where figns are joined and feparated, according to the agreement or difagreement of the things they ftand for. The figns we chiefly use are either ideas or words, wherewith we make either mental or verbal propofitions. Truth lies in fo joining or feparating these representatives, as the things they ftand for do in themselves agree or difagree; and falfhood in the contrary, as fhall be more fully fhown hereafter.

. Ideas in themselves neither true nor falfe

§. 20. Any idea then which we have in our minds, whether conformable or not to the existence of things, or to any idea in the minds of other men, cannot properly for this alone be called falfe. For these representations, if they have nothing in them but what is really exifting in things without, cannot be thought falfe, being exact reprefentations of fomething: nor yet, if they have any thing in them differing from the reality of things, can they properly be faid to be falfe reprefentations, or ideas of things they do not reprefent. But the miftake and falfhood is,

But are falfe, 1. When judged agreeable to another man's idea, withou: being fo.

§. 21. First, when the mind having any idea, it judges and concludes it the fame that is in other men's minds, fignified by the fame name; or that it is conformable to the ordinary received fignification or definition of that word, when indeed it is not: which is the moft ufual mistake in mixed modes, though other ideas alfo are liable to it.

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fixedness of 3. When judged ade quate, with

out being fo.

§. 22. Secondly, when it having a complex idea made up of fuch a collection of fimple ones, as nature never puts together it judges it to agree to a fpecies of creatures really exifting; as when it joins the gold.

§. 23. Thirdly, when in its complex idea it has united a certain number of fimple ideas that do really exift together in

5.

fome

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