457 poffible to show an example of any one, who has no other way to get the idea of motion, but barely by the definition of that name. Those who tell us, that light is a great number of little globules, ftriking brifkly on the bottom of the eye, fpeak more intelligibly than the fchools; but yet thefe words ever fo well understood would make the idea the word light ftands for no more known to a man that understands it not before, than if one should tell him, that light was nothing but a company of little tennis-balls, which fairies all day long ftruck with rackets against some men's foreheads, whilft they paffed by others. For granting this explication of the thing to be true; yet the idea of the cause of light, if we had it ever fo exact, would no more give us the idea of light itself, as it is fuch a particular perception in us, than the idea of the figure and motion of a sharp piece of steel would give us the idea of that pain which it is able to caufe in us. For the cause of any sensation, and the fenfation itself, in all the fimple ideas of one fenfe, are two ideas; and two ideas fo different and diftant one from another, that no two can be more fo. And therefore fhould Des Cartes's globules ftrike ever fo long on the retina of a man, who was blind by a gutta ferena, he would thereby never have any idea of light, or any thing approaching it, though he underftood what little globules were, and what ftriking on another body was, ever fo well. And therefore the Cartefians very well diftinguish between that light which is the cause of that fenfation in us, and the idea which is produced in us by it, and is that which is properly light. Simple ideas, why undefinable, farther ex plained. §. 11. Simple ideas, as has been shown, are only to be got by thofe impreffions objects themselves make on our minds, by the proper inlets appointed to each fort. If they are not received this way, all the words in the world, made ufe of to explain or define any of their names, will never be able to produce in us the idea it ftands for. For words being founds, can produce in us no other fimple ideas, than of those very founds; nor excite any in us, but by that voluntary connexion 6. connexion which is known to be between them and thofe fimple ideas, which common ufe has made them figns of. He that thinks otherwife, let him try if any words can give him the taste of a pine-apple, and make him have the true idea of the relifh of that celebrated delicious fruit. So far as he is told it has a refemblance with any taftes, whereof he has the ideas already in his memory, imprinted there by fenfible objects not ftrangers to his palate, fo far may he approach that resemblance in his mind. But this is not giving us that idea by a definition, but exciting in us other fimple ideas by their known names; which will be still very different from the true tafte of that fruit itself. In light and colours, and all other fimple ideas, it is the fame thing; for the fignification of founds is not natural, but only impofed and arbitrary. And no definition of light, or redness, is more fitted, or able to produce either of thofe ideas in us, than the found light or red by itself. For to hope to produce an idea of light, or colour, by a found, however formed, is to expect that founds fhould be vifible, or colours audible, and to make the ears do the office of all the other fenfes. Which is all one as to fay, that we might tafte, fmell, and fee by the ears; a fort of philofophy worthy only of Sancho Pança, who had the faculty to fee Dulcinea by hearfay. And therefore he that has not before received into his mind, by the proper inlet, the fimple idea which any word ftands for, can never come to know the fignification of that word by any other words or founds whatsoever, put together according to any rules of definition. The only way is by applying to his fenfes the proper object, and fo producing that idea in him, for which he has learned the name already. A ftudious blind man, who had mightily beat his head about vifible objects, and made ufe of the explication of his books and friends, to understand those names of light and colours, which often came in his way, bragged one day, that he now underftood what scarlet fignified. Upon which his friend demanding, what fcarlet was? the blind man answered, It was like the found of a trumpet. Juft fuch an under 4--ding standing of the name of any other fimple idea will he have, who hopes to get it only from a definition, or other words made ufe of to explain it. The contra ry fhowed in complex ideas, by inftances of a ftatue and rainbow. §. 12. The cafe is quite otherwife in complex ideas; which confifting of feveral fimple ones, it is in the power of words, ftanding for the feveral ideas that make that composition, to imprint complex ideas in the mind, which were never there before, and fo make their names be understood. In fuch collections of ideas, paffing under one name, definition, or the teaching the fignification of one word by feveral others, has place, and may make us underftand the names of things, which never came within the reach of our fenfes; and frame ideas fuitable to those in other men's minds, when they use those names: provided that none of the terms of the definition ftand for any fuch fimple ideas, which he to whom the explication is made has never yet had in this thought. Thus the word ftatue may be explained to a blind man by other words, when picture cannot; his fenfes having given him the idea of figure, but not of colours, which therefore words cannot excite in him. This gained the prize to the painter against the ftatuary: each of which contending for the excellency of his art, and the ftatuary bragging that his was to be preferred, because it reached farther, and even those who had loft their eyes could yet perceive the excellency of it, the painter agreed to refer himself to the judgment of a blind man ; who being brought where there was a ftatue, made by the one, and a picture drawn by the other, he was first led to the ftatue, in which he traced with his hands all the lineaments of the face and body, and with great admiration applauded the fkill of the workman. But being led to the picture, and having his hands laid upon it, was told, that now he touched the head, and then the forehead, eyes, nofe, &c. as his hands moved over the parts of the picture on the cloth, without finding any the leaft diftinction: whereupon he cried out, that certainly that must needs be a very admirable and divine piece of workmanfhip, which could repre fent 1 fent to them all thofe parts, where he could neither feel nor perceive any thing. §. 13. He that fhould ufe the word rainbow to one who knew all thofe colours, but yet had never feen that phænomenon, would, by enumerating the figure, largenefs, pofition and order of the colours, fo well define that word, that it might be perfectly underftood. But yet that definition, how exact and perfect foever, would never make a blind man understand it; becaufe feveral of the fimple ideas that make that complex one, being fuch as he never received by fenfation and experience, no words are able to excite them in his mind. The fame of intelligible §. 14. Simple ideas, as has been fhowed, can only be got by experience, from thofe objects, which are proper to produce in us thofe perceptions. When by this means we have our minds ftored with them, and know the names for them, then we are in a condition to define, and by definition to understand the names of complex ideas, that are made up of them. But when any term ftands for a simple idea, that a man has never yet had in his mind, it is impoffible by any words to make known its meaning to him. When any term ftands for an idea a man is acquainted with, but is ignorant that that term is the fign of it; there another name, of the fame idea which he has been accuftomed to, may make him understand its meaning. But in no cafe what foever is any name, of any fimple idea, capable of a definition. 4. Names of §. 15. Fourthly, But though the names of fimple ideas have not the help of definition to determine their fignification, yet that hinders not but that they are generally lefs doubtful and uncertain, than those of mixed modes and fubftances: because they standing only for one fimple perception, men, for the most part, eafily and perfectly agree in their fignification; and there is little room for mistake and wrangling about their meaning. He that knows once that whitenefs is the name of that colour he has obferved in fnow or milk, will not be apt apt to mifapply that word, as long as he retains that idea; which when he has quite loft, he is not apt to mistake the meaning of it, but perceives he underftands it not. There is neither a multiplicity of fim-, ple ideas to be put together, which makes the doubtfulness in the names of mixed modes; nor a fuppofed, but an unknown real effence, with properties depending thereon, the precife number whereof is alfo unknown, which makes the difficulty in the names of fubftances. But, on the contrary, in fimple ideas the whole fignification of the name is known at once, and confifts not of parts, whereof more or lefs being put in, the idea may be varied, and fo the fignification of name be obfcure or uncertain. 5. Simple ideas have few afcents in lineâ prædicamentali. §. 16. Fifthly, This farther may be obferved concerning fimple ideas and their names, that they have but few afcents in lineâ prædicamentali (as they call it) from the loweft fpecies to the fummum genus. The reafon whereof is, that the loweft fpecies being but one fimple idea, nothing can be left out of it; that fo the difference being taken away, it may agree with fome other thing in one idea common to them both; which, having one name, is the genus of the other two: v. g. there is nothing that can be left out of the idea of white and red, to make them agree in one common appearance, and fo have one general name; as rationality being left out of the complex idea of man, makes it agree with brute, in the more general idea and name of animal: and therefore when to avoid unpleasant enumerations, men would comprehend both white and red, and feveral other fuch fimple ideas, under one general name, they have been fain to do it by a word, which denotes only the way they get into the mind. For when white, red, and yellow are all comprehended under the genus or name colour, it fignifies no more but fuch ideas as are produced in the mind only by the fight, and have entrance only through the eyes. And when they would frame yet a more general term, to comprehend both colours and founds, and the like simple ideas, they do it by a word that fignifies all fuch |