§. 16. This was evidently the cafe of all Gentilism; nor hath even amongst Jews, Chriftians, and Mahometans, who acknowledge but one God; this doctrine, and the care taken in thofe nations to teach men to have true notions of a God, prevailed fo far, as to make men to have the fame, and the true ideas of him. How many, even amongst us, will be found, upon inquiry, to fancy him in the fhape of a man fitting in heaven, and to have many other abfurd and unfit conceptions of him? Chriftians, as well as Turks, have had whole fects owning and contending earneftly for it, and that the deity was corporeal, and of human fhape: and though we find few among us who profefs themfelves Anthropomorphites, (though fome I have met with that own it) yet, I believe, he that will make it his bufinefs, may find, amongst the ignorant and uninftructed Chriftians, many of that opinion. Talk but with country people, almost of any age, or young people of almoft any condition; and you fhall find, that though the name of God be frequently in their mouths, yet the notions they apply this name to are fo odd, low and pitiful, that no-body can imagine they were taught by a rational man, much lefs that they were characters written by the finger of God himfelf. Nor do I fee how it derogates more from the goodnefs of God, that he has given us minds unfurnished with thefe ideas of himself, than that he hath fent ús into the world. with bodies unclothed, and that there is no art or skill born with us: for, being fitted with faculties to attain these, it is want of industry and confideration in us, and not of bounty in him, if we have them not. It is as certain that there is a God, as that the oppofite angles, made by the interfection of two ftraight lines, are equal. There was never any rational creature, that fet himself fincerely to examine the truth of thefe propofitions, that could fail to affent to them; though yet it be paft doubt that there are many men, who, having not applied their thoughts that way, are ignorant both of the one and the other. If any one think fit to call this (which is the utmost of its extent) univerfal confent, fuch an one I eafily allow; but fuch an univerfal confent as this proves not the idea of God, any more than it does the idea of fuch angles, innate. If the idea of God be not innate, no other can be fuppofed in nate. §. 17. Since then, though the knowledge of a God be the moft natural discovery of human reason, yet the idea of him is not innate, as, I think, is evident from what has been faid; I imagine there will scarce be any other idea found, that can pretend to it: fince if God hath fent any impreffion, any character on the understanding of men, it is moft reasonable to expect it fhould have been fome clear and uniform idea of himfelf, as far as our weak capacities were capable to receive fo incomprehenfible and infinite an object. But our minds being at first void of that idea, which we are moft concerned to have, it is a ftrong prefumption against all other innate characters. I must own, as far as I can obferve, I can find none, and would be glad to be informed by any other. Idea of fub stance not in nate. §. 18. I confefs there is another idea, which would be of general use for mankind to have, as it is of general talk, as if they had it; and that is the idea of fubftance, which we neither have, nor can have, by fenfation or reflection. If nature took care to provide us any ideas, we might well expect they fhould be fuch, as by our own faculties we cannot procure to ourselves: but we fee, on the contrary, that fince by thofe ways, whereby our ideas are brought into our minds, this is not, we have no fuch clear idea at all, and therefore fignify nothing by the word fubftance, but only an uncertain fuppofition of we know not what, i, e. of fomething whereof we have no particular diftinct pofitive idea, which we take to be the fubftratum, or fupport, of those ideas we know. No propofitions can be innate, fince §. 19. Whatever then we talk of innate, either fpeculative or practical, principles, it may, with as much probability, be faid, that a man hath 100l. fterling in his pocket, and yet denied, that he hath either penny, fhilling, crown, or other coin, out of which the fum is to be made up, as to think that certin propofitions no ideas are innate. arc are innate, when the ideas about which they are can by no means be fuppofed to be fo. The general reception and affent that is given doth not at all prove that the ideas expreffed in them are innate: for in many cafes, however the ideas came there, the affent to words ex-. preffing the agreement or difagreement of fuch ideas, will neceffarily follow. Every one, that hath a true idea of God and worship, will affent to this propofition, "that God is to be worshipped," when expreffed in a language he understands: and every rational man, that hath not thought on it to-day, may be ready to affent to this propofition to-morrow; and yet millions of men may be well fuppofed to want one or both, thofe ideas to-day. For if we will allow favages and moft country people to have ideas of God and worship, (which conversation with them will not make one forward to believe) yet I think few children can be fupposed to have thofe ideas, which therefore they must begin to have fome time or other; and then they will alfo begin to affent to that propofition, and make very little queftion of it ever after. But fuch an affent upon hearing no more proves the ideas to be innate, than it does that one born blind (with cataracts, which will be couched to-morrow) had the innate ideas of the fun, or light, or faffron, or yellow; because, when his fight is cleared, he will certainly affent to this propo fition, "that the fun is lucid, or that saffron is yellow :” and therefore, if fuch an affent upon hearing cannot prove the ideas innate, it can much lefs the propofi tions made up of thofe ideas. If they have any innate ideas, I would be glad to be told what, and how many they are. §. 20. To which let me add: If there be No innate any innate ideas, any ideas in the mind, ideas in the which the mind does not actually think on, memory. they must be lodged in the memory, and from thence must be brought into view by remembrance; i. e. must be known, when they are remembered, to have been perceptions in the mind before, unlefs remem brance can be without remembrance. For to remember is to perceive any thing with memory, or with a consciousness F3 confcioufnefs, that it was known or perceived before : without this, whatever idea comes into the mind is new, and not remembered; this confciousness of its having been in the mind before 'being that which diftinguishes remembering from all other ways of thinking. Whatever idea was never perceived by the mind, was never in the mind.. Whatever idea is in the mind, is either an actual perception; or elfe, having been an actual perception, is fo in the mind, that by the memory it can be made an actual perception again. Whenever there is the actual perception of an idea without memory, the idea appears perfectly new and unknown before to the understanding. Whenever the memory brings any idea into actual view, it is with a confcioufnefs, that it had been there before, and was not wholly a stranger to the mind. Whether this be not fo, I appeal to every one's obfervation: and then I defire on inftance of an idea, pretended to be innate, which (before any impreffion of it by ways hereafter to be mentioned) any one could revive and remember as an idea he had formerly known; without which confcioufnefs of a former perception there is no remembrance; and whatever idea comes into the mind without that confcioufnefs is not remembered, or comes not out of the memory, nor can be faid to be in the mind before that appearance: for what is not either actually in view, or in the memory, is in the mind no way at all, and is all one as if he had never been there. Suppofe a child had the ufe of his eyes, till he knows and diffinguishes colours; but then cataracts fhut the windows, and he is forty or fifty years perfectly in the dark, and in that time perfectly lofes all memory of the ideas of colours he once had. This was the cafe of a blind man I onfe talked with, who loft his fight by the fmall-pox when he was a child, and had no more notion of colours than one born blind. I afk, whether any one can fay this man had then any ideas of colours in his mind, any more than one born blind? And I think no-body will fay, that either of the mind any idea of colours at all. 11 couched, and then he has the ideas bers not) of colours, de novo, b. his e conveyed to his mind, and that without any consciouf:* nefs of a former acquaintance: and thefe now he can revive, and call to mind in the dark. In this cafe ally thefe ideas of colours, which when out of view can berevived with a confcioufnefs of a former acquaintance, being thus in the memory, are faid to be in the mind. The use I make of this, is, that whatever idea, being not actually in view, is in the mind, is there only by being in the memory; and if it be not in the memory, it is not in the mind; and if it be in the memory, it cannot by the memory be brought into actual view,, without a perception that it comes out of the memory; which is this, that it had been known before, and is now remembered. If therefore there be any innate ideas, they must be in the memory, or elfe, no-wherein the mind; and if they be in the memory, they can be revived without any impreffion from without; and whenever they are brought into the mind, they are remembered, i. e. they bring with them a perception of their not being wholly new to it. This being aconftant and diftinguishing difference between what is, and what is not in the memory, or in the mind; that what is not in the memory, whenever it appears. there, appears perfectly knew and unknown before; and what is in the memory, or in the mind, whenever it is fuggefted by the memory, appears not to be new, but the mind finds it in itself, and knows it was there before. By this it may be tried, whether..there be any innate ideas in the mind, before impreffion from fenfation or reflection. I would fain meet with the man, who when he came to the ufe of reafon, or at any other time, remembered any one of them and to whom, after he was born, they were never new. If any one will fay, there are ideas in the mind, that are not in the memory: I defire him to explain himself, and make what he fays intelligible. $. 21. Befides what I have already faid, there is another reafon why I doubt that neither thefe nor any other principles are in ufe or Principles not innate, becaufe of tam fully perfuaded, that the,ttle certaine od made all things in per ty. not fatisfy myself why he F 4 Should |