the voluntary and intentional act of an intelligent being, performed with a view to a suitable end. "No affection whatsoever to any creature, which is not dependent on, nor subordinate to, a propensity of the heart to God, the Supreme and Infinite Being, can be of the nature of true virtue."

My meaning is not, that in every good or virtuous action which the christian performs, he thinks, while performing it, on God, and on his authority. Such is the imperfection of human nature, that many of those labours of love, which, we are assured, are acceptable to God through Jesus Christ, are performed without an immediate reference to the divine will, which has enjoined them. Whether the incapacity of immediately attending to the will and glory of God in every action that man performs, is owing to the limited nature of his faculties, or to the moral imperfections of his nature, it is unnecessary to determine; the fact is unquestionable.

As he who enters on a journey for the sake of his friend, affords evidence by every step which he advances, of the love which he bears to him, even when his friend, and the purpose for which he began his journey, are not always in his thoughts; so he who has conscientiously devoted himself to God, in the way of his appointment, who subordinates his actions and his pursuits to his glory, and who endeavours habitually to feel that love which he requires, indicates throughout the tenour of his conduct, the governing power of those principles of self-dedication to the divine will, and supreme regard to the divine authority, which distinguish the truly virtuous. There is a

fixed purpose in the mind, which is strengthened by frequent renewal, of acting as under the immediate inspection of God, and of employing talents, opportunities, and necessary though worldly avocations, agreeably to his will, and to the furtherance of his praise.

"The outward conformity," observes the celebrated Howe, "abstractly considered, can never be thought characteristical and distinguishing of the heirs of blessedness. The worst of men may perform the best of outward duties. The most glorious boasted virtues, if they grow not from the proper root, love to God, are but splendid sins*."

It is no objection to this doctrine, that there is in human nature a principle of moral approbation, a sense of right and of wrong, which leads to certain actions useful to individuals and to society. For, this principle of moral approbation, or conscience, operates, and often very powerfully, in minds in which there is no true virtue. Is there not frequently the most painful remorse, arising from a vivid perception of duty and obligation, and a sense of the desert of him who violates them,-where there is no hatred of sin, and no love of holiness? It is not necessary that the disposition of the heart should be virtuous in order to feel the injustice, and to see and fear the consequence, of being opposed to the authority of heaven. Of these the wicked, even in this life, have often such lively perceptions as to make the thoughts of God, and judgment, and eternity, insupportable to them.

Does not revelation teach us, that there is a day approaching, in which all shall stand before the judg * Howe's Works, vol. iii. p. 156.

ment-seat of God, when the judge shall so convince sinners of the evil of their sins, that their mouths will be stopped, and their own conscience will second and approve the justice of their dreadful sentence? But how different will this approval be from that of true virtue, which loves and fears God, and delights in his holiness? They have, indeed, an overwhelming sense of the righteousness of God, and of the desert of trans gression; but they have as strong an aversion to holiness, and as great an aptitude and longing for the practice of sin as before. If the exercise of the principle of moral approbation and disapprobation, or conscience, implied the possession of virtue, then would they be virtuous whose consciences shall be awakened on that great and terrible day of the Lord to the most perfect discharge of their duty. We know, on the contrary, that the measure of their iniquity will then be full, and that their depravity, as well as their guilt, will exclude them from the blissful presence of God.

We are exceedingly apt to mistake the sensibility of the principle of moral approbation, or, of conscience, for true virtue, because the workings of this presiding power of our nature shew, that the mind is not thoroughly hardened. Experience teaches us, that the tendency of sin is to deaden its sensibilities; and when we observe evidence of its being in exercise, approving of certain actions as virtuous, and of other actions as vicious, we are apt, without further inquiry, to take for granted the existence of virtue.

This is the natural operation of the moral faculty; and has nothing more of virtue in it than the natural operations of the understanding, or of the memory, or

of the principle of association, or of any other of the powers with which the Creator has endowed us. It is indeed called the moral faculty, and the moral sense; but this does not necessarily infer that its possessor is a holy and virtuous being; it only signifies that he was originally formed for virtue, and has the capacity of becoming virtuous. All that we can justly infer from its lively exercise is, that the person who is its subject has not reached that extreme wickedness which stupifies and deadens the conscience.

Besides, it should ever be kept in mind, that the affection or state of mind which we call virtuous is essentially one and the same. The love of God, and of our neighbour, is the same pure affection, different only in regard to the different beings who are its objects. But can this affection have any place in him who does not love God supremely, who does not intentionally make his will his rule, and whose ultimate end in all things is not his glory? If he is void of love towards the greatest and infinitely the best Being, he must be destitute of virtuous affection towards his fellow-creatures, that is, destitute of all true virtue. He may have, from mere selfishness, or from some other motive, equally worthless, thought on the duties which he owes to his neighbour, and he may have acted in conformity to his thoughts; but as he has lived to the exclusion of God, and has not only neglected the duties which he owes him, but has discharged those which he owes to man without consecrating them by a regard to the divine glory, have not the actions of his life, however useful to society, been performed with views and principles as entirely unconnected with the name and authority of God, as if

these had no real existence? We cannot bring ourselves to believe, that he gives to God the first place in his heart, who lives willingly unmindful of him, who acts as if he were not, who regards the annunciation of his will as a disagreeable interference, and who wishes to shun his presence as he would an unwelcome obtruder; and if he loves not God, neither, whatever be the decencies of his outward character, does he love his neighbour as himself.

It does not in the slightest degree affect the truth of this statement, that mankind act, and are apparently virtuous, under the influence of those affections and principles which God has implanted in human nature, though there be no intentional conformity to the divine will. Does it prove that they are virtuous, that in place of opposing, they yield to instinctive affections of their nature, and that under the direction of these impulsive feelings, they perform many actions truly lovely and useful? From the mere force of natural affection, which the Creator for wise ends has impressed on the mind of man, parents love their children, and children love their parents. From instinct mankind are led to pity those whom they see in distress, and thus become humane from the exercise of mere natural feeling. Excited by this feeling, the tear of sensibility flows from the same eye, which could behold with malice and envy the prosperity of him whose sufferings awaken compassion. Had it proceeded from the affection of pure benevolence, it would have led not only to pity the distressed, and to relieve him, but to rejoice in whatever tended to the furtherance of his happiness.