be the person that payeth me the foresaid rent of ten shillings, yet it is void; and so it is of all other rules of exposition of grants, when they meet in opposition with this rule, they are preferred.

Now to examine this rule in pleadings as we have done in grants, you shall find that in all imperfections of pleadings, whether it be in ambiguity of words and double intendments, or want of certainty and averments, the plea shall be strictly and strongly against him that pleads.

For ambiguity of words, if in a writ of entry upon dis- 22 11. 6. 43. seisin, the tenant pleads jointenancy with I. S. of the gift and feoffment of I. D. judgment de briefe, the demandant saith that long time before I. D. any thing had, the demandant himself was seised in fee quousque prædict' I. D. super possessionem ejus intravit, and made a joint feoffment, whereupon he the demandant reentered, and so was seised until by the defendant alone he was disseised; this is no plea, because the word intravit may be understood either of a lawful entry, or of a tortious; and the hardest against him shall be taken, which is, that it was a lawful entry; therefore he should have alleged precisely that I. D. disseisivit.

So upon ambiguity that grows by reference, if an action 3 Ed. 6. of debt be brought against I. N. and I. P. sheriffs of Lon- Dy. 66. don, upon an escape, and the plaintiff doth declare upon an execution by force of a recovery in the prison of Ludgate sub custodia I. S. et I. D. then sheriffs in 1 K. H. VIII. and that he so continued sub custodia I. B. et I. G. in 2 K. H. VIII. and so continued sub custodia I. N. et I. L. in 3 K. H. VIII. and then was suffered to escape; I. N. and I. L. plead, that before the escape, supposed at such a day anno superius in narratione specificato, the said I. D. and I. S. ad tunc vicecomites suffered him to escape; this is no good plea, because there be three years specified in the declaration, and it shall be hardest taken that it was 1 or 3 H. VIII. when they were out of office; and yet it is nearly induced by the ad tunc vicecomites, which should leave the intendment to be of that year in which the declaration supposeth that they were sheriffs; but that sufficeth not, but the year must be alleged in fact, for it may be it was mislaid by the plaintiff, and therefore the defendants meaning to discharge themselves by a former escape, which was not in their time, must allege it precisely.

For incertainty of intendment, if a warranty collateral be 26 H. 8. pleaded in bar, and the plaintiff by replication, to avoid

38 II. 6. 18.

warranty, saith, that he entered upon the possession of the defendant, non constat whether this entry was in the life of the ancestor, or after the warranty attached; and therefore it shall be taken in hardest sense, that it was after the warranty descended, if it be not otherwise averred.

For impropriety of words, if a man plead that his ances39 11. 6. 5. tors died by protestation seised, and that I. S. abated &c. this is no plea, for there can be no abatement except there be a dying seised alleged in fact; and an abatement shall not be improperly taken for disseissin in pleading, car parols sont pleas.

9 R. Dy. fo. 256

9. Ed. 4. 4 Ed. 6. Plow.

For repugnancy, if a man in avowry declare that he was seised in his demesne as of fee of white acre, and being so seised did demise the same white acre to I. S. habendum the moiety for twenty-one years from the date of the deed, the other moiety from the surrender, expiration, or determination of the estate of I. D. qui tenet prædict' medietatem ad terminum vitæ suæ reddend' 40s. rent: this declaration is insufficient, because the seisin that he hath alleged in himself in his demesne as of fee in the whole, and the state for life of a moiety, are repugnant; and it shall not be cured by taking the last, which is expressed to control the former, which is but general and formal; but the plea is naught, and yet the matter in law had been good to have entitled to have distrained for the whole rent.

But the same restraint follows this rule in pleading that was before noted in grants: for if the case be such as falleth within another rule of pleadings, then this rule may not be urged.

And therefore it is a rule that a bar is good to a common intent, though not to every intent. As if a debt be brought against five executors, and three of them make default, and two appear and plead in bar a recovery had against them two of three hundred pounds, and nothing in their hands over and above that sum: if this bar should be taken strongliest against them, it should be intended that they might have abated the first suit, because the other three were not named, and so the recovery not duly had against them; but because of this other rule the bar is good for that the more common intent will say, that they two did only administer, and so the action well considered; rather than to imagine, that they would have lost the benefit and advantage of abating the writ.

So there is another rule, that in pleading a man shall not disclose that which is against himself: and therefore

if it be a matter that is to be set forth on the other side, then the plea shall not be taken in the hardest sense, but in the most beneficial, and to be left unto the contrary party to allege.

And, therefore, if a man be bound in an obligation, that 28 H. 8. if the feme of the obligee do decease before the Feast of Dy. fo. 17. St. John the Baptist, which shall be in the year of our Lord God 1598, without issue of her body by her husband lawfully begotten then living, that then the bond shall be void; and in debt brought upon this obligation the defendant pleads that the feme died before the said feast without issue of her body then living: if this plea should be taken strongliest against the defendant, then should it be taken that the feme had issue at the time of her death, but this issue died before the feast; but that shall not be so understood, because it makes against the defendant, and it is to be brought in on the plaintiff's side, and that without traverse.

So if in a detinue brought by a feme against the execu- 30 E. 3. tors of her husband for her reasonable part of the goods of her husband, and her demand is of a moiety, and she declares upon the custom of the realm, by which the feme is to have a moiety, if there be no issue between her and her husband, and the third part if there be issue had, and declareth that her husband died without issue had between them; if this count should be hardliest construed against the party, it should be intended that her husband had issue by another wife, though not by her, in which case the feme is but to have the third part likewise; but that shall not be so intended, because it is matter of reply to be showed of the other side.

And so it is of all other rules of pleadings, these being sufficient not only for the exact expounding of these other rules, but obiter to show how this rule which we handle is put by when it meets with any other rule.

As for acts of parliament, verdicts, judgments, &c. which are not words of parties, in them this rule hath no place at all, neither in devises and wills, upon several reasons; but more especially it is to be noted, that in evidence it hath no place, which yet seems to have some affinity with pleadings, especially when demurrer is joined upon the evidence.

And, therefore, if land be given by will by H. C. to his 13. 14 R. P. son I. C. and the heirs males of his body begotten; the re- 412. mainder to F. C. and the heirs males of his body begotten:

the remainder to the heirs males of the body of the devisor:

17 H. 6. 10.

the remainder to his daughter S. C. and the heirs of her body, with a clause of perpetuity; and the question comes upon the point of forfeiture in an assize taken by default, and evidence is given, and demurrer upon evidence, and in the evidence given to maintain the entry of the daughter upon a forfeiture, it is not set forth nor averred that the devisor had no other issue male, yet the evidence is good enough, and it shall be so intended; and the reason thereof cannot be, because a jury may take knowledge of matters not within the evidence; and the court contrariwise cannot take knowledge of any matter not within the pleas; for it is clear that if the evidence had been altogether remote, and not proving the issue, there although the jury might find it, yet a demurrer might well be taken upon the evidence.

But if I take the reason of difference to be between pleadings, which are but openings of the case, and evidences which are the proofs of an issue; for pleadings being but to open the verity of the matter in fact indifferently on both parts have no scope and conclusion to direct the construction and intendment of them, and therefore must be certain; but in evidence and proofs the issue, which is the state of the question and conclusion, shall incline and apply all the proofs as tending to that conclusion.

Another reason is, that pleadings must be certain, because the adverse party may know whereto to answer, or else he were at a mischief, which mischief is remedied by a demurrer; but in evidence if it be short, impertinent, or uncertain, the adverse party is at no mischief, because it is to be thought that the jury will pass against him; yet, nevertheless, because the jury is not compellable to supply the defect of evidence out of their own knowledge, though it be in their liberty so to do; therefore the law alloweth a demurrer upon evidence also.

REGULA IV.

Quod sub certa forma concessum vel reservatum est non trahitur ad valorem vel compensationem.

THE law permitteth every man to part with his own interest, and to qualify his own grant, as it pleaseth himself; and, therefore, doth not admit any allowance or recompense, if the thing be not taken as it is granted.

So in all profits a prendre, if I grant common for ten beasts, or ten loads of wood out of my coppice, or ten loads

of hay out of my meads, to be taken for three years; he shall not have common for thirty beasts, or thirty loads of wood or hay, the third year, if he forbear for the space of two years; here the time is certain and precise.

So if the place be limited, or if I grant estovers to be spent in such a house, or stone towards the reparation of such a castle; although the grantee do burn of his fuel and repair of his own charge, yet he can demand no allowance for that he took it not.

So if the kind be specified, as if I let my park reserving to myself all the deer and sufficient pasture for them, if I do decay the game, whereby there is no deer, I shall not have quantity of pasture answerable to the feed of so many deer as were upon the ground when I let it; but am without any remedy, except I will replenish the ground again with deer.

But it may be thought that the reason of these cases is the default and laches of the grantor, which is not so. For put the case that the house where the estovers should be spent be overthrown by the act of God, as by tempest, or burnt by the enemies of the king, yet there is no recompense to be made.

And in the strongest case, where it is in default of the grantor, yet he shall make void his own grant rather than the certain form of it should be wrested to an equity or valuation.

As if I grant common ubicunque averia mea ierint, the 9 H. 6. 36. commoner cannot otherwise entitle himself, except that he aver that in such grounds my beasts have gone and fed; and if I never put in any, but occupy my grounds otherwise, he is without remedy; but if I put in, and after by poverty or otherwise desist, yet the commoner may continue; contrariwise, if the words of the grant had been quandocunque averia mea ierint, for there it depends continually upon the putting in of my beasts, or at least the general seasons when I put them in, not upon every hour

or moment.

But if I grant tertiam advocationem to I. S. if he neglect to take his turn ea vice, he is without remedy: but if my wife be before entitled to dower, and I die, then my heir shall have two presentments, and my wife the third, and my grantee shall have the fourth; and it doth not impugn this rule at all, because the grant shall receive that construction at the first that it was intended such an avoid

ance as may be taken and enjoyed; as if I grant proximam 29 H. 8. advocationem to I. D. and then grant proximam advocationem Dy. 38.