what he calls "La Parole Intérieure." His book with this title is a lucid exposition of the auditory type of verbal imagery. It is prefaced with a good historical introduction going back to Plato and Socrates, and quoting among others Bossuet, Locke, Leibnitz, Bonald, Maine de Biran, and Cardaillac.

He writes that "la parole intérieure" is more feeble than "la parole extérieure," but is much more rapid. (24:67, 69.) The following deserves reproduction verbatim. "In the internal word it suffices that we understand ourselves; we can then speak very low, very quickly, with little distinctness, abridge phrases, replace usual turns and expressions by others more simple or more expressive to our taste, modify the syntax, enrich the vocabulary by neologisms or borrowing from foreign terms; we can express to ourselves the entire personal 'nuance' of our feelings by terms of which we can create the sense and usage/ The internal language is our affair; we use it according to our fancy. It is in great part personal, a thing not permitted to the audible language which is essentially an instrument of society." (24:71.)

To Egger "the internal word is a simple image, an image purely of sound." (24:75.) Except in abnormal and pathological cases, the tactile (buccal) image is reduced to an image that the observation cannot grasp, if not to absolutely nothing. (24:76.)

The sonorous character of the word image is to him of general application, although he admits the possibility of individual variation, presupposed by the law of habit which he invokes elsewhere to explain the general sonorous character of the image. (24:81.) Egger thinks that the buccal-tactile elements had not yet been eliminated from the word image at the time that the Egyptians invented their ideographic form of writing. (24:84.)

Egger classifies the internal word into the calm and the lively form. (24:183.) The internal language becomes lively under the influence of passion and the imagination. (24:165.)

Just as the auditory elements drove out the tactile, they also drove out the visual from the word image. "The sound images have driven out, little by little, the visual images from their legitimate pre-eminence. Sound images have become the principal ones for the consciousness, because they alone can serve as a model for a material expression of the thought, which is at the same time prompt and easy."

The sign in language is always the most intense state in a given group. (24:281.) It is the image which carries the meaning. Egger admits the possibility of other forms of internal language. A man both blind and deaf would have a (24:288.)

tactile language.

He holds that the existence of an internal language is universal but not proved to be absolutely necessary. (24:289.) Paulhan, in his "Le Langage Intérieur et la Pensée" of 1886, shows that the investigation of mental language imagery has got beyond the personal stage. For "la parole intérieure" he substitutes "le langage intérieur," and he puts the sense fields more nearly on a parity. He says that "the internal language is a complex phenomenon, comprising visual, auditory, motor, tactile, and abstract representations. This last expression is particularly noteworthy. Some French authors, writing later, have not hesitated to use the term "abstract images." (48:1.) By abstract representations Paulhan means residues of sensations and tendencies; organized and systematized. They can represent, without resembling, acts, sensations, complexes of sensations, signs, or words." (48:4). As to individual differences, he writes: "each class of representations (visual, auditory, motor, or abstract) may predominate with varying vivacity in different individuals, and even in certain cases may constitute the only noticeable part of the signs which compose the internal word." (48:2.)

To Paulhan "thought is a 'langage intérieur,' and cannot be reduced to words or images of words: the abstract idea exists by itself under the form of a residue of an abstract representation: thought is a 'langage' not a 'parole.'"' (48:5.)

In 1887, appeared an article by A. Binet on the "Intensity of Mental Images." He writes: the world of images, which each one of us carries in his soul, has its laws like the material world which surrounds us; these laws are throughout analogous to those of organized matter, for the images are living elements which are born, transform themselves, and die." (9:473.)

One factor influencing the intensity of images is the strength of excitation which accompanied the original sensation. He thinks that the physiological process that corresponds to a strong image must be very different from that which accompanies a weak one, and that in the former case there must be disintegration of a greater quantity of nervous matter.

The study of the intensity of images is a study of the origin of our beliefs. (9:474.) Suggestion in the case of a normal person produces an idea only, in the case of the abnormal it produces sometimes an hallucination. This is due partly, (9:479) but not wholly, to hyperexcitability which lends energy to the idea. (9:475.) "That which gives intensity to the idea suggested is the manner in which one suggests it; it is the tone of the voice, the authority of the person, the mode of affirmation.”

The personal equation is a large factor, into which the sex

ual element largely enters. One man succeeds in suggestion where another fails because "he is the one loved." (9:478.)

The force of suggestion by resemblance depends upon the amount of resemblance. (9:481.) Binet conducted experiments which seemed to prove that in the case of hyperexcitables peripheral excitations produced a general increase of power (motor) and even led to the revival of memory images which could not otherwise be recalled. (9:482.)

Factors weakening the intensity of the suggested image, were resistance on the part of the subject (9:486), skepticism (9:488), and a counter suggestion of paralysis. (9:488.)

Binet and Féré the year previously noted in the case of hallucination, "the external projection not only of the (suggested) images, but beside of the bond of association.

If the image furnishes the materials of the hallucination, the associative bond gives it its form." (11:162.) "Association produces a belief, a belief in the reality of the association.) (9:477.)

M. E. Egger, in 1887, considered incidentally the place of the imagination in the development of the intelligence and of the image in the development of language. (25.)

In 1888, in his "Le Langage Intérieur," Ballet analyzes the word image into (a) the auditive image, corresponding to the heard word; (b) the visual image, corresponding to the read word; (c) the motor image of articulation, corresponding to the spoken word; and (d) the motor graphic image, corresponding to the written word. (8:14.)

Ballet aims to explain morbid phenomena by the study of the normal, and so first discusses the development of the function of language in the individual. For this purpose he divides persons into three classes:-the auditive, the visual, and two classes of motors as indicated above.

The latter part of the book, which need not be discussed here, is concerned with a discussion of diseases of language based on investigations in the normal fields. (8:172.)

Oelzelt-Newin (1889) distinguishes between "a function of the imagination which Meinong calls 'generative' and a second which he calls 'constructive.' The 'generative' brings forth component parts, the 'constructive' unites them." He says that "both processes take part in the production of images, but also can be separated clearly in fact." (46:15.)

His aim is æsthetic and he draws examples from music and the lives of artists as well as from psychiatry. He discusses the origin of the image, its properties, conditions, development and bodily substrate, as well as imagination in animals. At the end of the volume (46) there is a voluminous bibliography.

Taine in his work on the intelligence (1889) treats the mental image with great detail and great wealth of illustration, and with greater insight than other authors of his period. (60:35,41.) He considers the nature and reduction of images, and the laws of their revival and obliteration. The connection of general names and vague images; the existence of sensations in the mind as tendencies without express images; abnormal phenomena, such as obliteration of whole groups of images, loss of memory, and double personality, are treated under the general head of images. He defines the image as "a spontaneously reviving sensation, usually less energetic and precise than the sensation proper." He recognizes images of sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch, i. e., images of all the special senses. Taine also discusses illusion in connection with the sense image. (60:219, 264.) In illusion the image to some degree acquires the energy and precision of sensation.

Queyrat defines similarly the image. In his study of the imagination of children (1893), he says that "the image is a reproduction of sensation, a reproduction fainter and more general than the original, but always capable of ac

quiring under certain conditions an intensity such that one would yet believe in the reality of the object." (50:8.)

Van Biervliet in his "Images Sensitives et Images Motrices" (1897) through introspection and consideration of the results of anatomy reaches the following conclusions:

"It is necessary to conceive every sensation, every cerebral image (representation, hallucination, or memory) as a quantity of movement. Every cerebral image is sensory: the images which represent movements represent them as completed, that is, as seen, heard, or felt."

Every cerebral image is motor, because being a quantity of movement introduced into the organism from without, it must leave the organism under the form of muscular activity."

Every image originating at the level of the centre of projection, however feeble it may be, is drained by the descending motor fibres, which connect the centres to certain groups of muscles."

Every image which has reached the level of the association centres is drawn off by the descending paths in the centres of projection and by the motor paths."

One cannot make a radical distinction, a distinction of nature, between motor and sensory images." (62:128.)

The idea that every image tends to objectify itself will be met later on in a discussion of the works of Ribot and others.

In 1898, W. Lay made a study of the mental imagery of 100 students of Columbia College and of 120 artists. He combines this with results of his personal introspection.

He distinguishes between imagery and the imagination, saying that "the possession of creative imagination implies mental imagery but not vice versa. (38:2.)

Lay recognizes very many more kinds of mental imagery than had been considered commonly before this by writers on the subject of mental imagery. As the result of five series of experiments and of personal introspection, he differentiates ten groups which are as follows:-(1) visual, (2) auditory, (3) tactual, (4) gustatory, (5) olfactory, (6) thermal, (7) motor, (8) those of pain, (9) organic, (10) those of emotion. (38:4 and following.)

Lay brings out the great range of individual differences, and gives several curious instances, such as that of the sculptor who arranged his images according to their vividness in the following order:-touch, organic images, sounds and sight. (38:22.)

Macdougal in his discussion of music imagery states that "the function of music is to indicate or produce a mood rather than to communicate a set of images." (42:463.) This suggests Ribot's affective imagination and his ideas as to the nature of musical composition. A piece of music, says Macdougal, may suggest a vast number of things, but it does not mean these things "as a word does the object for which it stands." (42:463.) He believes that the symbols of music might perfectly well be employed to express particular images by means of the three forms of association, which he calls association by convention, by composition and by analogy. (42:464.) He recognizes the close connection between the imagination and the affective processes. (42:476.)

Philippe's "L' Image Mentale" (1903) treats of the evolution and dissolution of the image. The image is the common substrate of the imagination and the memory. He writes: "the image is neither a memory nor an invention, it is a simple representation. . . (49:3.) And again, of images, he asks, "What is in fact their true rôle in our memory?" and answers, "that of a simple substrate." (49:2.) "In reality," he says, "the imagination in the mental organism has three distinct functions: reproductive, creative, and representative. The last, beside, is the only one which is autonomous. It constitutes, indeed, the foundation of its (the imagination's) activity. (49:1.)

The image, "the psychological cell is in reality as complex as the physiological cell." (49:5.)

A distinction is made between fixed memories and mobile and unstable images. (49:131.) Of the latter he says that "by a constant application of the law of economy, useless de