which the ordinary process of associative thought gives rise." (36:44,45.) Where the details of the image are sufficiently concrete as to constitute a date, the image is a recollection (36:45.) As an opponent of the atomistic theory, James is bound to say that "an imagined object, however complex, is at one moment thought in one idea, which is aware of all its qualities together." (36:45.) James thinks that "the subjective difference between imagined and felt objects is less absolute than has been claimed, and that the cortical processes which underlie imagination and sensation are not quite as discrete as one at first is tempted to suppose. That peripheral sensory processes are ordinarily involved in imagination seems improbable; that they may be sometimes aroused from the cortex downward cannot, however, be dogmatically denied (36:72). James states that "the difference between sensation and imagination is not in localization but rather in intensity. 72.) (36: Zahlfleisch, in his "Über Analogie und Phantasie," regards mathematics as the best example of what the imagination has done for science (67:160.) He cites the discovery of the properties of similar triangles by Thales of Miletus as an example (67:162, 163). The historical connection between imagination, as embodied in religion, and the mathematics is also pointed out. Thus Philolaus dedicated the corners of certain figures to certain gods, and Plato always made the gods go to work in a geometrical fashion. (67:168.) In 1898, Dearborn made what claims to be a study of the reproductive imagination by means of ink blots. It is much more a study of association by similarity, which is of course basal to imagination, than a study of reproductive imagination. Dearborn's subjects were adults. The results were inconspicuous. About the only thing in the way of conclusion that the study contains is the rather trite statement that "experience and especially early experience of the subject, has important influence." (20:190.) Dearborn also observes that "the difference between the imagination of the country and city bred is clear." Chase, in his paper on "The Imagination in Relation to Mental Disease" (1899), writes: "it may be said that there are always two streams in consciousness of which one now prevails and then the other; one flows in the current of sensuous perception; and the other in that of representative consciousness, i. e., in the current of memory and imagination. Between the two currents, the presentative and representative, and also between the two elements in the latter, memory and imagination, there is an inverse ratio. (18:286.) (Cf. Binet, 10:308.) Chase believes that the harmonious blending of these two opposite tendencies is requisite for the building up of a symmetrical character. (18:287.) That is, sanity is the result of proper blending of the presentative and representative processes. Like so many others, Chase notices the close connection between the imagination and the feelings. (18:292.) "Studies in Imagination" (1900), by Lillian H. Chalmers, is based upon 282 returns, 70 from female teachers, 91 from female students, and 121 from male students. The study deals with literary tastes, dolls, number forms, etc. As to tastes, the female students show less difference between their childhood likes and their mature approvals. (16:115.) Miss Chalmers writes: "the answers show that our informants do not value the exercise of the imagination as highly from their adult standpoint as they experience in their childhood's reading." (16:117.) She finds that those who like and approve fanciful reading are generally those with a more literary taste, while the more practical people, that is those who like mathematics and the deeper studies, see less value and pleasure in fanciful reading, but like something real." Ribot, having previously established to his own satisfaction the existence of an affective memory, in his "L'Imagination Créatrice Affective" (1902), proceeded to do the same for the affective imagination. In it he answers the question: “Is there a form of the creative imagination, which forming new relations, assembles and combines affective states of different kinds and nothing but them?" (53:598.) Ribot presents two fundamentally opposed theories of music, viz.:-first, that music treats of sounds, -"c'est un chant intérieur non un sentiment intérieur, qui pousse le musicien à composer;" second, that emotion is the substance and raison d'etre of music. Ribot does not think that the opposition between these theories is irreducible; they correspond rather to two distinct classes of music. The second, he says, is a manifestation of the affective creative imagination. He makes it the basis of his study. to transform all into affect The three conditions necessary for such creation are: first, the innate habit of living in the world of sound sensations; second, the spontaneous tendency to translate everything musically, and express exterior and interior events in the language of sounds, and ive dispositions, into states felt, which are immediately incarnated and developed in a sonorous vestment" (53:605); third, the predominance of feeling states. (Sentiments.) (53:606.) These last, to fully support Ribot's theory, should so pre dominate as to shut out plastic images. He finds them, however, with some people even in the case of music of the internal type. For himself there are suggested by music no such images. There is "complete confiscation of the consciousness for the profit of the affective life." The primitive dance expresses emotions. It is their motor objectification and expansion under the condition of rhythm. (53:613.) It is the most elementary form of the affective creative imagination. (53:614.) Among primitive peoples insufficient material (few notes) and technique prevent the development of affective imagination. Since the right conditions of material and technique have been evolved the chief problem is "to give to that which is by nature vague and fleeting relative precision and stability." (53:615.) The affective imagination creates personages and develops characters "by creating, grouping, and putting in action 'êtres sonores' each one of which has its own life and expresses a state of the soul." (53:616.) It has two forms: one dependent, usually adapted to a dramatic work; the other free, disassociated from words and purely instrumental. The musician is in much better case than the literary symbolist, who faces the task of translating affective states into words. (53:620.) Symbolism must remain an incomplete type of the affective imagination. To the mystics Ribot denies affective creative imagination save in the case of "romans d'amour," mostly produced by the female sex. (56:625.) Among the greater parts of the mystics there is an exaltation of the memory rather than of the imagination. (53:624.) The "romans d'amour mystiques" are, however, impure examples of the affective imagination.' Ribot explains the neglect of the affective imagination ni the past by psychologists by three facts: I. The creative imagination has been studied too long as a complex faculty. In fact, the term affective imagination is only an abstraction. There is no imagination in general. There are men who imagine. There are several types to which men conform, of one of which, the diffluent, characterized by the vague contours of images, the affective imagination is a species. 2. The insufficiency of our knowledge of the psychology of the feelings. 3. The power of creating has shown itself first clearly in forms using plastic images, i. e., visual, tactile and motor. (53:629, 630.) Meyer prefaces his "Das Wesen der Einbildungskraft" by a discussion of views of the imagination in philosophy. He distinguishes two views: one holding this power to be the most original faculty of the soul which unites mind and body; the other denying to this power its originality and declaring that that which is called the power of the imagination is a compound product of other primal psychic forces. (45:26.) He shows that the idea that the image is the cause of motion led to the idea that the image might cause the growth of vegetation. The philosophy of Hartmann is a sort of somnambulistic ideation. But if the way the soul of the artist works is the way the soul of Nature works, then Nature's work is half conscious. That the artist works unconsciously is only half true. Imagination is the mid-station in the soul of the artist between the conscious and the unconscious. So the philosophical theories which introduce the image to explain world processes are transition philosophies attempting to bridge the gulf between materialism and idealism. Leaving philosophy, Meyer says that the memory, the elementary form of the imagination, is nothing else than the holding fast of inner pictures of sense perceptions. (45:37.) Our soul has, beside, the capacity from the memory elements by the processes of analysis and synthesis to produce new images. The memory is reproductive, the imagination is productive. (45:38.) The generic image is a schematic image developed from the images of many individuals (cf. Galton), and is not a mere reproduction, since it involves something that one has never seen. (45:38.) It is a new "structure of analytic thought, and the beginning of thought proper." (45:39.) There are involuntary image associations producing really new single forms. "Related elements from different memory impressions associate to form new compound images, which our soul never saw." (45:39.) The mixture of the free play of association and of thought and will controlling the attention, produce from the memory the new psychic power which we call the power of the imagination or phantasy. (45:40.) Dugas, in his "L'Imagination" (1903), considers imagination as mental and motor suggestion, as the principle of faith and action. It may be related to the will of which it is the initial form. The tendency of the image to produce belief or motion is a favorite thesis of the French school. Dugas says that "the imagination is not sufficiently characterized by the nature, origin, or special character of its representations: it should not be considered as the 'ensemble' of representations, or mental imagery. It is further and above all the art, spontaneous and reflective, of forming mental syntheses or combinations, what Bain calls by the word construct iveness." (24: Introduc. 2.) Its two essential qualities are originality and power. (24:3.) His final definition is this: "The imagination is concourse . the of two distinct qualities, the power of objectification and the force of combination. (24:4.) Binet's "L'Étude Experimentale de l'Intelligence" (1903), although not ostensibly a study of the imagination, deals so largely with this topic that it must be mentioned here. It is an intensive study of twenty persons, among whom both sexes and young and adult are represented. Among the eight chief topics considered, five touch on the imagination either directly or indirectly. Binet conducted experiments on ideation made with words and with phrases, on the measure of the memory, on the opposition between the interior and the exterior life, and as to the rôle of the image in thought, on thought without image, and on abstract thought and its images. The most valuable part of the study is that part which deals with experiments upon and the introspection of two sisters one aged fourteen and a half and the other thirteen. The obvious criticism on the study is that too great dependence is placed upon the introspection of such young and inexperienced subjects. Binet says that "the creations of the imagination resemble memory in that they are detailed and precise, and they resemble abstractions in that they do not correspond to any fact or external object, which has been previously perceived. On the other hand one may say that imaginations are not memories because they are false, and are not abstractions because they are detailed." (10:41.) He gets the following results expressed in mathematical form from experiments on the two sisters: The interpretation of this table is best given in Binet's own words. "We find in the case of one of our subjects precision of thought, ability to render account, constancy of attention, the practical spirit, mediocre development of the voluntary imagination, and above all the attention directed to the external world. Is this 'ensemble' of qualities not opposed in curious contrast to that other mind with whom the spirit of external observation less developed, a thought less precise, less methodical, less |