partly to bad housing conditions; and that parents are largely ignorant of the amount of sleep required by children at various ages.

Professor Frantisek Câda, of Prague, presented a preliminary communication of results from Child Study in the high schools of Prague, consisting of measurements of 397 children; and gave statistics of an investigation into the ability of children to estimate, by sight, sizes and distances and angles.

A very interesting exhibition of school building and furnishing appliances was made under the auspices of the Royal Sanitary Institute of London. It included books and periodicals on hygienic subjects, building materials, ventilating and heating apparatus, drinking fountains, dietaries, clothing, desks, blackboards, fittings for science teaching, games and sports, playsheds, and materials for the decoration of schoolrooms.

THE EDUCATIONAL VALUE OF HUMOR.

By STEPHEN S. COLVIN, University of Illinois.

One of the most striking characteristics of the English miracle and morality plays is the mingling of the sublime and the ridiculous. To us of to-day such a mixture seems incongruous in the extreme, and yet may it not be that the incongruity is in us rather than in the play? It is a characteristic of the literature of cruder times to blend these two seemingly opposite elements, and it is a mark of the greatest literature of all ages to do so as well. Homer and Shakespeare and Balzac, not to mention a score of other great writers, attest the fact that there is a true kinship between humor and the most exalted passions of the human heart. The untutored man feels it, the genius expresses it, but we, alas, of the middle plane have failed to recognize the fundamental truth. So it happens that common sense and psychology alike give but scant recognition to this part of our conscious life.

Doubtless this neglect is to be explained in part by the fact that humor is commonly considered an unimportant element in the practical business of the world, and partly because its subtle nature makes an analysis unusually difficult and unsatisfactory. It seems safe to assume at the outset, however, that humor is to be classed among the emotions. It contains unmistakable elements of organic bodily changes, varying greatly in intensity as they accompany uproarous mirth or delicate satire and word play; it possesses also a distinct perceptual phase, more marked in the higher manifestations of humor than in the majority of emotions, giving it often so predominatingly an intellectual cast as to obscure its rich affective basis; and finally, like all other emotions, it expresses itself in an attitude toward the object that has called forth the humorous experiHence a complete discussion of humor should include first, an outline of those elements of perception that constitute the intellectual phases of the emotion; second, an analysis of those bodily changes that accompany its manifestation, and third, a description of those acts that express its attitude toward its object. The present discussion, while recognizing the importance of these various aspects will, however, limit itself for the most part to the first, since it is in relation to the

ence.

perception of humor that the principal educational interest in the emotion arises.

It may be said in passing that Sully in his "Essay on Laughter" has described at some length the organic changes accompanying hearty laughter (often an expression of the humorous emotion) as have also J. R. Angell and H. B. Thompson in an article in the Psychological Review, and it may not be without interest to note that in laughter there is a pronounced effect on the circulation, while the general activity of the organism is heightened, making the more explosive types of humor, at least, feelings of euphoria. It is true that in the higher types of humor (and to these alone the name is most commonly applied) explosive laughter is entirely lacking, yet there are doubtless in all humorous experiences certain tendencies, however mild, toward laughter, be they nothing more than the smile of quiet appreciation. Hence it is not unwarranted to assume that organic changes, though in a greatly modified degree, are to be found in the more subtle forms of humor as well as in its cruder expressions. Humor, then, is a pleasurable affective state, and for purely physiological reasons, if for no others, it should be cultivated.

If we turn to a consideration of the intellectual aspect of humor, we are at once confronted with the difficulty of giving an exact characterization of the emotion in terms of perception. We find, for example, Hobbes defining the ludicrous as a conception of superiority and degradation. He says, "The passion of laughter is nothing else but sudden glory arising from a sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the inferiority of others, or with our own formerly." He then makes the chief element in the emotion egoistic, basing its existence on pride and love of power, thus bringing his conception of humor into accord with his general philosophic theory. Aristotle, too, finds in the ludicrous something base and unworthy, the rejoicing at another's misfortunes, the perception of a defect or ugliness. This general point of view, with certain modifications, is shared by Professor Bain, who, however, does not consider as necessary the egoistic element in the emotion. Another prominent theory is that expressed by Kant, Schopenhauer, and Lipps, among others, who hold that the essential element in all humor is a recognition of incongruity.

While neither of these theories is adequate fully to set forth the nature of humor, the second seems to have a far greater merit. I believe it would be quite impossible to show that all humorous situations exhibit relations of degradation and superiority, and further the extreme view set forth by Hobbes, which makes the emotion essentially egoistic, is clearly with

out justification. This merit, however, exists in Hobbes's theory, namely that it emphasizes the suddenness of the perception. Sluggish intellects and dull wits cannot grasp an amusing situation. The perception of humor is a sure indication of mental alertness, and here we find an element of significance for education.

On the other hand, I believe it quite within the powers of analysis to make clear that all forms of the comic, the humorous and witty, have in them suggestions of the strange, the unexpected, the absurd, the incongruous, the mal-proportioned.

If we grant that this is the case, however, we must not suppose that the sense of strangeness or incongruity in itself is sufficient to make a humorous situation. To this must always be added the feeling of personal disinterestedness (accompanied by a distinctly pleasurable experience). An object or event to be really humorous must be so in itself, and not because of any relation to the well being of the person who experiences the emotion. In this respect humor closely relates itself to the æsthetic sense, which likewise, as Schopenhauer has pointed out and Münsterberg has affirmed, must be entirely free from personal interest to be genuine. The individual who can laugh at the mishaps of another, but finds nothing humorous in his own trivial misfortunes must raise a suspicion as to the genuineness of his sense of humor. We may safely go so far as to say (paraphrasing the words of Kant in regard to our moral life), "The direct opposite of the principle of humor is, when the principle of private happiness is made the determining principle of this emotion."

Closely connected with this feeling of disinterestedness is the fact that humor extends the sympathies. The self-centered individual can never so divorce himself from a situation as to treat it from a genuinely humorous standpoint. The practical life and the life of mirth exclude each other absolutely. Hence the brute can no more feel the humor of the situation, than he can have an intimation of its ethical significance, its artistic exaltation, or its religious sublimity.

Yet on the other hand, the individual cannot be in a state of marked inferiority and dependence in relation to the object that he finds humorous. This of course does not mean that in the perception of ludicrous relations there may not be one term of great exaltation and the other of weakness, baseness or insignificance, as for example, when some petty being sets himself against an overshadowing power; but it does mean that the person who stands in the inferior relation cannot realize the humor in it, unless perchance, he is able to view this relation from the standpoint of the superior power, thus transcending his own insignificance. Here the humorous emotion runs

exactly counter to the religious, where a feeling of absolute dependence is characteristic of its most profound expressions. Solemnity is always a foe to laughter, and tyrants and school teachers tremble at the manifestations of mirth, the surest indications that they are no longer taken seriously and that their fall is at hand. In this connection Sully says that laughter is feared by those "who hold imposing rank or office and have the daily concern of maintaining a proper awe in others." To laugh at the gods is to depose them. Of all human weaknesses attributed by Homer to the Olympian deities, those qualities which made them the subjects of mirth were the most dangerous to their divinity.

Another characteristic of the sense for the humorous which is important for our purpose to notice is that it involves a relational activity of the mind. The dull person, as has already been said, and the merely emotional person are both incapable of really experiencing the delicious sense of the ludicrous, because both are incapable of forming subtle and far reaching associations on which the higher forms of humor so much depend.

To be aware of incongruities implies an intellect of considerable activity. Even surprise is an indication of mind. It is a well known fact that a considerable period must elapse in the life of the infant before he can find any situation surprising. What is true of the child here is also true of the race. In this connection Herbert Spencer remarks in his autobiography: "Surprise and curiosity are not the traits of the utterly ignorant, as they are commonly supposed to be, but of the partially cultured. . . . . He (primitive man) does nor concern himself about them (great natural changes) any further than as they affect satisfaction of his material needs." Such a mind evidently would possess little capacity for humor even of the crudest type.

Beside being of a disinterested nature and possessing a broad intellectual basis, the sense of humor has, as Sully points out, a social value. It binds those of common taste together, but is the foe of the barbarian and the stranger. It is opposed to vice, for vice is folly and folly is ludicrous. Because of this, satire has been one of the most valuable instruments in social reform. Many a man is willing to be known as a knave, but few indeed relish the rôle of the fool. "The fear of becoming ridiculous," says Sully, "is a valuable side support of what we call moderation."

In its highest expressions humor becomes a philosophy. Its disinterested character raises it above the view of the crowd, frees it from the trammels of the present, and allows a prospect of the universe sub specie aeternitatis. The quiet smile, free