a system of psychology containing considerable metaphysics. In view of these facts, many of the commentators on Herbart have felt that it was necessary, in order to understand his pedagogy, to present a discussion of his metaphysics and his metaphysical psychology. I shall take the position that this is not only unnecessary but that it is also confusing, especially for young students. This position is justified by the following points:

1. Many competent critics maintain that Herbart's metaphysics is inconsistent with his pedagogy. The best known American expression of this point is Professor John Dewey's discussion of Herbart's theory of interest. After summarizing Herbart's pedagogical doctrine of interest he says, "All this seems to me sound educational sense. ... But when we go to the psychology of interest, we find an account which not only does not justify previous statements, but actually contradicts them." (8: 28.)

2. Many of Herbart's followers who accept his system of pedagogy reject his metaphysics. In one of the recent monographs on Herbart these followers are discussed as follows:

. . . Even such redoubtable champions of Herbart as Dr. F. H. Hayward admit the incompleteness if not erroneousness of Herbart's metaphysics and psychology. Yet Dr. Hayward and the class of Herbartians of which he may fairly be reckoned as typical, maintain that no sort of criticism of Herbart's philosophy militates against the practical value of his educational doctrines; that as these last were not deduced from the philosophy, all criticism of the philosophy which is intended as an indirect attack on the pedagogy is irrelevant and futile. (9: 2.)

3. As suggested in the last paragraph, Herbart derived his pedagogical theory primarily from his experience as a tutor and from other nonmetaphysical sources. Some of these will be noted later. To a considerable extent his metaphysical and psychological studies were motivated by a desire to find a scientific justification of his pedagogical system.

4. Herbart's mature work, "The Outlines of Educational Doctrine," contains only a few pages of metaphysical discussion. Two thirds of the book is a concrete discussion of methods which is easily appreciated simply on the basis of common sense. As Professor J. H. von Fichte said in 1869:

We find in almost no work, as far as pedagogical literature is known to us, so many practical, comprehensive hints, precepts and warnings, in as small a space, as in Herbart's Outlines. . . . They betray everywhere the sharp glance of the experienced teacher which Herbart was. . . . They are emphatically recommended to the earnest consideration of every educator, particularly every teacher. . . . We scarcely presume too much, when we assert that Herbart was the first among all the German pedagogical writers to introduce order, light, and a comprehensive gradation of pedagogical problems, as also a quiet insight into pedagogical procedures, into the previously fragmentary mass of observations and precepts. (10: 296–298.)

...

Herbart emphasized the practical limitations of education.-There is one special correction to notice in order that the student may appreciate the difference between this discussion of Herbart which is based on his pedagogy, and other discussions which emphasize his metaphysics. According to his metaphysics (as generally interpreted), the possibilities of education are unlimited. According to his pedagogy, on the other hand, the teacher must keep constantly in mind the limitations of education. The following quotations from his "Outlines of Educational Doctrine" make this point clear, although they are from the most metaphysical sections of the book:

The assumption of unlimited plasticity is equally inadmissible; it is for psychology to guard against this error. The educability of the child is, to begin with, limited by his individuality. Then, too, the possibility of determining him and moulding him at will through education is lessened by time and circumstance. . . . Education seems thus to find a barrier, first, in the order of nature, and later in the pupil's own will. The power of education must be neither over- nor under-estimated. The educator should, indeed, try to see how much may be done; but he must always expect that the outcome will warn him to confine his attempts within reasonable bounds. (4: §§ 4, 5, 6.)

Now in order to gain an adequate knowledge of each pupil's capacity for education, observation is necessary, observation both of his thought masses and of his physical nature. (4: § 34.)

This statement is followed by detailed suggestions for observing children at their games, estimating their mental capacities, etc.

Thus, from the standpoint of practical education, we find Herbart emphasizing its essential limitations and the necessity of studying each individual in order to adjust his education to his peculiar possibilities and needs.

These suggestions concerning Herbart's metaphysics have been necessary in order that the student may appreciate certain characteristics of the point of view taken in this chapter, which differs from that taken in some other interpretations. We shall now proceed to a consideration of the main topic of the chapter, namely, the emphasis by the Herbartians on an interested, methodical study of history and literature for purposes of moral training.

Herbart profoundly influenced by new humanism. — In earlier chapters we studied the leaders in educational reform in relation to the dominant social movements with which they were connected: namely, Rousseau in connection with the emotional reaction, with the democratic movement culminating in the French Revolution, and with the psychological movement started by Locke; Pestalozzi in connection with the French and Swiss social revolutions, the regeneration of Prussia, etc. As noted above, Herbart was little interested in politico-social developments, but led a purely academic career. In the academic or intellectual life in which he participated there were two prominent movements which affected him: one was the development of philosophic thought; the other was new humanism. We noted above that the study of his philosophy is relatively futile in an elementary consideration of his pedagogy. It remains to consider his relation to the new humanistic movement of the eighteenth century. To

understand new humanism it will be necessary to compare it briefly with the earlier humanistic movement of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, which is ordinarily known as the Renaissance.

Sixteenth-century Renaissance interested in Roman civilization. Eighteenth-century humanism in called new in contrast with the humanism of the fifteenth- and sixteenthcentury Renaissance. The Renaissance was a development of modern ideals and methods in contrast with those of the Middle Ages. It affected all phases of life-commercial, political, religious, æsthetic, literary, etc. Its early ideals corresponded so closely to those of the Romans that a revival of classical study — the study of the classical literature of the ancients-became one of its chief elements. The humanists of the North Italian cities-Florence, Milan, Venice, etc.found expressed, in the Latin literature particularly, the sentiments that were dominant in their own life. The life of these little city states was similar in many respects to that of the ancient city states, such as Athens and Rome; hence the interests were the same. Consequently Cicero's discussions of the life of the ideal public citizen, the orator, became the standard guide for Renaissance humanists, and Quintilian's "Institutes of Oratory" became the accepted guide in education. The Latin language was the best vehicle for expressing these interests and ideals; hence it became the subject of most important study. A revival of an interest in the Greek language and literature was also an important element in the Renaissance, but it was not as prominent or as lasting as the interest in Latin. New types of schools developed which in the beginning provided a many-sided liberal education like that described above, on page 166.

Latin humanism of Renaissance declined by eighteenth century. — The broader interests of the early Renaissance soon declined, and it was not long before practically all that was left in the schools was a study of the Latin language for

purely linguistic purposes. In Germany, particularly, was this decline prominent. As Ziegler says, by the beginning of the eighteenth century Latin was still studied because it was the language of the learned classes, but without any of the original spirit of enthusiasm, appreciation, or pleasure. Greek was almost completely neglected, except by theological students, who studied it only in connection with the New Testament. Everywhere the study of the classical languages was considered a necessary evil, to be finished as soon as possible; because the spirit had flown, no one retained a real interest in the dead bones that remained.

New humanism developed from German nationalism. — Just as the early phases of Renaissance humanism were due to the intense development of city-state life in northern Italy, in a similar way the new humanism of the eighteenth century in Germany developed in connection with the beginnings of German nationalism and individualism which were described in Chapters VI and X. It was not only in Prussia but also in other parts of Germany, notably in Hanover and Saxony, that the new spirit found a place.

Greek ideals assimilated by German humanists. — As described in the earlier chapters, this new spirit of independence, with the additional stimulus from Rousseau, found expression in the new German literature of which Goethe (1749-1832) and Schiller (1759-1805) are the best known representatives. This literary movement, which was SO closely connected with the national development, found its ideal models in the literature of the Greeks, which expressed the same spirit of individualism that was manifesting itself in German life. The following statement by Professor Paulsen gives a brief summary of the characteristics of new (or neo-) humanism in its relation to the Rousseau movement.

Neo-Humanism rested on the conviction that the true civilization and education sought after by Rousseau was to be found in full perfection in the Hellenic world. It regarded Greek culture as the consummation