the meaning is that Christ suffered for sins as if he had been the real offender;** but this is the point in dispute, and you ought not to have taken it for granted. As well might you conclude that when the sins of the people of Israel were laid on the head of the scape goat he suffered as if he had been the real offender. Nor can I help thinking, notwithstanding your assertion to the contrary, that you, Sir, speak in stronger language, of the imputation of guilt to Jesus Christ,' than can be found in the scriptures; to prove the contrary you have only to point out where, in the sacred writings, the imputation of guilt to Christ is mentioned; but be not offended that your inferences are not admitted as divine truth. You think it consistent with the strictest justice, to accept of a voluntary offering in the place of another;'

e.) to accept of an innocent person to die in the place of the guilty; but this would be contrary to our common conceptions of justice. P. has been guilty of wilful murder, he is apprehended, and, according to law, ought to suffer for the crime; but Q. comes forward and offers to be condemned and suffer the penalty in the place of P. would an English judge and jury consent to the condemnation and execution of Q. in the place and stead of P.? Would not their doing so, though Q. was a volunteer in the business, be deemed a violation of law and justice in any civilized nation? It is fully admitted that the execution of a just punishment is compatible with

* P. 28.

the divine attributes; and, that it is one of the strongest evidences of divine wisdom and love, to maintain the dignity of his moral government.' But it by no means follows that to impute guilt to the innocent, and punish him for it, would be just. If it would be just for God to do this, how could it be proved unjust for men to imitate him by doing so likewise? You have not attempted to prove that the justice of God does not consist in doing that which is most right to be done by infinite wisdom and goodness.

I remain yours, &o.

LETTER VI.

SIR,

IN your reply to what I said concerning the law, you first attempt to prove that the law is a covenant of works ;* then in the next page you acknowledge it to be a covenant of grace: by which means, I think, you have refuted yourself. For the law viewed as a covenant is one, and if a mere covenant of works, how could it ever be a covenant of

* P. 30.

grace? but you, Sir, acknowledge it to be a covenant of grace: the conclusion is unavoidable, it never was merely a covenant of works. I know not what authority you have to divide the law of Moses, as if he had given two distinct and independent laws, the one moral, the other ceremonial; Moses gave it, and the Prophets and Apostles speak of it, as one entire system. You will find a reply to your reasoning concerning the law in another part of this work.* I will only add here that, the Old Testament saints, no doubt, looked forward to Christ for the accomplishment of many of the promises; but that they knew that he was to be a sacrifice for sins does not appear. Abraham believed that in Christ all families of the earth would be blessed; this was revealed to him; but how could he know that he would be a sacrifice for sins, seeing this was not then revealed? He and all the faithful, before the coming of Christ, were justified by believing and obeying God; but it could not be by believing what was not revealed.

You have declared your belief that mercy is perfectly incompatible with law, considered in the abstract.

Are we then to suppose a merciful God gave an unmerciful law to his sinful creatures? However incompatible mercy may be with your notions of law, surely, Sir, it is not 'perfectly incompatible' with the law of God; for in it the exercise of divine mercy is expressly mentioned. Nor is it necessary the law, in order to the maintenance of its

dignity, should preclude the exercise of mercy; for it may punish some and show mercy to others, according to their different characters; or it may mingle mercy with judgment in its treatment of the same persons; or it may first punish and then display mercy. All these are cases capable of illustration from the Old Testament. Had you not supposed it impossible for the law both to punish and show mercy, your reasoning would have been different; but, whatever you may think, the law certainly contains promises as well as threatenings, mercy as well as judgment, life as well as death and, under the ministration of it, God forgave the same people their iniquities and took vengeance on their inventions. (Psal. xcix. 8.) You think, Sir, the example I adduced, that we are told in the decalogue of God's shewing mercy to thousands of generations, does not support my position. Was not my position this, the law knows something of mercy? and is not the mention made in the law, of mercy to thousands of generations, a proof that it knows something of mercy? How then does it appear that this example does not support my position? I admit that the mercy here promised is to the posterity of them that fear God and keep his commandments: (i. e.) to the posterity of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. But how does this alter the case? Have their posterity, throughout all their generations, feared God and kept his commandments? The contrary is evidently the fact; yet God hath continued his mercy to them. An Apostle tells us they are still beloved for

the fathers' sakes; and that God hath concluded them all in unbelief, that he might have mercy upon them all. Rom. xi. 28, 32. Notwithstanding their unbelief and punishment, God will show himself faithful, according to the declaration of his law, by showing them mercy to the latest generations.

'

You observe that my argument against the sacrifices of the Jews being ricarious, because the law made no provision for a person whose life was forfeited, is a very singular one.' But, Sir, the case in in which life was forfeited was the only possible one in which a vicarious sacrifice could take place; for if a man had not so far transgressed the law as to forfeit his life, the law could not require that another creature should die in his place and stead; and if he had so far transgressed the law as to forfeit his life, it did not admit of another creature's dying in his place; but required that he himself should be put to death. This, I think, fully proves, that the law did not admit of vicarious sacrifices.

Instead of fairly meeting my argument, that the doctrine of satisfaction seems to strike at the foundation of the sytem of free grace and salvation, arising from the great love and rich mercy of the Deity; you endeavor to elude the force of it, by observing that if it apply against your system, it subverts ours, because we contend that no sinner can be saved without repentance. But, Sir, these are very dif

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