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APPENDIX.

1. Mr. Jerram's variations,

MR. JERRAM's Letters on atonement have undergone some material alterations since their appearance in the Universal Theological Magazine. Slight alterations I shall let pass unnoticed; but a few remarkable positions, and reasonings, which he has thought fit to drop, no doubt for some weighty reason, I think proper to state here, with my reply to them: I do this the rather because, though he has availed himself of my reply in the alterations which he has made, and labored in consequence of it to be more cautious in his assertions, he has not had the candor to drop the least hint of the existence of a reply.

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In reply to my first reason for rejecting the doctrine of satisfaction he had said, (U. T. M. V. vi. P. 142.) If there be any weight in your argument, it will prove that the doctrine of the new birth is not scriptural, as it is not mentioned in any of these sermons,' i. e. The sermons of the Apostles mentioned in the Acts. This passage he has now omitted. I replied to it, Though the phrase new birth does not occur in the Acts, yet repentance, faith, and conversion are expressly mentioned, among the things which the Apostles preached; and, I think, you will admit these comprehend an entire change of heart and life.'

In reply to another of my reasons Mr. J. had said, 'The case is ca pable, I presume, of being set in snch a point of view, as to take away the weight of the argument, suppose an insolvent debtor had no possible means of procuring a surety, and his creditor should provide one, might it not be said, with propriety, that the creditor had forgiven him all his debts? And is not this the case in the present instance ? Who is the creditor, and who the sinner's friend ?' (U. T. M. V. vị. P. 182.) In answer to this I said, All that the creditor does, in your supposed case, is the providing a surety, that he may receive payment. It matters not, so far as relates to the present argument, who provides the surety, if the creditor receive full payment, no part of the debt can remain for him to forgive, Z. owes X. £1000; Z. has nothing to pay; X. will not remit the debt, but casts him into pri son, and determines to keep him there till the whole is paid. Z. can find no one to be his surety to pay it for him. X. finds Y. and influences him to become surety for Z. and pay the whole of his debt for him. X. having received full payment, informs 7. what Y. has done for him; and adds, that as Y. has paid the debt, I will now freely forgive it.' Z. replies, 'there is nothing left for you to forgive, for

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you say, you have received full payment; and it is rather insulting to talk of forgiving me my debt, after you are paid all that I owed you.' But says X. I provided a surety for you; and if I had not you never could have found one.' 'True,' replies Z. and for that I thank you,' but had not my generous friend Y. discharged the debt, I might have perished before you would have forgiven it.'

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He added, in the same page, The effect is the same to him, (the sinner) as if he had been freely pardoned.' This led me to ask, Do you not here, Sir, confess that the sinner is uot freely pardoned, but that the effect is the same to him as if that were really the case? Yet you cannot be ignorant that the Apostles taught the doctrine of free forgiveness; and not merely that the effect was the same to the sinner; the case in itself is very different, for the full penalty being inflicted, though not on him, yet on another in his stead, there can be nothing more to inflict: consequently free pardon is out of the question.'

Another remarkable passage Mr. J. has suppressed. He had said, The object of justice is the inflicting of the penalty, and provided that be done, the person is indifferent,' (U. T. M. V. vi. P. 183.) on which I remarked that, 'The judge who should declare it a matter of indifference to him, whether the person he condemned and left for execution, was the real criminal, or an innocent man, would, by the unanimous consent of all civilized nations, be declared unfit to sit on the seat of justice and I presume divine justice is not less perfect than human justice. Shall not the judge of all the earth do right? am glad to find him candid enough to suppress the above absurd notion respecting the object of justice.

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Another suppressed passage contained this assertion, 'Though a creditor may frankly forgive his debtor, the concern being merely of a personal nature, yet it does not follow that a judge can as frankly forgive a condenined criminal.' (Ibid. P. 188.) To this I replied, Though an earthly judge cannot as frankly forgive a criminal, as a créditor can a debtor, because he is not absolutely independent, but accountable to them who appointed him to the office of judge: yet it does not follow that God, who is absolutely independent, and accountable to no one, cannot: surely you will admit that he can, in every case, act according to his sovereign will and pleasure.'

In another instance he has dropped his argument entirely, and substituted others. He had said, "It no more follows that, because all are not exempted from punishment, therefore a sufficient price for such exemption was not paid, than that because all the captives did not return from an enemy's country, therefore a sufficient price for their redemption was not given. An infallible medicine may be of fered to a sick man, and yet if he refuse to take that medicine he cannot receive any benefit from it.' (U. T. M. V. vi. P. 189.) This argument he has now abandoned. I replied to it as follows, I admit that a sufficient price may be paid to an enemy for the redemption of captives, and they may notwithstanding refuse to return; but this, Sir, is not a case in point: for you do not say that Christ gave an equi;

valent to the enemy who held us in bondage, to induce him to consent to our liberation. Besides, a mere state of captivity, and the execution of criminals for rebellion against their lawful sovereign, are two very different things. Sinners are not only in captivity to sin, they are also exposed to punishment: and if Christ suffered the punishment due to them, to the full satisfaction of justice, how can that punishment be justly inflicted on them also, though they choose to continue in their captivity to sin, seeing justice is already satisfied? You say The object of justice is the inflicting of the penalty, and provided that be done, the person is indifferent.' If Christ suffered the penalty, justice must, according to your own views, have gained its object: consequently, it can have no further penalty to inflict. I also admit that Au infallible medicine may be offered to a sick man, and yet if he refuse to take that medicine he cannot receive any benefit from it,' but surely there is a great difference between offering a medicine to a sick man, and buying off a criminal from the gallows; in the former case it would depend on the choice of the sick man whether he would take the medicine; but in the lat ter, if the supreme magistrate accepted the price as an equivalent for the life of the criminal, and owned that thereby justice was as completely satisfied, as it would have been had the condemned man been executed, he could not with any appearance of justice order the criminal to execution. This latter case is applicable to the satisfaction scheme; but those which you state are not at all in point: because in them the will of man is supposed to be concerned, but you will not say it depended on our will whether Christ should make satisfaction for sins, or justice accept of that satisfaction.'

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Mr. J. had said, 'As God forgives us even as debtors, by means of a provision of his own planning, and by a sacrifice of his own, our forgiveness is perfectly free.' (U. T. M. V. vi. P. 191.) This passage he now thinks proper to omit. I replied to it thus, This, Sir, does not appear from the whole of your statement, for, though the provision, &c. be of his own planning, if he receive payment (call it an equivalent, a consideration, or what you please, it is something which amounts to satisfactory payment in the eye of the law) before he cancels the debt, it cannot be said that he freely forgives the debt. F. owes D. £500. and has nothing to pay. D. arrests and casts him into prison. F. supplicates and begs that, as he is insolvent, D. would cancel the debt, D. insists he cannot in justice either cancel the debt or set F. at liberty until it be paid; but D. has a Son, a very generous youth, and quite as rich as his Father; D. desires and commands him to pay F's. debt; and he, being very compassionate, and desirous of pleasing his Father, pays the whole debt due from F. upon which F. is set at liberty. The question is, can it be said that D. freely forgives the debt? I think, you, Sir, will hardly answer in the affirmative, yet D. provided his Son to pay it. cording to your reasoning, before a christian either forgives a debt due to him from an insolvent person, or an injury done to his person, character, or property, he ought to find somebody to pay him the debt, or to make him full reparation for the injury; and when he has

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received such payment, or reparation, what remains for him to for give? Surely, Sir, if you review your own reasoning you will find it. hard to reconcile it with the gospel doctrine of free forgiveness of sins, through Jesus Christ. You may give the subject an air of plausibility in the eyes of the partisans of a system; but are you perfectly satisfied with your own arguments? I know that yours is the popular side of the question, and that the man who opposes it must expect reproach; but truth is more worth than reputation, friends, and every other worldly thing.' It seems my opponent was not fully satisfied with his arguments, otherwise we are at a loss to tell why he has pressed some of them, and adopted others.

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Mr. J's. fourth inference, in his last letter was, That the object of justice is the execution of the penalty; or what is the same thing the reinstating of the general interests on their former ground; and wh re that is done the person is indifferent. (U. T. M. V. vii. P. 123.) This he has suppressed and adopted the following in its place. That as it is the office of public justice, to maintain the laws in their vigor, and to guard the general interests from injury, whatever secures these objects, answers all the indispensable claims of justice.' (Letters on atonement, P. 89.) In reply to the former I said, 'I deny, Sir, that the object of divine justice in punishing is merely the execution of the penalty; because the admission of it would involve the supposition that God sometimes acts merely from a principle of revenge or retaliation, and punishment is inflicted merely for the sake of punishing; but such a supposition would be highly dishonorable to his character as the God of love, the Father of mercies, and irreconcileable with what the scriptures assert, that he is good to all, and that his tender mercies are over all his works, that his goodness abideth continually, that his compassions fail not, that his mercy endureth for ever, that he doth not affiict willingly. I should rather say, that the object of justice is the correction or removal of evil, and that the execution of the penalty is a mean to this end; but if so, according to the nature and fitness of things, the penalty, when executed, must fall upon the real transgressor; the executing of it upon an innocent person could not answer the purpose, there being no evil in him to correct. Were I to grant that the object of justice is merely the execution of the penalty, it would not follow that the person is indifferent, the fitness of things would require that it should be executed' on the guilty, not on the innocent. Reason suggests what scripture declares, that He that justifith the wicked, and he that condemneth the just, even they both are abomination to the LORD, (Prov, xvii. 15.) Do not your reasoning Suppose God to do what is declared an abomination to him, i. e. ta condemn and punish a just one?'

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The reinstating of the general interests on their former ground, does not appear to be exactly the same thing, with the execution of the penalty. The infliction of the penalty may or may not be necessary: this will depend on circumstances. The removal of evil reins states the general interests on their former ground, whether it takes place by the penitence and submission of the sinner, or be effected

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by the infliction of punishment. God's end is, not the destruction,. but the recovery of the sinner; the fitness of this end to be pursued by such a being is manifest; if the offender be recovered to the paths of rectitude, the necessity of punishment is superseded. The mere execution of the penalty, aside from the effects produced by it, reinstates nothing. Suppose the inhabitants of a province were in rebellion against their lawful sovereign, would it be most agreeable to the nature and fitness of things, for him to condemn his dutiful and obedient Son to death, and cause him to be executed in the place and stead of the rebels; alledging as the ground of his extraordinary conduct, that the penalty of death had been incurred by his rebellious subjects, that it must be inflicted on some one before he couldextend mercy to the revolted province or receive their submission, and that in the eye of justice it was a matter of indifference whether the penalty was executed on his obedient child, or the insurgents, if so be his child was willing to bear it? Would the execution of the penalty on his innocent Son reinstate the general interests on their former ground? Who would not admire the obedient and generous conduct of the Son, and at the same time execrate the unfeeling disposition, injustice, and cruelty of the Father? Would not the insurgents when they heard of it, be ready to exclaim, We have acted properly in renouncing our allegiance to a monster, who can vent his fury on his innocent child, and satiate his vengeance in his guiltless blood ? Sir, this picture is not overcharged, it is what you ought to prove agreeable to the nature and fitness of things; because illustrative of the views which your system presents to us of the character and justice of God; but how different to the reality as preented to view in his works and by his word! Suppose, on the contra ry, the sovereign sent his Son to the revolted province with a proclamation of mercy, to offer free pardon to all who would submit and return to their allegiance, and to threaten with the severést punishment all who refused to submit; commanding him at the same time patiently to endure all the insults and cruel treatment of the rebels, and to manifest goodness and love to them in return, assuring him that life should be secured to him, and his reward be great. He goes to the province, opens his commission, proclaims the mercy of his Father, offers pardon to the rebellious, and invites them in the most persuasive and affectionate manner to submit to their lawful sovereign; but they in return load him with reproaches, insult him in the most barbarous manner, put him to the torture, and cast him in a mangled state into a noisome dungeon; he bears it all without a murmur, and continues to manifest pity and love to them to the last: some of the inhabitants become his companions from his first appear ance in the province, these he commissions to make the proclamation more generally known, to continue persuading the rebels to submission after his departure, and in all things to imitate him: his Father rescues him from the dungeon, takes him to his palace, and commits the government and administration of the affairs of the revelted province to his hands; the Son by the proclamation, his cons

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