rit, it matters not whether that of the sinner or of his substitute, can never be a free gift. If we will act rationally we must either give up the doctrine of free grace, or the notion of Christ's making satis faction for sins, of his having bought and paid, literally, for our redemption. Again, they talk of the mercy of God to sinners; yet they contend that God shews no mercy but on the ground of full satisfaction made to his justice, which would supercede the need of mercy, and, in fact, leave no place for it; for after justice had received all it could demand, and inflicted all the punishment due to the offender, it would be an act of mere justice to liberate him, nor could he justly be detained as a criminal. Again, they generally profess to maintain the free forgiveness of sins, though in this they are opposed by a writer on their own side ;* yet they will have it that God never cancels our debts but on the ground of their being all fully paid by Christ, as our substitute; in which case the discharge of the sinner would be purely legal; as when a debt is fully paid there can be nothing to forgive. In this di lemma what is to be done? It seems, either the doctrine of divine mercy and free forgiveness must be given up, or the notion of satisfaction must be renounced, or we must believe manifest contradictions. I am aware our opponents will not admit the propriety of this reasoning, they will perhaps cry out against it as a daring attack upon a doctrine

See the preceding Chap.

long held sacred by many learned and pious men ; but I appeal to the candid and impartial whether it be not just and rational, and leave others to extricate themselves, in the best manner they can, from the dilemmas in which their own system involves them.:

2. The notion of Christ's making satisfaction for sins, and that sinners are saved on the ground of his satisfaction, involves ideas which are contrary to the nature of things; for it supposes sin, guilt, and punishment, innocence, and righteousness to be transferable that our sins, guilt, and punishment were transferred to Christ; and that his innocency, and righteousness are transferred to us. But the nature of these things must change before they can become transferable.

Sin is the transgression of some law; it is the act of an intelligent being; it cannot, in any sense, ber come the act of him who never participated in it; it cannot, consistently with either truth or justice, be imputed to a person who is perfectly innocent. To impute sin is to charge crimes upon a person; tọ charge crimes upon one who is innocent, is to fix a false charge on him, and is contrary to every known law and principle of justice. God himself hath pro tested against it, by saying, (Ezek. xviii. 20.)

The righteousness of the righteous shall be upon him, and the wickedness of the wicked shall be upon him.' This prohibits the idea of the wickedness of the wicked, being imputed, or transferred, to an innocent person, and of the righteousness of a

righteous person being transferred, or set up to the account of the sinner. It follows that our sins could not be transferred or imputed to Christ.

Guilt is the consciousness of having sinned. It can attach to none but the actual transgressor. An innocent person can never be conscious of having sinned. To be conscious that others have sinned, and are guilty, fixes no guilt on an innocent man. Guilt must be personal or it cannot exist; for conscious innocence precludes the possibility of feeling guilt, and a man must sin before he can become the subject of guilt. To impute guilt is to charge a man with being guilty and the charge must be either true or false. If the person to whom guilt is imputed, i. e. said to belong, be really culpable the imputation is just; but if he be innocent the imputation is unjust and false; and, if the person who imputes it be acquainted with his innocence, such imputation is universally held to be base and infamous. This is the case among men; and shall we ascribe to God a proceeding which would stamp infamy on the character of a mortal. To say the person to whom the guilt is imputed is willing it should be so, by no means removes the difficulty; for his agreeing to it does not make the imputation the less. false, nor the less unjust in itself: he is innocent and he cannot be reckoned guilty, consistently with truth and justice.

Punishment is any kind of penalty, pain, or suffering inflicted on a transgressor. For it to be just

E

he on whom it is inflicted must be really criminal. Pain and suffering, simply in themselves, are not punishment; they take the name of punishment only when inflicted for some crime. An innocent person may suffer; but it cannot with propriety be said he is punished. The word punishment implies criminality in the person on whom it is inflicted. Punishment, in criminal cases, cannot be transferred from the guilty to the innocent, without departing from the approved rules, and defeating the ends of punitive justice. Punishment must be intended either to secure or destroy the person of the offender that he may not repeat his crime, or to reform him, or to make reparation to society, or to deter others by what he suffers from committing similar crimes, or for several of these ends combined; but none of these ends could be secured by an innocent person suffering in the place and stead of the guilty. Such vicarious sufferings would leave the real criminal at liberty to repeat his crime if he pleased; it would not be likely to reform him, as he would escape with impunity; the slaying the innocent, in the place and stead of the guilty, could be no reparation to society; nor would it be likely to deter others from similar acts of criminality. The established connexion between crime and punishment must be dissolved before punishment can become transferable. If an innocent person should show himself ready to die in the place and stead of a criminal, the infliction of death on him would be execrated, and surely a

deed so execrable is not to be ascribed to the divine government.

The doctrine of satisfaction also supposes innocence and righteousness to be transferable. Inno-+ cénce stands opposed to guilt. It must be personal or it cannot exist. To impute innocence to a guiltyj man is a false imputation. The innocency of one man cannot, in the nature of things, constitute ano ther, who is guilty, innocent; but the doctrine I am opposing supposes God to account the sinner innocent, or just, on the ground of his sin and guilt having been imputed to, and his punishment having been borne by Christ. Under this view at supposes an impossibility; for God cannot view any person or thing otherwise than it is; to suppose the contrary is to suppose him capable of viewing things in a false light, which is impossible: he cannot view a guilty person otherwise than guilty, nor an innocent person otherwise than innocent. Righteousness consists in right dispositions and actions; He who' doeth righteousness is righteous. Righteousness must be personal, or it cannot exist. transferred from one man to another. right dispositions and actions of one ther is a false imputation, and leaves the person to whom righteousness is merely so imputed as much an unrighteous man as he was before. The supposed satisfaction of Christ would not be thought, by its advocates, to answer the purpose, if on the ground of it his righteousness were not transferred, or imputed, to the unrighteous person; but this latter is im

It cannot be

To impute the person to ano