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ance of our memories, wherein there may be two defects.

Firft, That it lofes the idea quite, and fo far it produces perfect ignorance; for fince we can know nothing farther than we have the idea of it, when that is gone, we are in perfect ignorance.

Secondly, That it moves flowly, and retrieves not the ideas that it has, and are laid up in ftore, quick enough to ferve the mind upon occafions. This, if it be to a great degree, is ftupidity; and he who, through this default in his memory, has not the ideas that are really preferved there ready at hand when need and occafion calls for them, were almost as good be without them quite, fince they ferve him to little purpose. The dull man, who lofes the opportunity whilft he is feeking in his mind for those ideas that thould serve his turn, is not much more happy in his knowledge than one that is perfectly ignorant. It is the business therefore of the memory to furnish to the mind those dormant ideas which it has prefent occafion for; in the having them ready at hand on all occafions, confifts that which we call invention, fancy, and quickness of

parts.

$9.

THESE are defects, we may obferve, in the memory of one man compared with another. There is another defect which we may conceive to be in the memory of man in general, compared with fome fuperior created intellectual beings, which in this faculty may fo far excel man, that they may have conftantly in view the whole scene of all their former actions, wherein no one of the thoughts they have ever had may flip out of their fight. The omnifcience of God, who knows all things paft, prefent, and to come, and to whom the thoughts of mens hearts always lie open, may fatisfy us of the poffibility of this; for who can doubt but God may communicate to thofe glorious fpirits, his immediate attendants, any of his perfections, in what proportion he pleafes, as far as created finite beings can be capable? It is reported of that prodigy of parts,

Monfieur Pascal, that, till the decay of his health had impaired his memory, he forgot nothing of what he had done, read, or thought, in any part of his rational age. This is a privilege fo little known to most men, that it feems almost incredible to those who, after the ordinary way, measure all others by themfelves, but yet, when confidered, may help us to enlarge our thoughts towards greater perfections of it in fuperior ranks of fpirits; for this of Mr. Pafcal was ftill with a narrownefs that human minds are confined to here, of having great variety of ideas only by fucceffion, not all at once; whereas the feveral degrees of angels may probably have larger views, and fome of them be endowed with capacities able to retain together, and conftantly fet before them, as in one picture, all their paft knowledge at once. This, we may conceive, would be no fmall advantage to the knowledge of a thinking man, if all his paft thoughts and reafonings could be always prefent to him; and therefore we may fuppofe it one of those ways wherein the knowledge of feparate spirits may exceedingly furpass ours.

10. Brutes have Memory. THIS faculty of laying up and retaining the ideas that are brought into the mind, feveral other animals seem to have to a great degree as well as man. For to pass by other inftances, birds learning of tunes, and the endeavours one may obferve in them to hit the notes right, put it paft doubt with me that they have perception, and retain ideas in their memories, and use them for patterns; for it seems to me impoffible that they fhould endeavour to conform their voices to notes (as it is plain they do) of which they had no ideas. For though I fhould grant found may mechanically caufe a certain motion of the animal fpirits in the brains of those birns whilft the tune is actually playing, and that motion may be continued on to the mufcles of the wings, and fo the bird mechanically be driven away by certain noifes, because this may tend to the bird's prefervation, yet that can never be fuppofed a reason why it fhould caufe mechanically, either whilft the tune was playing,

much less after it has ceased, such a motion in the organs of the bird's voice, as fhould conform it to the notes of a foreign found, which imitation can be of no ufe to the bird's prefervation. But which is more, it cannot, with any appearance of reafon, be fuppofed (much lefs proved) that birds, without fenfe and memory, can approach their notes nearer and nearer by degrees to a tune played yesterday; which if they have no idea of in their memory, is now nowhere, nor can be a pattern for them to imitate, or which any repeated effays can bring them nearer to; fince there is no reafon why the found of a pipe should leave traces in their brains, which not at first, but by their after endeavours, fhould produce the like founds: And why the founds they make themselves fhould not make traces which they should follow, as well as thofe of the pipe, is impoffible to conceive..

CHAP. XI.

OF DISCERNING, AND OTHER OPERATIONS OF THE MIND.

A

1. No Knowledge without Difcerning.

NOTHER faculty we may take notice of in our minds, is that of difcerning and distinguishing between the feveral ideas it has. It is not enough to have a confused perception of fomething in general : Unless the mind had a diftinct perception of different objects and their qualities, it would be capable of very little knowledge, though the bodies that affect us were as busy about us as they are now, and the mind were continually employed in thinking. On this faculty of diftinguishing one thing from another, depends the evidence and certainty of feveral, even very general propofitions, which have paffed for innate truths;, because men overlooking the true caufe, why thofe propofitions find univerfal affent, impute it wholly to native uniform impreffions; whereas it in truth depends upon this clear difcerning faculty of the mind, whereby it perceives two

ideas to be the fame, or different. But of this more hereafter.

§2. The Difference of Wit and Judgment. How much the imperfection of accurately difcriminating ideas one from another, lies either in the dullnefs or faults of the organs of fenfe, or want of acutenefs, exercise or attention in the understanding, or haftiness and precipitancy natural to fome tempers, I will not here examine: It fuffices to take notice, that this is one of the operations, that the mind may reflect on and obferve in itfelf. It is of that confequence to its other knowledge, that fo far as this faculty is in itfelf dull, or not rightly made ufe of for the diftinguishing one thing from another; fo far our notions are confufed, and our reason and judgment difturbed or mif led. If in having our ideas in the memory ready at hand, confifts quickness of parts; in this of having them unconfused, and being able nicely to diftinguith one thing from another, where there is but the leaft difference, confifts, in à great meafure, the exactness of judgment, and clearnefs of reafon, which is to be obferved in one man above another. And hence perhaps may be given some reason of that common obfervation, that men, who have a great deal of wit, and prompt memories, have not always the cleareft judgment, or deepest reafon; for wit lying moft in the affemblage of ideas, and putting thofe together with quickness and variety, wherein can be found any refemblance or congruity, thereby to make up pleafant pictures, and agreeable vifions in the fancy; judgment, on the contrary, lies quite on the other fide, in feparating carefully one from another, ideas wherein can be found the leaft difference, thereby to avoid being misled by fimilitude, and by affinity to take one thing for another. This is a way of proceeding quite contrary to metaphor and allufion, wherein for the most part lies that entertainment and pleafantry of wit, which ftrikes fo lively on the fancy, and therefore is fo acceptable to all people; because its beauty appears at first fight, and there is required no labour of thought to examine what truth or reafon there

is in it. The mind, without looking any farther, refts fatisfied with the agreeablenefs of the picture, and the gaiety of the fancy; and it is a kind of an affront to go about to examine it by the fevere rules of truth and good reafon, whereby it appears that it confifts in fomething that is not perfectly conformable to them..

$3. Clearness alone binders Confufion.

To the well diftinguishing our ideas, it chiefly contributes, they be clear and determinate; and when they are fo, it will not breed any confufion or mistake about them, though the fenfes fhould (as fometimes they do) convey them from the fame object differently, on different occafions, and fo feem to err: For though a man in a fever fhould from fugar have a bitter tafte, which at another time would produce a fweet one; yet the idea of bitter in that man's mind would be as clear and diftinct from the idea of fweet, as if he had tafted only gall. Nor does it make any more confufion between the two ideas of fweet and bitter, that the famte fort of body produces at one time one, and at another time another idea by the tafte, than it makes a confufion in two ideas of white and fweet, or white and round, that the fame piece of fugar produces them both in the mind at the fame time. And the ideas of orange colour and azure, that are produced in the mind, by the fame parcel of the infufion of lignum nephriticum, are no lefs diftinct ideas, than thofe of the fame colours, taken from two very different bodies.

$4. Comparing.

THE COMPARING them one with another, in refpect of extent, degrees, time, place, or any other circumftances, is another operation of the mind about its ideas, and is that upon which depends all that large tribe of ideas, comprehended under relation; which of how vaft an extent it is, I fhall have occafion to confi-der hereafter.

§ 5. Brutes compare but imperfectly. How far brutes partake in this faculty, is not eafy to determine; I imagine they have it not in any great degree: For though they probably have feveral ideas diftinct

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