Book II. than as diftinguished from others more compounded, it will not be perhaps amifs to take a view of fome of them again under this confideration, and examine thofe different modifications of the fame idea, which the mind either finds in things exifting, or is able to make within itself, without the help of any extrinsical object, or any foreign fuggeftion.

Thofe modifications of any one fimple idea (which, as has been faid, I call fimple modes) are as perfectly different and diftinct ideas in the mind, as those of the greateft diftance and contrariety. For the idea of two is as diftinct from that of one, as bluenefs from heat, or either of them from any number; and yet it is made up only of that fimple idea of an unit repeated; and repetitions of this kind joined together, make those distinct fimple modes, of a dozen, a gross, a million.

2. Idea of Space.

I SHALL begin with the fimple idea of space. I have Thowed above, chap. 4. that we get the idea of space, both by our fight and touch; which, I think, is fo evident, that it would be as needlefs to go to prove that men perceive, by their fight, a diftance between bodies of different colours, or between the parts of the fame body, as that they fee colours themselves; nor is it lefs obvious that they can do fo in the dark by feeling and touch.

3. Space and Extenfion.

THIS fpace confidered barely in length between any two beings, without confidering any thing elfe between them, is called distance; if confidered in length, breadth, and thickness, I think it may be called capacity. The term extenfion is ufually applied to it, in what manner foever confidered.

§ 4. Immenfity.

EACH different diftance is a different modification of fpace; and each idea of any different diflance or space is a fimple mode of this idea. Men, for the ufe, and by the custom of measuring, fettle in their minds the ideas of certain ftated lengths, fuch as are an inch, foot, yard, fathom, mile, diameter of the earth, &c. which are so

many diftinct ideas made up only of fpace. When any fuch stated lengths or measures of space are made familiar to mens thoughts, they can in their minds repeat them as often as they will, without mixing or joining to them the idea of body, or any thing elfe, and frame to themselves the ideas of long, fquare, or cubic, feet, yards, or fathoms, here amongst the bodies of the univerfe, or else beyond the utmost bounds of all bodies; and by adding thefe ftill one to another, enlarge their idea of space as much as they please. This power of repeating, or doubling any idea we have of any distance, and adding it to the former as often as we will, without being ever able to come to any stop or stint, let us enlarge it as much as we will, is that which gives us the idea of immenfity.

§ 5. Figure.

THERE is another modification of this idea, which is nothing but the relation which the parts of the termination of extenfion, or circumfcribed space, have amongst themselves. This the touch difcovers in fenfible bodies, whose extremities come within our reach; and the eye takes both from bodies and colours, whose boundaries are within its view; where obferving how the extremities terminate either in ftraight lines, which meet at difcernible angles, or in crooked lines, wherein no angles can be perceived, by confidering these as they relate to one another, in all parts of the extremities of any body or space, it has that idea we call figure, which affords to the mind infinite variety: For befides the vaft number of different figures that do really exist in the coherent maffes of matter, the stock that the mind has in its power, by varying the idea of space, and thereby making ftill new compofitions, by repeating its own ideas, and joining them as it pleases, is perfectly inexhaustible; and fo it can multiply figures in infi

nitum.

§ 6. Figure.

For the mind having a power to repeat the idea of any length directly ftretched out, and join it to another in the fame direction, which is to double the length of

that ftraight line, or else join it to another with what inclination it thinks fit, and fo make what fort of angles it pleases; and being able alfo to fhorten any line it imagines, by taking from it one half, or one fourth, or what part it pleafes, without being able to come to an end of any fuch divifions, it can make an angle of any bignefs; fo alfo the lines that are its fides, of what length it pleases; which joining again to other lines of different lengths and at different angles, till it has wholly inclofed any space, it is evident, that it can multipiy figures both in their shape and capacity in infinitum ; all which are but fo many different fimple modes of space.

The fame that it can do with ftraight lines, it can do alfo with crooked, or crooked and ftraight together; and the fame it can do in lines, it can alfo in fuperficies; by which we may be led into farther thoughts of the endless variety of figures that the mind has a power to make, and thereby to multiply the simple modes of space.

$7. Place.

ANOTHER idea coming under this head, and belonging to this tribe, is that we call place. As in fimple space, we confider the relation of distance between any two bodies or points, fo in our idea of place, we confider the relation of distance betwixt any thing, and any two or more points, which are confidered as keeping the same diftance one with another, and fo confidered as at reft; for when we find any thing at the fame diftance now, which it was yesterday, from any two or more points, which have not fince changed their diftance one with another, and with which we then compared it, we fay it hath kept the fame place; but if it hath fenfibly altered its diftance with either of thofe points, we fay it hath changed its place; though, vulgarly fpeaking, in the common notion of place, we do not always exactly obferve the distance from precife points, but from larger portions of fenfible objects, to which we confider the thing placed to bear relation, and its diftance from which we have fome reason to obferve.

§ 8.

THUS, a company of chefsmen ftanding on the fame fquares of the chefsboard where we left them, we say they are all in the fame place, or unmoved, though perhaps the chefsboard hath been in the mean time carried out of one room into another, because we compared them only to the parts of the chefsboard, which keep the fame distance one with another. The chefsboard, we alfo fay, is in the fame place it was, if it remain in the fame part of the cabin, though perhaps the fhip which it is in fails all the while; and the fhip is faid to be in the fame place, fuppofing it kept the fame distance with the parts of the neighbouring land, though perhaps the earth hath turned round; and fo both chefsmen, and board, and fhip, have every one changed place, in refpect of remoter bodies, which have kept the fame diftance with one another. But yet the distance from certain parts of the board, being that which determines the place of the chefsmen; and the distance from the fixed parts of the cabin (with which we made the comparison) being that which determined the place of the chefsboard; and the fixed parts of the earth, that by which we determined the place of the fhip; these things may be faid to be in the fame place in those refpects, though their distance from fome other things, which in this matter we did not confider, being varied, they have undoubtedly changed place in that respect, and we ourselves fhall think fo, when we have occasion to compare them with those other.

BUT this modification of distance, we call place, being made by men, for their common ufe, that by it they might be able to defign the particular pofition of things, where they had occafion for fuch defignation. Men confider and determine of this place, by reference to thofe adjacent things which beft ferved to their prefent purpofe, without confidering other things, which, to another purpose, would better determine the place of the fame thing. Thus in the chefsboard the ufe of the defignation of the place of each chefsman, being determin

ed only within that chequered piece of wood, it would cross that purpose to measure it by any thing else; but when thefe very chefsmen are put up in a bag, if any one should ask where the black king is, it would be proper to determine the place by the parts of the room it was in, and not by the chefsboard; there being another use of defigning the place it is now in, than when in play it was on the chefsboard, and fo must be determined by other bodies. So if any one fhould afk, in what place are the verses which report the story of Nifus and Eurialus, it would be very improper to determine this place, by faying they were in fuch a part of the earth, or in Bodley's Library; but the right defignation of the place would be by the parts of Virgil's works; and the proper anfwer would be, that these verfes were about the middle of the ninth book of his Æneids, and that they have been always conftantly in the fame place ever fince Virgil was printed; which is true, though the book itself hath moved a thousand times; the use of the idea of place here, being to know only in what part of the book that story is, that fo upon occafion we may know where to find it, and have recourfe to it for our use.

$10. Place.

THAT Our idea of place is nothing elfe but fuch a relative pofition of any thing, as I have before-mentioned, I think is plain, and will be eafily admitted, when we confider that we can have no idea of the place of the univerfe, though we can of all the parts of it; because beyond that we have not the idea of any fixed, diftinct, particular beings, in reference to which we can imagine it to have any relation of diftance; but all beyond it is one uniform space or expanfion, wherein the mind finds no variety, no marks. For to fay, that the world is fomewhere, means no more than that it does exift; this, though a phrafe borrowed from place, fignifying only its exiftence, not location; and when one can find out, and frame in his mind clearly and diftinctly the place of the univerfe, he will be able to tell us whether it moves or ftands ftill in the undiitin