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culty; and the use of reason becomes daily more vifible, as these materials that give it employment increafe. But though the having of general ideas, and the ufe of general words and reafon ufually grow together; yet I fee not how this any way proves them innate. The knowledge of some truths, I confefs, is very early in the mind, but in a way that shows them not to be innate. For, if we will obferve, we fhall find it ftill to be about ideas, not innate, but acquired; it being about those first which are imprinted by external things, with which infants have earlieft to do, which make the most frequent impreflions on their fenfes. In ideas thus got, the mind difcovers, that fome agree, and others differ, probably as foon as it has any use of memory, as foon as it is able to retain and receive diftinct ideas. But whether it be then or no, this is certain it does fo long before it has the ufe of words, or comes to that which we commonly call the ufe of reafon. For a child knows as certainly, before it can speak, the difference between the ideas of fweet and bitter (i. e. that sweet is not bitter), as it knows afterwards (when it comes to fpeak) that wormwood and fugar-plums are not the fame thing.

§ 16.

A CHILD knows not that three and four are equal to feven, till he comes to be able to count to seven, and has got the name and idea of equality; and then, upon explaining thofe words, he prefently affents to, or rather perceives the truth of that propofition. But neither does he then readily affent, because it is an innate truth; nor was his affent wanting till then, becaufe he wanted the ufe of reafon; but the truth of it appears to him, as foon as he has fettled in his mind the clear and diftin&t ideas that these names ftand for; and then he knows the truth of that propofition, upon the fame grounds, and by the fame means that he knew before, that a rod and cherry are not the fame thing; and upon the fame grounds alfo, that he may come to know afterwards, that it is impoffible for the fame thing to be and not to be; as fhall be more fully shown hereafter.

So that the later it is before any one comes to have those general ideas about which thofe maxims are, or to know the fignification of thofe general terms that stand for them, or to put together in his mind the ideas they ftand for, the later alfo will it be before he comes to affent to those maxims, whofe terms, with the ideas they ftand for, being no more innate than those of a cat or a weafel, he muft ftay till time and observation have acquainted him with them; and then he will be in a capacity to know the truth of thefe maxims upon the firft occafion that fhall make him put together those ideas in his mind, and obferve whether they agree or difagree, according as is expreffed in thofe propofitions. And therefore it is, that a man knows that eighteen and nineteen are equal to thirty-feven, by the fame selfevidence that he knows one and two to be equal to three: Yet a child knows this not fo foon as the other, not for want of the use of reason, but because the ideas the words eighteen, nineteen, and thirty-feven stand for, are not fo foon got, as those which are fignified by one, two, and three.

§ 17. Affenting, as foon as propofed and underflood, proves them not Lunate.

THIS evafion therefore of general affent, when men come to the use of reason, falling as it does, and leaving no difference between thofe fuppofed innate and other truths that are afterwards acquired and learned; men have endeavoured to fecure an univerfal affent to thofe they call maxims, by faying, they are generally offented to as foon as propefed, and the terms they are propofed in, understood: Seeing all men, even chil-dren, as foon as they hear and understand the terms, affent to thefe propofitions, they think it is fufficient to prove them innate. For fince men never fail, after they have once understood the words, to acknowledge them for undoubted truths, they would infer, that certainly these propofitions were firft lodged in the understanding; which, without any teaching, the mind at the very first propofal immediately clofes with, and af fents to, and after that never doubts again.

§18. If fuch an Affent be a Mark of Innate, then that One and Two are equal to Three; that Sweetnefs is not Bitterness; and a thousand the like, must be Innate.

In answer to this, I demand whether ready affent given to a propofition upon first hearing, and understanding the terms, be a certain mark of an innate principle? If it be not, fuch a general affent is in vain urged as a proof of them. If it be faid that it is a mark of innate, they must then allow all fuch propofitions to be innate, which are generally affented to as foon as heard, whereby they will find themselves plentifully stored with innate principles. For upon the fame ground, viz. of affent, at first hearing and understanding the terms, that men would have those maxims pass for innate, they must also admit feveral propofitions about numbers to be innate: And thus, that one and tro are equal to three; that two and two are equal to four; and a multitude of other the like propofitions in numbers, that every body affents to at first hearing, and understanding the terms, muft have a place amongst thefe innate axioms. Nor is this the prerogative of numbers alone, and propofitions made about feveral of them; but even natural philofophy, and all the other fciences afford propofitions, which are fure to meet with affent as foon as they are underftood. That two bodies cannot be in the fame place, is a truth that nobody any more sticks at, than at this maxim, That it is impoffible for the fame thing to be, and not to be; that white is not black; that a fquare is not a circle; that yellownefs is not feetness. These, and a million of other fuch propofitions, as many at least as we have distinct ideas of, every man in his wits, at first hearing, and knowing what the names stand for, muft neceffarily af fent to. If these men will be true to their own rule, and have affent at first hearing and understanding the terms, to be a mark of innate, they must allow not only as many innate propofitions as men have distinct ideas, but as many as men can make propofitions wherein different ideas are denied one of another

fince every propofition, where one different idea is denied of another, will as certainly find affent at first hearing and understanding the terms, as this general one, It is impoffible for the fame thing to be, and not to be; or that which is the foundation of it, and is the eafier understood of the two, the fame is not different. By which account they will have legions of innate propofitions of this one fort, without mentioning any other. But fince no propofition can be innate, unless the ideas, about which it is, be innate, this will be to fuppofe all our ideas of colours, founds, taftes, figure, &c. innate, than which there cannot be any thing more oppofite to reafon and experience. Univerfal and ready affent, upon hearing and understanding the terms, is (I grant) a mark of felf-evidence; but felf-evidence depending not on innate impreffions, but on fomething elfe (as we fhall fhow hereafter), belongs to feveral propofitions, which nobody was yet fo extravagant as to pretend to be innate.

§ 19. Such less general Propofitions known before these univerfal Maxims.

NOR let it be faid, that thofe more particular felf-evident propofitions, which are affented to at first hearing, as, that one and two are equal to three; that green is not red, &c. are received as the confequences of those more univerfal propofitions, which are looked on as innate principles; fince any one who will but take the pains to obferve what paffes in the understanding, will certainly find that thefe, and the like lefs general propoftions, are certainly known, and firmly affented to by thofe who are utterly ignorant of thofe more general maxims; and fo, being earlier in the mind than those (as they are called) firft principles, cannot owe to them the affent, wherewith they are received at first hearing. $20. One and One equal to Two, &c. not general nor useful, anfwered.

If it be faid that these propofitions, viz. two and two are equal to four; red is not blue, &c. are not general maxims, nor of any great ufe; I anfwer, That makes nothing to the argument of univerfal affent, upon hear

ing and understanding: For if that be the certain mark of innate, whatever propofition can be found, that receives general affent as foon as heard and understood, that must be admitted for an innate propofition, as well as this maxim, That it is impoffible for the fame thing to be, and not to be; they being upon this ground equal. And as to the difference of being more general, that makes this maxim more remote from being innate; thofe general and abstract ideas being more ftrangers to our first apprehenfions than thofe of more particular felf-evident propofitions; and therefore it is longer before they are admitted and affented to by the growing understanding. And as to the usefulness of thefe magnified maxims, that perhaps will not be found fo great as is generally conceived, when it comes to its due place to be more fully confidered.

21. Thefe Maxims not being known sometimes till propofed, proves them not Innate.

BUT we have not yet done with affenting to propofitions at first hearing and understanding their terms; it is fit we first take notice, that this, inftead of being a mark that they are innate, is a proof of the contrary; fince it fuppofes, that feveral who understand and know other things, are ignorant of thefe principles till they are propofed to them; and that one may be unacquainted with these truths till he hears them from others. For if they were innate, what need they be propoied in order to gaining affent, when, by being in the understanding, by a natural and original impreffion (if there were any fuch) they could not but be known before? Or doth the propoling them print them clearer in the mind than nature did? If so, then the confequence will be, that a man knows them better after he has been thus taught them, than he did before. Whence it will follow, that these principles may be made more evident to us by others teaching, than nature has made them by impreffion; which will ill agree with the opinion of innate principles, and give but little authority to them; but, on the contrary, makes them unfit to be the foundations of all our other knowledge, as they are pre

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