themselves into our waking thoughts, or else caused by external objects fucceffively affecting our fenfes; and having from the revolutions of the fun got the ideas of certain lengths of duration, we can, in our thoughts, add fuch lengths of duration to one another as often as we please, and apply them, fo added, to durations paft or to come; and this we can continue to do on, without bounds or limits, and proceed in infinitum, and apply thus the length of the annual motion of the fun to duration fuppofed before the fun's or any other motion had its being; which is no more difficult or abfurd, than to apply the notion I have of the moving of a fhadow one hour to-day upon the fun-dial, to the duration of fomething laft night, v. g. the burning of a candle, which is now abfolutely feparate from all actual motion; and it is as impoffible for the duration of that flame for an hour last night to co-exist with any motion that now is, or ever fhall be, as for any part of duration, that was before the beginning of the world, to co-exist with the motion of the fun now. this hinders not, but that having the idea of the length of the motion of the fhadow on a dial between. the marks of two hours, I can as diftinctly measure in my thoughts the duration of that candle-light last night, as I can the duration of any thing that does now exist; and it is no more than to think, that had the fun fhone then on the dial, and moved after the fame rate it doth now, the fhadow on the dial would have paffed from one hour-line to another, whilft that flame of the candle lafted.

$29.

But yet

THE notion of an hour, day, or year, being only the idea I have of the length of certain periodical regular motions, neither of which motions do ever all at once exift, but only in the ideas I have of them in my memory, derived from my fenfes or reflection, I can with the fame eafe, and for the fame reason, apply it in my thoughts to duration, antecedent to all manner of motion, as well as to any thing that is but a minute or a day antecedent to the motion, that at this very moment the fun is in. All things paft are equally and

perfectly at reft; and to this way of confideration of them are all one, whether they were before the beginning of the world, or but yesterday; the measuring of any duration by fome motion, depending not at all on the real co-exiftence of that thing to that motion, or any other periods of revolution, but the having a clear idea of the length of fome periodical known motion, or other intervals of duration, in my mind, and applying that to the duration of the thing I would measure.

§ 30.

HENCE We fee, that some men imagine the duration of the world, from its firft exiftence to this prefent year 1689, to have been 5639 years, or equal to 5639 annual revolutions of the fun, and others a great deal more; as the Egyptians of old, who, in the time of Alexander, counted 23,000 years from the reign of the fun; and the Chineses now, who account the world 3,269,000 years old, or more; which longer duration of the world, according to their computation, though I should not believe to be true, yet I can equally imagine it with them, and as truly understand, and fay, one is longer than the other, as I understand, that Methufalem's life was longer than Enoch's. And if the common reckoning of 5639 fhould be true (as it may be as well as any other affigned), it hinders not at all my imagining what others mean, when they make the world 1000 years older, fince every one may with the fame facility imagine (I do not fay believe) the world to be 50,000 years old, as 5639, and may as well conceive the duration of 50,000 years, as 5639. Whereby it appears, that to the meafuring the duration of any thing by time, it is not requifite that that thing fhould be co-exiftent to the motion we meafure by, or any other periodical revolution; but it fuffices to this purpose, that we have the idea of the length of any regular periodical appearances, which we can in our minds apply to duration, with which the motion or appearance never co-existed.

§ 31.

FOR as, in the hiftory of the creation delivered by Mofes, I can imagine, that light exifted three days before

the fun was, or had any motion, barely by thinking that the duration of light, before the fun was created, was fo long as (if the fun had moved then as it doth now) would have been equal to three of his diurnal revolutions; fo, by the fame way, I can have an idea of the chaos, or angels, being created, before there was either light, or any continued motion, a minute, an hour, a day, a year, or 1000 years. For if I can but confider duration equal to one minute before either the being or motion of any body, I can add one minute more till I come to fixty; and by the fame way of adding minutes, hours, or years (i. e. fuch or such parts of the fun's revolution, or any other period whereof I have the idea), proceed in infinitum, and suppose a duration exceeding as many fuch parts as I can reckon, let me add whillt I will; which I think is the notion we have of eternity, of whofe infinity we have no other notion than we have of the infinity of number, to which we can add for ever without end.

632.

AND thus I think it is plain, that from those two fountains of all knowledge before-mentioned, viz. reflection and fenfation, we get the ideas of duration, and the meafures of it.

For, first, By obferving what paffes in our minds, how our ideas there in train conftantly fome vanish, and others begin to appear, we come by the idea of fueceffion.

Secondly, By obferving a distance in the parts of this fucceffion, we get the idea of duration.

Thirdly, By fenfation, obferving certain appearances, at certain regular and feeming equidiftant periods, we get the ideas of certain lengths or measures of duration, as minutes, hours, days, years, &c.

Fourthly, By being able to repeat thofe measures of time, our ideas of itated length of duration in our minds, as often as we will, we can come to imagine duration, where nothing does really endure or exift; and thus we imagine to-morrow, next year, or feven years

hence.

Fifthly, By being able to repeat any fuch idea of any length of time, as of a minute, a year, or an age, as often as we will, in our own thoughts, and adding them to one another, without ever coming to the end of fuch addition, any nearer than we can to the end of number, to which we can always add, we come by the idea of eternity, as the future eternal duration of our fouls, as well as the eternity of that infinite Being, which muft neceffarily have always existed.

Sixthly, By confidering any part of infinite duration, as fet out by periodical measures, we come by the idea of what we call time in general.

CHAP. XV.

OF DURATION AND EXPANSION, CONSIDERED TOGETHER.

TH

1. Both capable of greater and lefs.

HOUGH we have, in the precedent chapters, dwelt pretty long on the confiderations of space and duration, yet they being ideas of general concernment, that have fomething very abftrufe and peculiar in their nature, the comparing them one with another may perhaps be of ufe for their illuftration; and we may have the more clear and diftinct conception of them, by taking a view of them together. Distance or space, in its fimple abstract conception, to avoid confufion, I call expanfion, to distinguish it from extenfion, which by fome is used to express this distance only, as it is in the folid parts of matter, and fo includes, or at least intimates, the idea of body; whereas the idea of pure distance includes no fuch thing. I prefer alfo the word expanfion to space, becaufe space is often applied to distance of fleeting fucceffive parts, which never exist together, as well as to thofe which are permanent. In both these (viz. expanfion and duration), the mind has this common idea of continued lengths, capable of greater or lefs quantities; for a man has as clear an idea of

the difference of the length of an hour and a day, as of an inch and a foot.

§2. Expanfion not bounded by Matter.

THE mind, having got the idea of the length of any part of expanfion, let it be a fpan, or a pace, or what length you will, can, as has been faid, repeat that idea; and fo, adding it to the former, enlarge its idea of length, and make it equal to two fpans, or two paces; and so as often as it will, till it equals the diftance of any parts of the earth one from another, and increafe thus, till it amounts to the distance of the fun, or remotest star. By fuch a progreffion as this, fetting out from the place where it is, or any other place, it can proceed and pafs beyond all thofe lengths, and find nothing to stop its going on, either in or without body. It is true, we can easily in our thoughts come to the end of folid extenfion; the extremity and bounds of all body, we have no difficulty to arrive at; but when the mind is there, it finds nothing to hinder its progrefs into this endless expanfion; of that it can neither find nor conceive any end. Nor let any one fay, that beyond the bounds of body, there is nothing at all, unless he will confine GOD within the limits of matter. Solomon, whofe understanding was filled and enlarged with wisdom, feems to have other thoughts, when he fays, Heaven, and the heaven of heavens, cannot contain thee: And he, I think, very much magnifies to himself the capacity of his own understanding, who perfuades himself, that he can extend his thoughts farther than GOD exifts, or imagine any expanfion where he is not.

§3. Nor Duration by Motion.

JUST fo is it in duration. The mind having got the idea of any length of duration, can double, multiply, and enlarge it, not only beyond its own, but beyond the existence of all corporeal beings, and all the meafures of time, taken from the great bodies of the world, and their motions. But yet every one easily admits, that though we make duration boundless, as certainly it is, we cannot yet extend it beyond all being. GOD, every one cafily allows, fills eternity; and it is hard to find a rea