understands English, has presently in his mind distinct ideas, which are all but the different modifications of motion. Modes of motion anfwer thofe of extenfion : Swift and flow are two different ideas of motion, the measures whereof are made of the diftances of time and space put together; fo they are complex ideas comprehending time and fpace with motion.

§3. Modes of Sounds.

THE like variety have we in founds. Every articulate word is a different modification of found; by which we see, that from the fenfe of hearing by fuch modifications, the mind may be furnished with distinct ideas to almost an infinite number. Sounds alfo, befides the distinct cries of birds and beafts, are modified by diverfity of notes of different length put together, which make that complex idea called a tune, which a mufician may have in his mind when he hears or makes no found at all, by reflecting on the ideas of thofe founds fo put together filently in his own fancy.

§ 4. Modes of Calours.

THOSE of colours are alfo very various; fome we take notice of as the different degrees, or, as they are termed, fades of the fame colour. But fince we very feldom make affemblages of colours either for use or delight, but figure is taken in alfo, and has its part in it, as in painting, weaving, needle-work, &c. thofe who are taken notice of, do moft commonly belong to mixed modes, as being made up of ideas of divers kinds, viz. figure and colour; fuch as beauty, rainbow, &e.

$5. Modes of Tofte..

ALL compounded taftes and fniells are alfo modes made up of the fimple ideas of thofe fenfes. But they being fuch as generally we have no names for, are lefs taken notice of, and cannot be fet down in writing, and therefore must be left without enumeration to the thoughts and experience of my reader.

$ 6.

In general it may be obferved, that thofe fimple modes which are confidered but as different degrees of the fame fimple idea, though they are in themselves many of them very diftinct ideas, yet have ordinarily no distinct names, nor are much taken notice of as diftinct ideas,. where the difference is but very small between them. Whether men have neglected these. modes, and givenno names to them, as wanting measures nicely to diftinguish them, or because when they were fo diftinguished, that knowledge would not be of general or neceffary ufe, I leave it to the thoughts of others; it is fufficient to my purpose to show, that all our fimple ideas come to our minds only by fenfation and reflec tion; and that when the mind has them, it can various ly repeat and compound them, and fo make new complex ideas. But though white, red, or fweet, &c. have not, been modified or made into complex ideas, by feveral combinations, fo as to be named, and thereby. ranked into species; yet fome others of the fimple ideas, viz. thofe of unity, duration, motion, &c. above inftanced in, as alfo power and thinking, have been thus modified to a great variety of complex ideas, with names. belonging to them.

$7. Why fome Modes have, and others have not Names. THE reafon whereof, I fuppofe, has been this: That the great concernment of men being with men one amongst another, the knowledge of men and their actions, and the fignifying of them to one another, was most neceffary; and therefore they made ideas of actions very. nicely modified, and gave thofe complex ideas names, that they might the more easily record, and difcourse of thofe things they were daily converfant in, without long ambages and circumlocutions; and that the things they were continually to give and receive information about, might be the eafier and quicker understood. That this is fo, and that men in framing different complex ideas, and giving them names, have been much governed by the end of fpeech in general, (which is a very fhort and expedite way of conveying their thoughts

207 one to another) is evident in the names, which in feveral arts have been found out, and applied to feveral complex ideas of modified actions belonging to their feveral trades, for dispatch fake, in their direction or difcourfes about them; which ideas are not generally, framed in the minds of men not converfant about thefe operations. And thence the words that ftand for them, by the greatest part of men of the fame language, are not understood; v. g. colfbire, drilling, filtration, cobobation, are words ftanding for certain complex ideas, which being feldom in the minds of any but those few whose particular employments do at every turn fuggeft them to their thoughts, thofe names of them are not generally understood but by fmiths and chemifts, who having framed the complex ideas which these words ftand for, and having given names to them, or received them from others upon hearing of these names in communication, readily conceive thofe ideas. in their minds; as by cohobation all the fimple ideas of diftilling, and the pouring the liquor diftilled from any thing, back upon the remaining matter, and diftilling it again. Thus we fee that there are great varieties of fimple ideas, as of taftes and fmells, which have no names; and of modes many more, which either not having been generally enough obferved, or elfe not being of any great ufe to be taken notice of in the affairs and converse of men, they have not had names given to them, and fo pafs not for fpecies. This we shall have occasion hereafter to confider more at large, when we come to speak of words.

CHAP. XIX.

WHE

OF THE MODES OF THINKING.

1. Senfation, Remembrance, Contemplation, &c. HEŇ the mind turns its view inwards upon itfelf, and contemplates its own actions, thinking is the first that occurs. In it the mind obferves a

great variety of modifications, and from thence receives diftinct ideas. Thus the perception which actually accompanies, and is annexed to any impreffion on the body made by an external object, being diftinct from alk other modifications of thinking, furnishes the mind with a diftinct idea, which we call fenfation; which is, as it were, the actual entrance of any idea into the understanding by the fenfes. The fame idea, when it again recurs without the operation of the like object on the external fenfory, is remembrance; if it be fought after by the mind, and with pain and endeavour found, and brought again in view, it is recollection; if it be held there long under attentive confideration, it is contemplation; when ideas float in our mind, without any reflection or regard of the understanding, it is that which the French call reverie; our language has scarce a name for it; when the ideas that offer themselves (for, as I have obferved in another place, whilft we are awake, there will always be a train of ideas fucceeding one another in our minds) are taken notice of, and, as it were, registered in the memory, it is attention; when the mind with great earneftness, and of choice, fixes. its view on any idea, confiders it on all fides, and will not be called off by the ordinary folicitation of other ideas, it is that we call intention or ftudy: Sleep, without dreaming, is reft from all thefe; and dreaming itfelf, is the having of ideas (whilft the outward fenfes are ftopped, fo that they receive not outward objects with their ufual quickness) in the mind, not fuggefted by any external objects, or known occafion, nor under any choice or conduct of the understanding at all. And whether that, which we call ecftacy, be not dreaming with the eyes open, I leave to be examined.

§ 2.

THESE are fome few inftances of those various modes of thinking, which the mind may observe in itself, and fo have as diftinct ideas of, as it hath of white and red, a fquare or a circle. I do not pretend to enumerate them all, nor to treat at large of this set of ideas, whịch are got from reflection; that would be to make a vo

lume. It fuffices to my prefent purpose, to have shown here, by fome few examples, of what fort these ideas are, and how the mind comes by them; efpecially fince I fhall have occafion hereafter to treat more at large of reafoning, judging, volition, and knowledge, which are fome of the molt confiderable operátions of the mind, and modes of thinking.

§3. The various Attention of the Mind in Thinking. BUT perhaps it may not be an unpardonable digreffion, nor wholly impertinent to our present defign, if we reflect here upon the different fate of the mind in thinking, which those instances of attention, reverie and dreaming, &c. before-mentioned, naturally enough fuggeft. That there are ideas, fome or other, always prefent in the mind of a waking man, every one's experience convinces him, though the mind employs itself about them with feveral degrees of attention. Sometimes the mind fixes itself with fo much earneftnefs on the contemplation of fome objects, that it turns their ideas on all fides, remarks their relations and circumstances, and views every part fo nicely, and with fuch intention, that it fhuts out all other thoughts, and takes no notice of the ordinary impreffions made then on the fenfes, which at another feafon would produce very fenfible perceptions; at other times it barely obferves the train of ideas that fucceed in the understanding, without directing and pursuing any of them; and at other times it lets them pafs almoft quite unregarded, as faint fhadows that make no impreflion.

§ 4. Hence it is probable that thinking is the Action, not Effence of the Soul.

THIS difference of intention, and remiffion of the mind in thinking, with a great variety of degrees between earnest study, and very near minding nothing at all, every one, I think, has experimented in himfelf. Trace it a little farther, and you find the mind in fleep retired as it were from the fenfes, and out of the reach of those motions made on the organs of fenfe, which at other times produce very vivid and fenfible ideas. I need not for this inftance in those who fleep out whole