ftormy nights, without hearing the thunder, or feeing the lightning, or feeling the fhaking of the house, which are fenfible enough to those who are waking; but in this retirement of the mind from the fenfes, it often retains a yet more loose and incoherent manner of thinking, which we call dreaming; and last of all, found fleep closes the fcene quite, and puts an end to all appearances. This, I think, almoft every one has experience of in himself, and his own obfervation without difficulty leads him thus far. That which I would farther conclude from hence, is, that fince the mind can fenfibly put on, at several times, feveral degrees of thinking, and be sometimes even in a waking man fo remifs, as to have thoughts dim and obfcure to that degree, that they are very little removed from none at all, and at laft, in the dark retirements of found fleep, lofes the fight perfectly of all ideas whatsoever; fince, I fay, this is evidently fo in matter of fact, and conftant experience, I ask whether it be not probable that thinking is the action, and not the effence of the foul? fince the operations of agents will eafily admit of intention and remiffion, but the effences of things are not conceived capable of any fuch variation. But this by the by.

CHAP. XX.

A

OF MODES OF PLEASURE AND PAIN.

1. Pleafure and Pain fimple Ideas.

MONGST the fimple ideas, which we receive both from fenfation and reflection, pain and pleafure are two very confiderable ones: For, as in the body there is fenfation barely in itself, or accompanied with pain or pleafure, fo the thought or perception of the mind is fimply fo, or elfe accompanied alfo with pleafure or pain, delight or trouble, call it how you pleafe. Thefe, like other fimple ideas, cannot be defcribed, nor their names defined; the way of knowing. them is, as of the fimple ideas of the fenfes, only by

experience; for to define them by the presence of good or evil, is no otherwise to make them known to us, than by making us reflect on what we feel in ourselves, upon the several and various operations of good and evil upon our minds, as they are differently applied to or confidered by us.

2. Good and Evil, what.

THINGS then are good or evil, only in reference to pleasure or pain. That we call good, which is apt to caufe or increafe pleasure, or diminish pain in us; or else to procure or preferve us the poffeffion of any other good, or abfence of any evil; and on the contrary, we name that evil, which is apt to produce or increase any pain, or diminish any pleasure in us, or else to procure us any evil, or deprive us of any good. By pleasure and pain, I must be understood to mean of body or mind, as they are commonly diftinguished, though in truth they be only different conftitutions of the mind, fometimes occafioned by diforder in the body, fometimes by thoughts of the mind.

$3. Our Paffions moved by Good and Evil. PLEASURE and pain, and that which caufes them, good and evil, are the hinges on which our paffions turn; and if we reflect on ourselves, and obferve how thefe, under various confiderations, operate in us, what modifications or tempers of mind, what internal fensations (if I may fo call them) they produce in us, we may thence form to ourselves the ideas of our passions. $ 4. Love.

THUS any one reflecting upon the thought he has of the delight which any present or absent thing is apt to produce in him, has the idea we call love: For when a man declares in autumn, when he is eating them, or in fpring, when there are none, that he loves grapes, it is no more but that the taste of grapes delights him; let an alteration of health or couititution deftroy the delight of their tafte, and then he can be faid to love grapes no longer..

§ 5. Hatred.

On the contrary, the thought of the pain, which any thing prefent or abfent is apt to produce in us, is what we call hatred. Were it my bufinefs here to inquire any farther than into the bare ideas of our paffions, as they depend on different modifications of pleasure and pain, I fhould remark, that our love and hatred of inanimate infenfible beings, is commonly founded on that pleasure and pain which we receive from their use and application any way to our fenfes, though with their deftruction; but hurred or love, to beings capable of happiness or mifery, is often the uneafinefs or delight which we find in ourfelves, arifing from a confideration of their very being or happinefs. Thus the being and welfare of a man's children or friends, producing conftant delight in him, he is faid conftantly to lope them. But it fuffices to note, that our ideas of love and hatred are but the difpofitions of the mind, in refpect of pleasure and pain in general, however caufed

in us.

§ 6.

Defire.

THE uneafiness a man finds in himself upon the absence of any thing whofe prefent enjoyment carries the idea of delight with it, is that we call defire; which is greater or lefs, as that uneafinefs is more or lefs vehement. Where, by the by, it may perhaps be of fome ute to remark, that the chief, if not only fpur to human induftry and action, is uncafinefs: For whatever good is propofed, if its abfence carries no difpleafure nor pain with it, if a man be easy and content without it, there is no defire of it, nor endeavour after it; there is no more but a bare velleity, the term used to fignify the lowest degree of defire, and that which is next to none at all, when there is fo little uneafinefs in the abfence of any thing, that it carries a man no farther than fome faint wishes for it, without any more effectual or vigorous ufe of the means to attain it. Defire alfo is topped or abated by the opinion of the impoifibility or unattainablenefs of the good propofed, as far

as the uneafinefs is cured or allayed by that confideration. This might carry our thoughts farther, were it seasonable in this place.

§7. Joy.

For is a delight of the mind, from the confideration of the prefent or affured approaching poffeffion of a good; and we are then poffeffed of any good, when we have it fo in our power, that we can ufe it when we please. Thus a man almoft ftarved has joy at the arrival of relief, even before he has the pleasure of ufing it: And a father, in whom the very wellbeing of his children caufes delight, is always, as long as his children are in such a state, in the poffeffion of that good; for he needs but to reflect on it, to have that pleasure.

§ 8. Sorrow.

SORROW is uneafinefs in the mind, upon the thought of a good loft which might have been enjoyed longer, or the fenfe of a prefent evil.

$9. Hope.

HOPE is that pleafure in the mind, which every one finds in himself, upon the thought of a profitable future enjoyment of a thing, which is apt to delight him.

§ 10.

Fear.

FEAR is an uneafinefs of the mind, upon the thought of future evil likely to befal us.

§ 11. Despair.

any

DESPAIR is the thought of the unattainableness of good which works differently in mens minds, fometimes producing uneafmefs or pain, fometimes rest and indolency.

§ 12. Anger.

ANGER is uneafinefs or difcompofure of the mind, upon the receipt of any injury, with a prefent purpose of revenge.

§ 13. Envy.

EN is an uneafinefs of mind, caufed by the confideration of a good we defire, obtained by one we think fhould not have had it before us.

14. What Paffions all Men have.

THESE two last, envy and anger, not being caufed by pain and pleasure fimply in themselves, but having in them fome mixed confiderations of ourselves and others, are not therefore to be found in all men, because those other parts of valuing their merits, or intending revenge, is wanting in them; but all the reft terminated purely in pain and pleasure, are, I think, to be found in all men. For we love, defire, rejoice, and hope, only in respect of pleasure; we hate, fear, and grieve, only in refpect of pain ultimately: In fine, all thefe paffions are moved by things, only as they appear to be the caufes of pleasure and pain, or to have pleasure or pain fome way or other annexed to them. Thus we extend our hatred ufually to the fubject (at least if a sensible or voluntary agent) which has produced pain in us, because the fear it leaves is a constant pain; but we do not fo conftantly love what has done us good, because pleasure operates not fo ftrongly on us as pain, and becaufe we are not fo ready to have hope it will do fo again. But this by the by.

$15. Pleafure and Pain, what.

By pleafure and pain, delight and uneafinefs, I must all along be understood (as I have above intimated) to mean not only bodily pain and pleasure, but whatfoever delight or uneafinefs is felt by us, whether arifing from any grateful or unacceptable fenfation or reflection.

$ 16.

Ir is farther to be confidered, that in reference to the paffions, the removal or lefening of a pain is confidered, and operates as a pleafure; and the lofs or diminishing of a pleasure, as a pain.

§ 17. Shame.

THE paffions, too, have most of them in moft perfons operations on the body, and caufe various changes in it, which, not being always fenfible, do not make a neceffary part of the idea of each paffion; for, Shame, which is an uneafinefs of the mind upon the thought of having done fomething which is indecent, or will